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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates how the role of an adaptive governance framework, adapted 
from social-ecological transition (SET) theory, could assist in the challenges 
associated with electricity system decarbonisation and decentralisation through a 
case study of the National Electricity Market (NEM) in eastern Australia.  The NEM is 
currently undergoing change at the household, distribution and system level due to 
the rapid uptake of solar PV and increasingly, domestic battery storage.  By using a 
case study of an area where rapid change is happening, the thesis offers insights in 
the form of a general framework for adaptive governance that could assist 
policymakers in meeting decarbonisation targets in Great Britain. 
SET theory suggests that adaptive governance is needed within social-ecological 
systems (SES) to manage the transformation of a system that is locked-in to an 
undesirable state.  Adaptive governance is achieved by the empowerment of local 
actors to create local policy, thereby increasing the innovation potential of the local 
areas to meet the local policy strategy. Policy and innovation are then coordinated to 
meet an overarching national vision.   
The NEM is currently experiencing a form of carbon lock-in.  While the federal 
system of government has allowed State initiatives to incentivise the use of DER, a 
lack of a national vision and coordination of State policy and the innovations 
stemming from these policies has created challenges in maintaining the functionality 
of the electricity system.  Taking lessons learnt from the NEM case study and SET 
theory, this thesis suggests an adaptive governance framework that could assist in 
electricity system decentralisation, through the empowerment of local policy which is 
coordinated to meet a national vision.  
This has lessons for GB, in particular, because GB has set a target for net-zero 
emissions by 2050.  Reaching this target requires increasing the use of distributed 
energy resources (DER).  Enabling decentralisation to work in conjunction with the 
traditional centralised system requires new rules, new regulations, new markets and 
new institutions.  Taking lessons learnt from an energy system that has already 
undergone this type of change, an alternative approach for GB policymakers is 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In October 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a 
report on the increasing scale of environmental, social and economic impacts of 
climate change should global average temperatures rise above the 1.5⁰C limit.  The 
report stated, that ‘rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and 
infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems ’ will be 
required to reach the goal of keeping global average temperature rise to a maximum 
of 1.5⁰C (IPCC 2018 p.17).  This sentiment was then echoed by the International 
Energy Agency, which, in a press release of the 2019 World Energy Outlook, stated 
that if we wish to meet our climate targets then ‘the world urgently needs to put a 
laser-like focus on bringing down global emissions’ and that this ‘requires rapid and 
widespread changes across all parts of the energy system’ (IEA, 2019a). 
Globally, data from 2010 shows that electricity and heat production accounted for the 
highest levels of greenhouse gas emissions by sector (EPA, 2017).  Since 1992, 
when governments signed the Kyoto Protocol, decarbonisation efforts have 
concentrated predominantly on the electricity sector with renewable electricity in 
2018 accounting for 26.2% of global electricity production (REN21, 2019).  This 
production consists of an increase in capacity to over 33% RE in 2018 (15.8% from 
hydropower, 5.5% from wind, 2.4% from solar PV and 2.6% from other renewable 
sources (Figure 1-1-1)), up 5% from the previous year.  The IPCC report states that 
if we are to keep to a maximum of 1.5⁰C of average global warming then renewable 
generation will need to provide 70-85% of electricity production by 2050.  From the 
figures stated above, this suggests that the installation of RE capacity needs to 
accelerate considerably over the next 30 years. 
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Figure 1-1-1  Global electricity production by fuel type 2019.  26.2% of electricity was produced from RE sources, 
from an installed RE capacity of 33% of total capacity. (Source: REN21, 2019)  
In 2019, the GB Government set a legislated target of net-zero emissions by 2050 
(CCC, 2019). The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) has stated that to meet the 
net-zero target by 2050, renewable and low-carbon generation needs to be 
increased from a 50% share, as it is today in GB, to 95% in 2050 (ibid.). This growth 
is also needed to meet the additional expected electricity demand from heat pumps 
and electric vehicles as the transport and heat sectors decarbonise.  It is 
recommended that the extra demand is met by additional renewable generation and 
other low-carbon generation capacity and by increased resource and energy 
efficiency (ibid.). Therefore, decarbonising electricity is essential in reducing the 
emissions of the other energy sectors and this may increase the use of the electricity 
distribution system. 
To increase the share of renewable generation, the use of domestic solar and small-
scale wind and other distributed energy resources (DER) (including other demand-
side options, such as demand response and energy efficiency) are now becoming an 
important part of the solution for emission reduction in the electricity sector (Ofgem, 
2017a). The ‘rapid and far-reaching transitions’ (IPCC, 2018 p.17) that are needed 
encompass new technical solutions and challenges, and subsequently, new 
business models and new economic strategies.  Changes to the energy system may 
also require behavioural changes, such as the future electricity grid enabling, and 
requiring, the current, passive consumer to become engaged and active (Hoggett, 
2016).  This new type of customer could assist in meeting the net-zero target by 
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increasing their energy efficiency and reducing their demand for grid generated 
electricity through local generation and other demand response initiatives (Willis et 
al., 2019a). The reducing costs of DER allow customers, who were once enforced 
passive consumers, to now generate, store and trade their energy requirements – 
becoming a ‘prosumer’.  Local generation could allow customers to provide other 
grid services, such as demand response and frequency control, through means such 
as aggregation into a virtual power plant (VPP) (AEMO, 2019a) or to trade in a local 
energy market (Bray and Woodman, 2018).  Governance of the system needs to 
ensure that those customers who are not able to become prosumers also benefit 
from the energy transition and are not unfairly burdened with the costs of a changing 
system (Willis et al., 2019a). Changes within the electricity system require electricity 
system governance, that is ‘the policies, institutions, market and networks rules and 
incentives and the process/politics behind them ’ (Mitchell et al., 2016), to enable the 
positive social, economic and environmental changes that DER can bring, and be 
adaptive to react quickly to unexpected challenges and outcomes that may arise, 
whether positive or negative. 
The exact nature and timing of how system change may happen cannot be predicted 
since this depends on the governance and other enabling conditions such as new 
technology, falling technology costs and new business models (Willis et al., 2019b).  
Decarbonising energy affects energy system interactions across sectors and scales, 
but again the rate of change and what the resultant effects might be cannot be 
predicted accurately.  Research has suggested that to change the energy system 
from a predominantly carbon-based centralised system to one that is more 
decarbonised and can thus integrate centralised assets and networks alongside 
decentralised assets and networks, the governance surrounding the system needs to 
be flexible, or adaptive to enable change (Mitchell et al., 2016; Willis et al., 2019a). 
This is particularly relevant for the distributed area as this is where the majority of 
change is expected to occur (NIC, 2016). 
For this thesis, the ‘decentralised’ facets of the system are defined as the distribution 
system and the technologies and processes (including those related to decision-
making and customer involvement) that operate within the distributed area.  The 
‘centralised’ facet then includes transmission, large-scale generation and the central 
institutions that have traditionally governed and operated the energy system.   
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This thesis explores how governance needs to be adaptive to enable an evolving 
energy system, and for GB in particular, through a case study of the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) in eastern Australia, which is currently seeing a rapid 
uptake of domestic decentralised energy generation.  The results from the case 
study are used to suggest an adaptive governance framework for energy and applied 
to GB to explore how adaptive governance could be used in a GB context.  Section 
1.1 introduces the case study.  Section 1.2 then presents a general overview of why 
energy systems are now, in the majority, defined as centralised and how enabling 
DER and decentralisation, therefore, requires changes to system governance.  
Section 1.3 discusses whether current energy system governance can be 
considered as fit for purpose.  Section 1.4 presents the aims and objectives of the 
thesis and section 1.5 gives an overview of the thesis chapters. 
 
1.1 AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET AS A CASE STUDY 
The NEM is the largest of the four energy systems in Australia and covers the 
eastern states of Australia – Queensland (QLD), New South Wales (NSW), The 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Victoria (VIC), South Australia (SA), and 
Tasmania (TAS).  Unlike other federal countries such as the USA, the rules, 
regulations and wholesale market of all the NEM States, are operated by centralised 
institutions (Poulter, 2020).  The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) is 
responsible for the NEM rules; regulation for retail1, transmission and distribution is 
undertaken by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER)2; and the Australian Energy 
Market Operator (AEMO) is responsible for the wholesale market and transmission 
planning. However, the States are run by State governments which can create State 
policy, including energy policy (the governance structure of the NEM is discussed 
further in Chapter 5).  The NEM is currently experiencing changes to system 
operation and design caused by a rapid uptake of distributed energy resources 
(DER) i.e. domestic solar photovoltaics (PV) and battery storage. 
By the end of 2019, there were just over 2 million domestic solar photovoltaic (PV) 
installations in Australia, with the largest proportion of these in the states of South 
                                              
1
 Except in Victoria where the Essential Services Commission are sti l l responsible for retail regulation as Victoria did not jo in 
the National Energy Customer Framework (NECF) and Tasmania where the majority of energy assets are sti l l publically owned. 
2 Technical regulation is the responsibility of the State regulators 
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Australia (SA) and Queensland (QLD), where 32% of households in these States 
had installed a PV system (APVI, 2019a).  An average of the total of all of the 
Australian states in 2015, showed that just over 15% of Australian households had 
PV installed, rising to 23% by May 2019 (APVI, 2019b).  The large amount of PV in 
Australia has created opportunities for domestic storage companies such as Tesla, 
Enphase and Sonnen, which are competing for the Australian market (Parkinson, 
2015).  It could be expected that the demand for traditional generation may be 
reduced due to the falling costs of domestic storage (Mountain, 2018) and Australia’s 
excellent solar resource (Solargis, 2013), as many householders choose to generate 
and store some, if not all, of their electricity needs (Mountain, 2016; Simshauser, 
2016). 
The rapid uptake of PV and storage has caused challenges in the technical, 
economic and social parameters of the energy system.  Part of this challenge is the 
possibility of a so-called ‘utility death spiral’ (Stephen Lacey, 2014).  A death spiral is 
a feed-back loop that occurs when, due to rising electricity prices, consumers switch 
to on-site generation and/or leave suppliers.  This then leaves the retailer with either 
fewer customers, or less kWhs, from which to recoup costs and to pay for the fixed 
costs of the system i.e. network charges, thus having to raise prices which increases 
costs to those remaining consumers, and so on, until demand eventually collapses.   
Within energy, this phenomenon has been recognized as a utility death spiral and is 
a possibility in Australia due to the high level of DER installation. This is a cause for 
concern, not only for the electric utilities but also for those customers who are unable 
to install a DER system, as they are left to bear the rising costs (discussed further in 
section 7.2.1). 
Australia’s high level of DER installation was caused by separate and in some cases 
unforeseen events, (i) an initial, generous State Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) policy for solar 
PV, (ii) high and rising energy prices, (iii) rapid cost reductions in DER technologies 
and (iv) unexpected grid blackouts (leading to a government-initiated review of the 
security and reliability of the NEM, known as the Finkel review (Finkel et al., 2017)).  
These events led to DER uptake across Australia, and the focus of this case study, 
the NEM States, happening much quicker than anticipated.  Due to the unexpected 
speed of the uptake, this thesis discusses the limitations of the NEM’s centralised 
governance structure in adapting quickly enough to capture the new social, 
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economic and technical values that DER can bring.  Following the rapid uptake of 
DER, the thesis shows how governance in the NEM has become increasingly 
reactive, putting pressure on policymakers, the market institutions and regulators to 
constantly catch up with events rather than to define the desired endpoint and work 
out how best to get there. 
As will be discussed in Section 7.2.1, although some energy professionals in the 
NEM believe that the NEM is not currently in the grips of a ‘death spiral’, if NEM 
governance does not adapt to the evolution of the energy system, then others have 
suggested that the death spiral is still a possibility or is possibly occurring. The rapid 
uptake of DER has also caused further challenges which have affected NEM 
functionality.  The NEM is, therefore, an interesting case study because of the rapid 
change; the drivers behind that change; the impact on the energy system; the 
impacts on scale – whether people, local or national; the questions this raises and 
the lessons which can be learnt from this. It is also an interesting case study to 
understand the ability of governance to be flexible, or adaptive, and what adaptive 
solutions there might be. 
 
1.2 CENTRALISED ENERGY SYSTEMS AND THEIR GOVERNANCE  
The current governance and system structure of energy, both in Great Britain (GB) 
and in many countries worldwide, was created through reforms designed to 
maximise the economic efficiency of the large scale generation technologies and 
associated infrastructure and markets, through the increased centralisation of the 
system and its governance (Pollitt, 2012). Economic efficiencies in the energy sector 
in the 20th century led to the deployment of large-scale generation plant, with fossil 
fuels as the dominant primary energy source (Smil, 2017), and the development of 
transmission and distribution networks to transport energy from the generator to the 
consumer (Rutter and Keirstead, 2012).  The governance that surrounds the current 
system has evolved to suit the characteristics of this centralised system of 
generation and transport (Pollitt, 2012).   
Originally, the majority of centralised energy systems worldwide were government-
owned (Pollitt, 2012).  Following the interest in market-liberalisation ideals, and the 
‘shock' of the 1970’s oil crisis, many governments introduced further reforms to 
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maximise energy security, promote economic efficiency and growth, and 
encouraging innovation (ibid.).  These reforms led many OECD and other 
governments from leading developing countries to restructure their energy industries 
from state-owned corporations to private, competitive companies. In many cases, the 
natural monopoly elements (transmission and distribution) could be vertically 
separated from the potentially competitive elements (generation and retail).  These 
potentially competitive elements were separated and allowed to operate within 
markets.  Regulation of the monopoly elements was needed to prevent monopoly 
pricing and encourage efficiency. This led to the establishment of independent 
regulators for the economic and technical regulation of the monopolistic elements 
(Pollitt, 2012).   
In GB, renewable energy has been incorporated, to the extent that it has, by 
reducing centralised fossil fuel-based generation e.g. coal, and replacing some of 
this capacity with large, centralised renewable generation e.g. offshore wind (BEIS, 
2017).  The energy system has been able to adapt to some change and continues to 
operate in the traditional centralised manner. To be able to reach the net-zero target 
for the decarbonisation of electricity generation, heat and transport, the GB energy 
system needs to increase energy efficiency and embrace both centralised and 
decentralised renewable energy and increase energy efficiency and demand-side 
participation (Willis et al., 2019b).  Enabling decentralisation changes both system 
operation and design, particularly at the distribution level.   
Increasing the use of DER changes the way energy is produced and also how it uses 
the infrastructure of the system, as DER are connected to the electricity distribution 
grid.  Traditionally, electricity is generated by large centralised generating plant and 
sent via high voltage transmission lines and then to consumers via low voltage 
distribution grids. Reports suggest that by 2030, distribution grids need to completely 
change how they operate to incorporate the rise in DER (NIC, 2016; Ravens and 
Lawrence, 2017).  As the energy system evolves, the grid is expected to be 
comprised of a combination of both centralised and decentralised generation, with 
many industrial, commercial and domestic customers generating and storing part of 
their energy requirements, changing the energy flows from a one-way to a two-way 
system (Figure 1-1-2).  The University of Exeter’s IGov project has suggested that 
supporting such changes requires new institutions, changes to the responsibilities of 
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current institutions, and new markets and new methods of regulation (Mitchell et al., 
2016; Willis et al., 2019a). Increasing the use of DER alters system operations, both 
technically and economically; as mentioned, centralised governance coevolved to 
suit the efficient running of a an increasingly centralised system, so governance 
needs to reflect these same efficiencies for an increasingly decentralised system. 
 
 
Figure 1-1-2 Changing electricity flows on the future power system (NIC, 2016) 
As the energy system evolves to one which includes more decentralised resources, 
as in happening currently in many electricity systems worldwide (e.g. Krog and 
Sperling, 2019; Beermann and Tews, 2017; Sheldrick and Tsukimori, 2017), this 
changes the characteristics within the energy system (summarised in Table 1-1).  
Enabling decentralisation needs the governance of the system to be able to adapt to 
these changing characteristics, so avoiding the challenges currently being 
experienced in the NEM.  For the centralised and decentralised facets to work 
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together, there needs to be coordination between the wholesale and new distribution 
markets to ensure system reliability (see section 7.3.3) and operational coordination 
between the centralised and decentralised physical system as decentralised 
generation changes the demand for grid-supplied electricity, causing challenges to 
the security and system strength of the whole system (meaning the combined 
decentralised and centralised facets and is discussed further in section 7.1).    
Table 1-1  Comparison of the changing characteristics of the energy system as it moves to include 
decentralisation (source: Pow nall, 2019) 
Characteristics Traditional Energy System 
Characteristics 









Fossil and nuclear-based 
 
Decarbonised, multiple scales 
Energy flow 
 
Supply based, load following 
 










Linear, top-down system 
operation 
 










Clear lines between power, heat 
and mobility sectors, supply 
chain activities and business 
models 
 
Breaking down of demarcation 
lines and coalescing at the 





Distant from use 
 




Energy focused stakeholders 
 
Multiple stakeholders – data/IT, 
car manufacturers etc. 
 
The core argument of this thesis is that governance will need to become adaptive to 
(i) enable the power system suggested in Figure 1-2, (ii) to absorb the changing 
characteristics, without negatively affecting system security, reliability and 
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affordability and (iii) to react to unforeseen outcomes and events in a positive and 
timely manner. 
 
1.3 FIT FOR PURPOSE GOVERNANCE 
The growing use of energy since the industrial revolution to provide power, heat and 
transport services enables modern society to function and, as will be described in 
more detail in Chapter 2, allows energy to be defined as essential to modern living 
(Cook, 1971; Smil, 2017).  This co-evolution of energy systems and society has 
created energy systems that are dependent on ‘dirty’ energy and involving social, 
technical, economic, political and environmental aspects.  The multiple interactions 
between each of these parameters allow energy systems to be defined as complex 
systems (Bale et al. 2015). 
Due to this interdependence, and modern society needing energy to function, the 
energy system can be viewed as a complex, essential system. As a complex system, 
energy governance needs to recognise that as the current system decarbonises any 
changes made in one aspect can cause expected, or unexpected, interactions within 
other parts of the system (Oughton et al., 2018).  Reaching decarbonisation targets 
involves heat, transport and electricity and subsequently creates changes in the 
social, technical, economic, political and environmental parameters of the system.  
As an essential system, governance will need to ensure that, as these new 
interactions occur, the energy system continues to function securely, reliably and 
affordably. 
The increasing use of DER, both now and in the future, is a positive new 
development for the energy system. As well as helping to reduce carbon emissions, 
it is happening because of changing energy economics and it is increasingly 
connecting more people to the way they use energy and the way the energy system 
works.  As is discussed further in section 7.2.2, an engaged and active prosumer will 
be essential in enabling DER to benefit all customers.  However, the changing role of 
the consumer to a prosumer has also led to concerns about the public service 
obligation (PSO), one aspect of economic regulation.  The PSO is an important part 
of the supplier’s licence which ensures that vulnerable customers still have access to 
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energy.  Ensuring that energy remains affordable for all energy users may require 
changes to the method in which customers are charged for their energy use.  
The use of variable domestic DER is becoming a challenge to the incumbent utility 
business model and the traditional centralised governance structure.  For example, 
as new actors become involved in the energy system, so this changes the value 
streams within the system, away from the traditional system actors and industries, 
reducing the revenue available for traditional generation and supply assets, leaving 
the incumbent utilities attempting to protect their assets by slowing change to 
guarantee revenue (Lockwood et al., 2017).   
As the results from NEM case study in Chapter 7 show, enabling decentralisation to 
make a positive contribution to decarbonisation, overcome incumbency and to 
benefit all energy customers, requires new methods of designing energy policy, new 
rules and regulations, new distribution level markets and new methods of paying for 
energy, essentially new governance.  This thesis suggests that ongoing 
decentralisation both requires and stimulates a requirement for, new forms of 
governance (i.e. to fill the ‘distribution governance gap’) and that this new 
governance will be essential to overcome the incumbency within current 
governance. The newly evolved system (i.e. combining centralised and decentralised 
assets) requires new coordination between centralised and decentralised systems of 
assets and systems of governance. Moving from the current centralised energy 
system to the new coordinated, and evolved energy system is discussed in Chapters 
8 and 9. 
Governance needs to ensure that, as an essential system, the electricity system 
continues to function by protecting the centralised assets that are needed, but also to 
allow the positive social, economic and environmental contribution that 
decentralisation can bring. In particular, as energy systems evolve, governance 
needs to protect the functionality i.e. the security, reliability and affordability, of the 
system. 
Understanding that energy systems are essential and complex suggests that, as 
systems begin to evolve, governance needs to be able to adapt to system changes. 
In particular, system governance needs to enable the system to function even as 
unforeseen outcomes or occurrences happen.  Governance also needs to ensure 
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that all customers have equitable access to energy and recognise that changes to 
system interactions will be temporal and occur over different sectors and scales. The 
adaptive structure will need to work efficiently, both economically and technically to 
ensure affordability, reliability and security, for traditional centralised systems as well 
as incoming decentralised assets.  This allows governance to initiate, absorb and 
capture the benefits of energy system change wherever change is happening.  
In this case, it is important to understand whether the current governance structure 
is: 
 fit-for-purpose for an energy system that combines centralised and 
decentralised assets? 
 adaptive enough to absorb and capture the system-level benefits that new 
technologies and business models can bring for (i) all customers (including 
those that cannot become part of the new, smart distributed system), (ii) grid 
operation, (iii) markets and (iv) decarbonisation targets?   
 adaptive enough to deal with unforeseen events and occurrences, and 
 if not, what needs to be changed?  
In Chapter 2, this thesis reviews two transition and transformation theories, that of 
socio-technical transitions (STT) and social-ecological transitions (SET).  Both 
theories recognise the challenges associated with transitions of complex systems.  
However, Chapter 2 concludes that the theory of SET is more suitable for the 
changes that are currently being seen in energy, due to the similarities in the 
parameters of social-ecological systems and energy systems and the recognition 
that changes may be needed to the governance of the system to allow for a 
transformative change. This thesis will answer the broad questions above by 
applying the theory of adaptive governance from social-ecological transition theory to 
a case study of the NEM, which is undergoing rapid change at the distribution level. 
1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This PhD was designed to contribute to the IGov2 project (Willis et al., 2019b).  
IGov2 is a research project that questions the nature and dynamics of change within 
energy systems, concerning energy system governance and innovation.   The results 
from IGov2 suggested institutional, market and hierarchal changes needed within 
energy system governance in GB. It is not the aim of the thesis to identify adaptive 
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governance at all levels of the NEM as it would be beyond the capabilities of the 
study to produce a framework for governance for the entire energy industry in 
Australia, as has been done in GB by the IGov project  (Mitchell et al., 2016; Willis et 
al., 2019a).  It is, therefore, the aim of this work to study the adaptiveness of 
governance i.e. ‘the policies, institutions, market and networks rules and incentives 
and the process/politics behind them’ (Mitchell et al., 2016) of the NEM, to create an 
adaptive governance framework which could enable decentralisation and can 
coordinate with the traditional system and the new centralised institutions as 
suggested by the results of the IGov2 project.  The framework suggested has been 
created through research of both the theoretical framework taken from social-
ecological literature and its practical application in water and food systems, and, by 
applying this to a case study of the NEM in Australia creating a possible governance 
framework for decentralising energy systems.  Australia was chosen as a case study 
area due to the rapid uptake of DER at a household level and the lessons that could 
be learnt from the effect of this uptake on system governance for GB. 
As a member of the IGov2 research group, I attended meetings, workshops and 
conferences between 2016 and 2019, focussing on future markets, regulation, 
direction setting, coordination, and the importance of local authorities in the future 
energy system.  The focus of the IGov project was to understand how changes to 
governance could enable the decarbonisation of the GB energy system.  The project 
employed analyses of energy system change in countries/areas beyond GB, namely 
California, New York, Germany and Australia, to take lessons learnt for best practice 
for the governance of decarbonising energy systems.  The insights from the case 
studies helped to inform the final project results (Mitchell et al., 2019). 
Results from the initial IGov project (Mitchell et al., 2016) suggested that current GB 
governance was not fit-for-purpose and that, for the changes needed to meet 
decarbonisation targets, new institutions, markets and practices would be required.  
A report was produced for IGov2 suggesting new roles for existing institutions and 
the new institutions that were needed to enable energy system change.  The need 
for changes to governance has also been recognised among industry actors, where 
the Open Networks project is researching the future role of the distribution networks, 
a distribution market and the integration of new business models (ENA, 2017a).   
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The thesis assesses the practicalities of adaptive governance within an energy 
system, employing a case study of Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM).   
This thesis develops the principles of adaptive governance for energy system 
change through the means of the NEM case study by employing the research 
questions: 
 What factors are driving the uptake of DER in Australia? 
 What has been the NEM governance response to the uptake of DER? 
 Following Unruh’s (2000) ideas of carbon lock-in, how does the history of the 
Australian path-dependent coevolution of energy systems and technology 
make it more or less inclined to be adaptive?   
 To what extent do the principles for adaptive governance from SET theory 
feature in the Australia case study and if present, how have they enabled a 
positive contribution to the changes being seen?   
 What are the regulatory and governance lessons to be learnt for GB? 
The results of the research questions are discussed to create a framework for 
adaptive governance for practical application and to assist policymakers for GB 
energy system decentralisation. 
 
1.5 OVERVIEW 
This thesis is structured over 10 Chapters, Chapter 2 provides the context and looks 
at the theory of transitions; how we should define an energy system for transition 
purposes; and the arguments for the transition theory which provides a better 
understanding of transition versus transformation and what is needed to create a 
successful transformation.   This chapter will also identify gaps within the literature 
for the use of adaptive governance for energy system change and introduce the 
research questions to answer these gaps.   
Chapter 3 establishes the methodological processes for answering the research 
questions.  It provides the rationale for using mixed methods and the use of a single 
case study to provide a narrative and the value of this within social science research.  
The Chapter sets out the approach to the research and justifies the identification of 
the interviewees within the case study area.  
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Chapters 4 through to 7, provide the results of the NEM case study. Chapter 4 
introduces the case study area and tracks the drivers for the rapid uptake of DER in 
Australia between 2010 and 2018. The Chapter investigates the technical, political, 
environmental, economic and social drivers.  The chapter discusses that it was an 
unexpected combination of all these drivers that led to the rapid uptake of DER in the 
NEM.  The Chapter concludes that, although this can be seen as a success, the 
unexpected speed of uptake led to further challenges in the electricity system, due to 
the issues investigated and discussed in Chapters 5-7.   
Chapter 5 traces the history of the NEM and its governance to provide insight into 
the current governance structure, including any changes to governance following the 
Finkel review. It introduces the reforms that have led to the current centralised 
governance structure of the NEM, and the vested interests of some State 
governments.  The chapter then discusses why this centralised structure and the 
vested interests of some of the States have led to difficulties introducing new 
reforms, as recommended by the Finkel review, that would enable decentralisation to 
create whole-system benefits.  Chapter 6 provides an insight into the influence of 
the coal industry on Australia’s energy system and its governance, and the 
difficulties for decarbonisation due to lock-in and the vested interests of the 
government. It discusses how the national government's support of the coal industry 
has helped to create ‘carbon lock-in’ of the NEM.  The chapter then discusses how 
the federal system of government has allowed some States that have a positive 
decarbonisation agenda, to counter the national government's position. Chapter 7 
looks at the challenges and governance responses due to the expansion of DER, 
until September 2019.  The chapter discusses that, although the NEM has been 
successful in the adoption rates of DER, this success has created challenges 
throughout all the parameters of the system, due to the inflexibility of current 
governance, and that this inflexibility can be partly blamed on the influence of the 
coal industry on NEM policy.  
Chapter 8 considers the principles of adaptive governance in relation to the NEM 
case study and its application for energy system decentralisation.  It discusses how 
some principles of adaptive governance were present in the NEM and the benefits 
that have been realised from these.  It also discusses how challenges arose due to 
the lack of adaptive principles in other areas of governance.  By taking lessons learnt 
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from both the positive and negative aspects of NEM governance, the chapter 
suggests principles for adaptive governance by that may be applied for energy 
system change elsewhere. 
Chapter 9 applies the principles from Chapter 8 to Great Britain as a guide to 
policymakers.  The chapter suggests a framework for adaptive governance that 
could be used to assist in reaching the 2050 net-zero target. Chapter 10 concludes 




2. TRANSITION THEORIES FOR CHANGE WITHIN 
SYSTEMS  
Chapter One introduced the ideas that DER will be necessary for energy system 
decarbonisation efforts and that governance is needed to complement this relative 
shift towards decentralisation.  The chapter introduced the energy system as 
essential and complex, and that changes within the energy system can cause 
multiple reactions due to this complexity.  In this Chapter, Section 2.1 briefly 
describes the history of energy systems and society and discusses further how this 
coevolution has created a system that is essential to modern societies.  It then 
summarises why energy can be defined as a complex system and identifies the 
system parameters and the interactions between them. Section 2.2 reviews 
transition theories and introduces the relevance of using social-ecological transition 
theory for managing the evolution of the energy system.   
Complex system theory suggests that changes in one part of the system may have 
consequences, seen or unforeseen, in another part of the system due to the complex 
dynamics within it (Meadows, 2009; Oughton et al., 2018).  Due to these system 
complexities, changing the energy system, in the time available as set out by the 
IPCC, from its current top-down, fossil fuel-based, centralised structure (see Table 
1-1) to one which also incorporates decentralisation, will not be a simple task.  
Enabling the rapid change needed in the energy system requires a governance 
framework that can adapt to the consequences of rapid change. 
The complexity of energy transitions is recognised within academia, not least within 
the literature on socio-technical transitions (STTs) (Berkhout et al., 2003; Foxon et 
al., 2010; Geels, 2011, 2002).  In 2002, Geels (Geels, 2002) introduced the Multi-
Level Perspective (MLP) as an analytical tool for studying technological transitions, 
which is discussed further in section 2.2.1.  Alternative literature for complex systems 
transition and its management, this time concerning the sustainability of ecosystems, 
is social-ecological transitions (SET) theory.  SET theory concentrates on the 
mitigation of environmental sustainability issues such as climate change (Engle, 
2011; Folke et al., 2005; Foxon et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2010; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; 
Walker et al., 2004).  Within SET, adaptive capacity i.e. the ability of a system and 
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it’s actors to adapt to change is recognised, as is the need for adaptive governance 
should a system become locked-in to an undesirable state (Westley et al., 2011; 
Foxon, 2011; Smith and Stirling, 2010; Foxon et al., 2009).   
This chapter discusses why the principles for adaptive governance (AG) from SET 
may be more relevant for energy system change than the transition management 
approach from socio-technical transitions and introduces the research questions 
which will help create an AG framework for practical application.  
 
2.1 DEFINING ENERGY SYSTEMS 
‘Modern industrial society is totally dependent on high rates of consumption of 
natural gas, petroleum and coal’ 
(Cook, 1971) 
Before a strategy to further decarbonise the energy system can be decided, the type 
of energy system, the elements within that system and how they interact – the 
parameters of the system - need to be understood and defined.  This will help to 
create a framework for changes to the energy system that acknowledges, and works 
with, the system parameters to enable energy system decarbonisation. This section 
will briefly describe why energy can be defined as essential and complex and identify 
the system parameters. 
2.1.1 Why energy can be defined as an essential system 
‘The history of human culture can be viewed as the progressive development of new 
energy sources and their associated conversion technologies ’ (Hall et al., 2003 pp. 
318). Smil (2017) noted that energy transitions have always been a part of human 
life.  From the first use of biomass for cooking, from the original windmills and 
watermills to the steam engine, electricity and the internal combustion engine, 
energy has vastly improved economic productivity as well as the living and working 
conditions of modern societies (Smil, 2017).   
The first industrial revolution changed population geographies, as economic, political 
and social changes occurred resulting in rising urbanisation. The larger population 
densities in the towns and cities created areas of high energy needs.  Providing 
goods and services for these growing population centres required an increase in the 
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use of transport and power (Smil, 2017).  Gradually the internal combustion engine, 
and the use of liquid fuels for transport, overtook coal-fired steam engines, barges 
and traditional horsepower.  Gas use increased for heating and cooking as pipelines 
enabled gas to be transported over longer distances (Smil, 2017).   
As the health and wealth of the newly industrialised nations grew, so did their use of 
energy (Cook, 1971).  By 1971, 30% of the world’s population was consuming 80% 
of the world's energy (ibid.).  An increase and reliance on hydrocarbon energy (Hall 
et al., 2003) allowed for progress in medicine, food production, industrial processes, 
transportation, living standards, and communication, among other things (Smil, 
2017) but also created path dependency between a ‘successful’ society and energy 
intensive industries (Fouquet, 2016).  In developing societies the positive health 
benefits of reducing the use of solid fuels ‘in situ’ for cooking and moving to a 
modern energy system has also been noted (e.g. Smith et al., 2013).  Increasingly, it 
is the services that rely on energy that provide some of Maslow’s (1943) foundations 
for society’s physiological (e.g. food, water, shelter), and safety and security (e.g. 
health, employment, property) needs.  
These advances have contributed to the exponential growth of the population on the 
planet, from one billion people at the start of the industrial revolution to two billion by 
the 1920s and nearly 8 billion today. Providing the services that support such a huge 
population, relies on energy. Therefore, this reliance on energy to provide our basic 
needs, which in turn, contributes to the economic growth of a nation, allows energy 
to be defined as essential to modern living. 
 
2.1.2 Energy as a complex system   
The coevolution of energy systems and society have created a system that 
comprises multiple interactions between actors and technologies.  Energy systems 
are also influenced by politics and economics, as global policy to reduce the 
environmental effects of climate change, changes the value streams within energy 
markets (Karl, 2004).  Changes to these value streams need to account for the 
influence of incumbent actors over changes to energy policy, as these actor’s 
business models have been designed around the traditional fossil-fuel-based, 
centralised system (Lockwood et al., 2017; Unruh, 2000).  It is these multiple 
33 
parameters and the interactions between them and their sub-systems, and the 
influence of the actors in them, that give rise to uncertain system-level outcomes so 
that energy can be understood as an example of a complex system (Goldthau and 
Sovacool, 2012).  
How energy is generated and supplied is influenced by societal preferences and 
needs.  The energy system has evolved to provide heat, power and transport and 
the means to transport that energy through infrastructure.  This co-evolution, as 
described in Section 2.1.1, illuminates the social and technical linkages of the energy 
system.  
There are other interlinking elements to the energy system as well as the social and 
technical.  As mentioned, innovations in the use of energy enabled industrialisation 
which in turn increased the wealth of the industrialised nations.   Energy is traded 
globally, so fluctuations in the market price for energy can affect world economies, 
and the societies they support, in positive or negative ways (Karl, 2004).  The 
supporting global and national infrastructure for the generation and supply of energy 
has grown to complement the fossil-fuel-based system.  Changes within this 
supporting infrastructure change the value streams within the energy system.  For 
example, renewable energy has been shown to reduce the wholesale price of energy 
– the merit-order effect (McConnell et al., 2013; Ray et al., 2010) - changing the 
dynamics of the wholesale market and the investment conditions for new electricity 
generation (Alba et al., 2017).  Changes to the energy system, and its markets, 
alters the value streams and costs of different energy services and resources, 
locally, nationally and globally, and so the economic element of energy also needs to 
be considered as energy systems change. 
Current energy policy is influenced by the global need to reduce greenhouse gases, 
alongside sustainable development goals such as energy justice and security 
concerns. Energy policy is also influenced by the institutions, companies and 
organisations that have grown alongside the fossil-fuel-based energy system 
(Lockwood et al., 2017).  The influence of these incumbent groups over any changes 
to the energy system has been recognised as one of the elements of carbon lock-in 
(Unruh, 2000).  Changes to the energy system will need to recognise and reduce, 
the existing influence of some energy system stakeholders.  It is not possible to think 
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about changing energy system dynamics without also including the effects of politics 
on change because of the distributional effects, both negative and positive. 
Energy also has an environmental effect.  The burning of fossil fuels causes climate 
change, which has environmental, social and economic impacts (IPCC, 2018).  
Extraction and processing of the resources needed for energy systems can have 
detrimental effects on the local ecology and environment, increasing water and air 
pollution (Karl, 2004).  The technology drivers needed to help stabilise carbon 
emissions may also have other environmental impacts and so these impacts also 
need to be considered when addressing system change e.g. the use of lithium for 
battery storage. 
Energy systems can be defined by their social, technical, economic, political and 
environmental parameters. The functionality of a complex system is dependent on 
the multitude of interactions between the parameters of the whole system, including 
sub-systems (Bale et al., 2015).  A complex system can learn, evolve, or be locked 
into a path-dependent cycle, using the linkages which are spread within and through 
the parameters of the entire system (Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012; Meadows, 2009; 
Unruh, 2000).  There are numerous linkages and interactions within energy systems.  
For example, 
 Society’s energy demand has shaped the infrastructure needed to supply that 
demand (Rutter and Keirstead, 2012; Smil, 2017).   
 The resource used to generate energy can have positive or negative 
environmental and economic consequences (Karl, 2004).  
 Policy and society dictate the necessity, speed and direction of system 
change, which in turn influences the demand for energy, and the infrastructure 
and resource used (IPCC, 2018; Smil, 2017).   
 Incumbent’s economic interests in resisting change can slow the speed of 
change (Lockwood et al., 2017).   
Bale et al (2015 pp. 152) suggest that energy systems can be described as complex 
adaptive systems as they have ‘interrelated, heterogeneous elements (agents and 
objects)’ which have no autonomous control and may be self-organising, non-linear, 
emergent and may have co-evolved. This allows any introduction of a new element 
to cause repercussions with further objects or agents within the system (ibid.).   
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Due to the combination of these characteristics, as a complex adaptive system, 
energy systems can be difficult to predict, steer and manage towards sustainable 
futures. Indeed, as energy systems begin decentralise this increases the complexity 
through the introduction of further objects and agents and increasingly shifts them 
from a traditional ‘hierarchal system’ to one which is becoming polycentric (Wolsink, 
2020). Therefore the inherent unpredictability, such as emergence and disruption 
(Winskel et al., 2019), of an increasingly polycentric energy system can frustrate 
current energy system governance (Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012) as the evolution 
of the system, and the system itself, may enter into unexpected, or unintended, 
states (Oughton et al., 2018).  This unpredictability of complex system change 
suggests that governance will need to be flexible (Mitchell et al., 2016), or adaptive 
(Geels et al., 2019), to react to these emergent and disruptive pressures. 
2.2 TRANSITION THEORY FOR CHANGE WITHIN COMPLEX SYSTEMS  
Among the many theories that offer perspectives into processes of change in 
complex systems, two are that of socio-technical transition (STT) theory and social-
ecological transition (SET) theory. STT theory has been applied to energy transitions 
but there have been criticisms in the use of STT and the multi-level perspective 
(MLP), and this will be discussed further in Section 2.2.1.  Section 2.2.2 suggests an 
alternative avenue for energy transitions, by taking lessons from SET which, 
although recommended as an interesting avenue for research (Goldthau, 2014), has 
gained little traction in energy transitions until recently (e.g. Akamani, 2016; Geels et 
al., 2019; Brisbois, 2020).   
2.2.1 Socio-technical transitions  
Building on Rip and Kemp’s (1998) model on socio-technical transitions, Geels 
(2002) developed the multi-level perspective (MLP).  He suggested that the transition 
would occur as changes in distinct ‘levels’ of systems:  
1. landscape – macro-pressures which are beyond the influence of the regime 
and niche actors 
2. the current socio-technical regime – a combination of current technologies, 
policy, knowledge, culture, infrastructure and markets (meso) 
3. advancement of technology in the niche level – for new/radical technologies at 
the beginning of their development (micro). 
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The MLP (illustrated in Figure 2-1) suggests that landscape pressures would 
destabilise the current regime and open a ‘window of opportunity’ for niche 
technologies to become established.  As a new niche technology is adopted over 
time to become the ‘norm’, the socio-technical regime then stabilises, causing a 
transition shift, with the new technology and regime influencing the landscape level. 
The MLP describes a progression as new technologies that are better able to answer 
a consumer need change, over time, the regime and landscape. 
 
Figure 2-1 The multi-level perspective (Geels, 2002) 
In the current energy transition, these system levels as described by the MLP could 
be characterised by global priorities (Foxon et al., 2010; Geels, 2011; Verbong and 
Geels, 2010).  For example, the landscape-level - climate and global policy to 
mitigate the effects of climate change; the regime – the incumbent energy 
companies and infrastructure, individual countries’ energy policy, energy markets 
and consumer choice; the niche – new renewable energy technologies; and it would 
be possible to manage elements of these boundaries to ensure a smooth transition 
to a new energy future (Kemp et al., 2007; Loorbach, 2010; Rotmans et al., 2001; 
Smith et al., 2005).  
This landscape pressure – the acknowledgement of the speed of anthropological 
climate change - drives global energy policy. Previous transitions, due to technical 
innovations, had no set time limit.  These previous transitions were due to a change 
in resource -  from biomass (wood) to coal, then oil and then gas -  rather than a 
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societal need to reduce carbon emissions, and took place over at least three 
generations (Smil, 2017).  The need to reduce global carbon emissions to avoid the 
consequences of climate change means that there is a time limit on the current 
transition and therefore the concept of ‘over time’ needs to change (Sovacool, 2016). 
At the regime level, social movements have demanded a change from dirty energy 
but existing incumbent technologies and infrastructure have resisted this change 
(Lockwood et al., 2017).  These incumbents are also able to influence future political 
objectives through the use of lobbying (Kuzemko et al., 2016). Within the 
technological niche, an individual country’s energy policy has provided ‘windows of 
opportunity’ for new technologies, ahead of what would be a normal transition 
process (ibid.). Unlike previous energy system transitions, the current transition is 
landscape, regime and niche led, rather than just led by technical innovation at the 
niche level.  Pressures are occurring at all levels, as defined by the MLP, rather than 
just pressure from the landscape level, suggesting that the MLP may not be the best 
approach to understanding how the current energy transition may proceed. 
The STT approach has been used as the basis for proposals of how to govern 
energy transitions more effectively. Proponents of STT theory believe that the use of 
transition management (TM) could be used on elements of the transition to push 
towards a cleaner energy system (e.g. Kemp et al., 2007; Loorbach, 2010; Rotmans 
et al., 2001).  They recommend that by managing all levels of governance, and by 
the use of experimentation and learning, that niche technologies could be 
encouraged that would fit into the long-term strategy.    
TM has been used in the Netherlands (Kern and Smith, 2008).  However, problems 
occurred due to the focus on the technological aspects, without recognising the 
influence of society and politics on transitions (ibid.).  Due to the influence of the 
fossil fuel industry on the national transition taskforce advisory board, the outcome of 
the intended transition to renewable energy was focussed more on economic 
efficiency rather than institutional changes and structural innovation, which were 
needed to achieve an increase in RE generation (ibid.).  This agrees with one of the 
criticisms of the MLP, in that it did not recognize the effect of politics and power on 
transitions and was too focused on technological communities (Genus and Coles, 
2008; Smith et al., 2005).  
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Stirling (2014b pp.1) cautions against the use of TM in that historically it is ‘unruly, 
bottom-up ‘transformations’ rather than top-down structured ‘transitions’ that typically 
achieve the most profound (sometimes rapid) radically progressive social changes ’.  
It is these transformations which lead to an effective change as social movements 
need to challenge the resistance of incumbent companies. Stirling (2014b) 
recognized that in energy systems, rather than a system transition, there is a need 
for institutional transformation and that this type of transformation would counter the 
inertia of the incumbents, whose influence can challenge change, as seen in the 
Netherlands example (Kern and Smith, 2008). 
Unruh (2000) recognizes this incumbency and suggests that it is the influence of 
these actors within energy system governance that create the carbon lock-in of the 
institutions and technologies in the original energy system.  He suggests that this 
carbon lock-in will slow any transition of new technologies and actors as incumbents 
protect their position within the energy system – which points at the need for 
institutional transformation, as suggested by Stirling (2014b). The complexities of 
energy transitions are discussed by Berkhout et al (2003), who suggest that it is 
social movements who put pressure on the regime from the macro-level that have 
forced a window of opportunity for the niche innovations to come through.  It is 
discussed that these socio-political actors see that their efforts are best used in 
destabilizing the incumbent regime, allowing an avenue for the successor, thus 
forcing a top-down transformation.   Geels (2014), by bringing the idea of politics and 
power into the MLP, agrees that the resistance of the incumbent regime and their 
ability to influence policy is slowing down the shift to a decarbonised future and the 
adoption of green technologies from the niches.  Geels (2014) also states that to 
progress with the inclusion of new, green technologies the regime would need to be 
de-stabilised.  This discussion – that incumbency within socio-technical systems 
needs to be addressed and that any transition requires the previous social-technical 
system to be removed – suggests that the system will need to be transformed but 
there is little understanding of how a managed transformation may be achieved.   
Other criticisms to the MLP framework recognize the bias that transitions would 
begin from the bottom up, with niche innovations leading the way (Genus and Coles, 
2008; Smith et al., 2005). For a traditional technical transition, such as from the 
horse and cart to the motor car, this is true.  However, for renewable energy, others 
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suggest that it was social movements that initiated a change within the regime level 
which then allowed entry for the niche innovations. For example, the start of the 
German Energiewende was initiated by social movement groups taking control of 
local electricity networks (Morris and Jungjohann, 2016).  In Denmark ‘Folk High 
Schools’ designed the first wind turbines in response to the 1973 oil crisis and a 
desire to find alternative energy sources to nuclear power (Toke, 2011). It has been 
suggested that the transition to a sustainable energy future would come from these 
types of social movements rather than technological innovation (Stirling, 2014b).       
For current energy system change, pressures are coming from every level as 
defined by the MLP - landscape pressures of time-limiting climate change and 
subsequent climate policy; regime pressures from social movements and niche 
pressures from innovative technologies and ideas.  This is contrary to the idea of 
niche innovations and a ‘window of opportunity’ leading to a steady transition, as 
suggested by the MLP.     
The MLP is a useful descriptor for explaining how levels interact within energy 
systems and how transitions take place, but it is limited in its recognition of the 
complexities within the modern energy system.  Although recognizing the resistance 
of the incumbent regime (Geels, 2014), the MLP does not suggest how to manage 
against a political climate which does not favour change, or how to transform to a 
completely new system. The MLP is also basing its theories on historical energy 
transitions, initiated by fuel economics and technical innovations, rather than a move 
to a sustainable system. It could be suggested that the MLP does not fit with the 
current energy system change of a forced transition to meet decarbonisation targets 
within a prescribed timeframe, and which may require political, societal, 
environmental and economic changes, as well as technical change. The incumbency 
within the energy system will also make a transition difficult (Unruh, 2000). For 
example, this incumbency may allow the uptake of DER to create a possible death 
spiral for incumbent utilities unless there is the transformational change to the way 
the energy system operates, as suggested by Stirling (2014b).  Regulators, 
companies etc. will have to have a timely recognition that change is necessary but is 
also likely to affect their business model in the future.   
Energy system change may require the governance of the system to be adaptive – 
have an ‘adaptive capacity’ to respond to these known multiple pressures and future 
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unknowns (Berkhout et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2005).  Berkhout et al (2003) and 
Smith et al (2005) refer to the adaptive capability functions of a technological regime 
and use this as a basis for assessing it’s adaptive capacity.  However, due to the 
complexity of the energy system, all system parameters will be affected and so these 
need equal consideration.  Due to the complex nature of the energy system, system 
governance needs to be adaptive to these future unknowns, thereby allowing and 
managing change, whether transitional or transformational, while still protecting the 
functionality of an essential system.   
In recognition of these criticisms, and the need to protect system functionality, this 
thesis suggests that a social-ecological transitions (SET) framework may be more 
applicable to the type of change that is needed within energy.  I argue that SET is 
able to offer more insights into how change within energy as an essential and 
complex system may take place and that the theory provided within SET literature 
offers an alternative approach to understanding whether transition or transformation 
is needed.  SET achieves this by assessing the adaptive capacity of a system and 
suggesting principles for adaptive governance that can manage a transformation, 
should a transformation be needed or is happening.  
2.2.2 Relevance of social-ecological transitions for energy 
Similar to socio-technical systems, social-ecological systems (SES) are complex 
systems made from diverse multiple layers, involving the ecosystem landscape as 
well as the social actors, institutions, culture, politics and the technology needed 
within the ecological systems to provide sustainability for water and land use (Engle, 
2011; Westley et al., 2011).  Unlike the MLP, social-ecological transition theory 
recognizes the effect of politics on transitions and includes technology, not as the 
cause of the transition but as one part of, or a solution for, a disturbance (Walker et 
al., 2004; Westley et al., 2011). So, like energy systems, the parameters of social-
ecological systems involve social, technical, environmental, economic and political 
levels.   
In the same vein as STT theory, SET theory recognizes resilience and adaptability 
within a transition, but unlike the MLP and more in agreement with Stirling (2014c), 
SET recognizes that to move to a new desired system then the old system may need 
to be transformed (Folke et al., 2005; Walker et al., 2004; Westley et al., 2011).  
Within the SET literature, authors identify the nature of adaptability within a system, 
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its governance and its social actors (Folke et al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2010; Pahl-
Wostl, 2009; Schultz et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2004). The authors suggest that 
adaptability within the system needs to be assessed, to understand if this 
adaptability allows the system to transition to a preferred system through learning 
and flexibility, or whether a transformation of the entire system is needed.   
As discussed previously, within the MLP there is limited consideration of the time 
limits associated with climate change (Sovacool, 2016).  Time limits are an important 
consideration within SETs, as ecological systems are being disturbed by the speed 
of climate change.  Climate change has led to intermittent rainfall, increased flooding 
and droughts putting increased pressure on water and land use (Engle and Lemos, 
2010; Westley et al., 2011).  Within SET, and similar to transition management used 
within STT, management has been needed to ensure that social-ecological systems 
(SES) are able to adapt, safeguarding food and water security in a sustainable 
environment.  Folke et al (Folke et al., 2005) term this adaptive management (AM).  
AM seeks a flexible, sustainable system that can be resilient, adaptable and 
transformable to absorb shocks and disturbances (Engle, 2011; Foxon et al., 2009). 
Foxon et al (Foxon et al., 2009) suggest that insights from both TM and AM would 
create governance that is both resilient whilst also being robust – able to adapt to 
shocks whilst also retaining system functionality. They also stress that diversity 
within AM has proven invaluable and that the use of multiple stakeholders at all 
levels and representative of all agencies, is something that is missing within TM. 
Also missing within STT theory, SET proposes that the adaptability of governance is 
needed to manage transformational change (Folke et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2004; 
Westley et al., 2011).   
Previous literature that discussed the use of SET for energy systems warned against 
its use, suggesting that unlike the discreet geographical areas that are preferred by 
ecological systems, energy systems have no physical place (Smith and Stirling, 
2010).  However including DER, and indeed any RE generation, has changed the 
view of energy as a finite ‘owned’ resource to that which perhaps can be defined as 
a ‘common pool resource’ (Roelich and Knoeri, 2015; Wolsink, 2020).  Brisbois 
(2020) suggests that, due to the increasing decentralisation of energy, comparisons 
can be made across water and energy governance.  Water governance, due the 
nature of water systems are already polycentric and therefore lessons may be learnt 
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for the increasingly polycentric nature of energy as it begins to include both 
centralised and decentralised assets.  Therefore, it could be suggested that the 
decentralised elements of energy systems have similarities with the decentralised 
elements of water systems, as both make use of a common pool resource which can 
be regionally, or locally, specific. 
Like an ecosystem, enabling decentralisation uses a diverse range of resources to 
create a local energy system that is preferable for a particular geographical type.  
For example, in rural areas the majority of households have access to roof space for 
solar and could choose to self-generate electricity, whereas in urban districts, where 
a greater number of people live in apartments, individual access to solar may be 
difficult and so a community solar project may be more applicable.  
This thesis is not suggesting that the energy system is a social-ecological system but 
rather that lessons from SET could be learnt, and applied, particularly for 
decentralisation, due to the similarities between the complex interactions between 
these system’s parameters and the recognition of the importance of the local 
resource. Sustainability transitions in both energy and ecological systems need to 
consider the social, environmental, political, technical and economic elements of the 
system, and to recognise the individual needs of a particular locality. 
Section 2.3 introduces the concepts of resilience, adaptability and transformability as 
defined within SET literature, and the definitions from SET theory that are to be used 
throughout this thesis. Section 2.4 will introduce the principles of adaptive governance 
from social-ecological literature, Section 2.5 discusses the difference between a 
transition and a transformation and section 2.6 applies SET theory to energy systems. 
 
2.3 RESILIENCE, ADAPTABILITY AND TRANSFORMABILITY 
The idea of resilience, adaptability and transformability was applied in ecological 
literature, primarily within ecosystem sustainability (Holling, 1973) and then defined 
for social-ecological transitions (SET), where: 
1. Resilience - ‘the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize 
while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, 
structure, identity, and feedbacks’ (Walker et al., 2004) and its capacity for 
renewal, re-organisation and development (Folke, 2006; Nelson et al., 2007) 
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2. adaptability – ‘the capacity of the actors within the system to influence its 
resilience’ (Nelson et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2004) 
3. transformability - ‘The capacity to create a fundamentally new system when 
ecological, economic, or social (including political) conditions make the 
existing system untenable’ (Folke et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2004). 
 
When deciding whether a system needs to be resilient or transformative, it is 
important to understand resilience and adaptive capacity in relation to the aspirations 
of the system that is required, that is, it’s desirability.  System desirability can be a 
subjective term.  For example, if an ecosystem is left to its own devices (what the 
ecosystem desires), the outcome that the system achieves may not be one that is 
useful for the social actors within the system, such as pastureland returning to scrub.  
Therefore for social-ecological systems, and used within this thesis, desirability is 
defined as the social goals that the system actors wish the system to achieve 
(Nelson et al., 2007).   
A resilient system has a high adaptive capacity enabling it to adapt to changes in its 
environment.  A system with a high adaptive capacity is able to absorb changes 
through renewal, re-organisation and development (Folke, 2006; Nelson et al., 
2007).  Such changes help to maintain alignment with current system function, 
structure, identity and retain the same feedbacks.  In this case, a resilient system,  
which includes the actors within the system, will exhibit a high adaptive capacity i.e. 
be able to absorb changes within, or to, the system, while perpetuating a system’s 
existing structures and functions (Folke, 2006; Nelson et al., 2007). System 
pathways may then be said to be ‘locked-in’ (Smith and Stirling, 2010; Westley et al., 
2011).  Should a system become ‘locked-in’ to a state, that is on the whole, 
undesirable and is therefore not able to achieve the required outcome, it would be 
necessary to bring about a system transformation to achieve the new, desired state.   
In SET, system transformability has been defined as ‘the capacity to create untried 
beginnings from which to evolve a new way of living when existing ecological, 
economic, or social structures become untenable’ (Walker et al., 2004).  In this case, 
it is not adaptive capacity within the system that is required but adaptive governance 
to achieve the new requirement whilst still maintaining the functionality of the 
essential system. 
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Within energy systems, such as GB, the desired function is to ensure that the energy 
system provides customers with a reliable, secure and affordable source of power 
(Energy Systems Catapault, 2018). For those countries which have a 
decarbonisation agenda, meeting these targets now also requires the energy system 
to become decarbonised, so including decarbonisation as a desired function (ibid.).  
As discussed here and in Chapter 1, achieving this desired function requires 
changes to the way that energy is generated and supplied, changing its identity from 
carbonised to decarbonised, and its structure from centralised to incorporate 
increasing levels of decentralised assets, which can affect system interactions (as 
discussed in section 2.1.2).  In this case, it is necessary to identify resilience within 
the system.  If the system has the adaptive capacity to absorb the desired changes 
needed to decarbonise without detriment to the desired function, then a transition 
can occur.  However, if the system resilience is not allowing a required change to 
occur, and is protecting the original system, or if a change is occurring and this 
change is creating challenges to the desired system function, this suggests that a 
transformation will be needed, requiring adaptive governance.  
 
2.4 ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE  
Adaptive capacity has been defined as ‘the ability to recover or adjust to change 
through learning and flexibility so as to maintain or improve into a desirable state’ 
(Engle, 2011).  If a system is to be transformed into a new desirable state, then the 
institutions that govern it need to have the adaptive capacity to achieve this – 
adaptive governance.  Adaptive governance ‘is a process of creating adaptability and 
transformability’ in SESs (Walker et al., 2004). 
Within the SET literature, authors suggest that for governance to be adaptive it 
needs to develop systems in such a way that they have the capacity to absorb any 
changes, both seen and unforeseen, without a collapse in basic functioning  (Engle, 
2011; Folke, 2006; Folke et al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2010; Nelson et al., 2007; Smith 
and Stirling, 2010). There is consensus from the authors mentioned that the 
principles of adaptive governance include: 
 an increase in the use of informal networks across multiple levels, away from 
the rules and regulations of agencies;  
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 that increasing participation increases diversity within system governance, 
easing the flow of information and expertise, which in turn, creates an 
environment that encourages innovation and alternative policies, thereby 
increasing social capital;  
 that AG would see policy as a hypothesis and policy would become an 
iterative process to increase institutional learning; 
 that transformative leadership from individuals and empowerment of social 
actors is needed, giving the capacity to respond to changes at any level and 
speed, either through current policy or by encouraging creative responses. 
Dietz et al (2003) and Nelson et al (2007) also suggest that the use of informal 
networks would reduce conflict by including all interested parties in the planning 
process and recognize the importance of creating an institutional infrastructure for 
the coordination of research, social capital and multilevel rules across all levels of 
governance.  Following these principles, as suggested by the authors above, would 
then reduce the resilience of locked-in systems.   
Social capital has been defined as ‘networks together with shared norms, values and 
understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups’ (OECD, 2001).  
Within SET theory, social capital is met by an increase of participation and 
representation where multiple social networks combine local knowledge with 
scientific knowledge and encompass both local and national organisations and 
institutions (Folke et al., 2005; Schultz et al., 2015).  Having governance that 
connects across multiple organisational levels and multiple social boundaries allows 
for transparent policymaking that can be considered more legitimate and has the 
potential to increase trust between individuals, institutions and government (Dietz et 
al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2007; Schultz et al., 2015; Westley et al., 2011).  
Increasing participation in this way then increases diversity within system 
governance.  An increase in diversity, with coordination between each of the diverse 
areas/groups, can reduce the negative effects for unforeseen events, or shocks, due 
to the increased knowledge base from a range of local perspectives (Granovetter, 
1973).  Authors suggest that to be effective (in some way) these social networks 
should be politically independent, away from the formal processes around regulation 
and implementation (Folke et al., 2005; Nelson et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2015).  
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These social networks require transformative leadership that can recognise and 
identify opportunities and constraints (Folke et al., 2005).  Where there are practical 
examples of increasing social capital for social-ecological systems, the results 
suggested that this increase enabled the adaptive capacity of the system, which in 
turn improved the responses to disturbances through increased knowledge (Engle 
and Lemos, 2010; Nelson et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2015).   
Change within complex systems creates outcomes that may or may not be 
predictable (Allen et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2007).  Therefore, it is important to create a 
governance process which will be able to react to these changing events through 
innovation in policy, technology, economics and social processes (Westley et al., 
2011).  Westley et al (2011) note that within innovation studies for business, 
technology and organisational behaviour, should large firms wish to innovate then 
this is best achieved, not through a ‘control and direct’ approach, but by providing the 
resources and opportunities needed to promote innovative practices from the lower 
levels.  These innovative practices are then coordinated by middle management to 
meet a firm’s strategic priority.     
Rather than being employed as a one-off action, several authors highlight the value 
of treating policy as a hypothesis to be tested (Folke et al., 2005; Nelson et al., 2008; 
Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007). Thus, designing and implementing policy becomes a 
continuous process of assessment which, by acknowledging the inevitability of policy 
failure, becomes an opportunity for learning to be generated and shared (Mazzucato, 
2013).  Nelson et al (2008) suggest that this policy experimentation is generally more 
achievable when implemented locally, where financial and political risks are reduced, 
rather than at a national level.  Allowing a policy process to evolve at local levels has 
the potential to empower social actors within the local regions who have an interest 
in the local system while creating smaller areas of policy trials which can be 
constantly modified through learning and communication (Nelson et al., 2008) (see 
Figure 2-2).  While Figure 2-2 considers policy experimentation, in the context of 
energy any policy experiment will cause interactions between the various elements 
of the system.  These interactions cause challenges not only within the physical 
system but also the social and economic parameters.  These challenges and 
possible solutions to these challenges are discussed further in Chapter 7. 
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Following the lessons from SET literature, this suggests that local policy becomes 
the hypothesis, the actions taken from the local policy direction as the experiment 
(Folke et al., 2005), and the results of the experiment the learning from the local 
policy areas able to be used through diffusion or scaling up (Westley et al., 2011).  
Local policy then needs mid-level coordination of the experimentation process, which 
would include the coordination of research and social capital across all levels of 
governance, to achieve a strategic national or global priority (Westley et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 2-2 The process of adaptive governance.  Local policy trials are coordinated regionally w ithin the 
boundaries of the national policy objective and is a continuous process of experimentation and learning (Nelson 
et al., 2008). 
Creating policy in this way increases participation and representation in the 
policymaking process, and therefore the transparency and legitimacy of local policy 
(Westley et al., 2011).  This, in turn, creates the trust needed between those involved 
in the transformation process to increase the acceptability of the process itself and 
the other actors involved (ibid.).  
 
2.5 TRANSITION OR TRANSFORMATION? 
Energy systems need to become more flexible to incorporate both large and small-
scale generation, new technologies and changing social preferences (Mitchell, 
2016). In energy system change it is necessary to understand the system we need to 
take us to a sustainable, clean energy future - whether the current system is 
desirable, i.e. does the system have the required adaptive capacity to achieve this 
new desired outcome and so able to undergo a transition to the new desired state?;     
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or is the system ‘locked-in’ to a path trajectory that will make this transition difficult?; 
suggesting that a transformation may occur or is needed. 
SET theory suggests that transformation needs to be, in some way, managed.  This 
management then defines the desired function of the system which is achieved 
through adaptive governance processes (Nelson et al., 2007).  For energy, in those 
countries with a positive decarbonisation agenda, the desired function is to provide a 
decarbonised energy system that is secure, reliable and affordable.  An unmanaged 
(but perhaps desired) transformation e.g. the unexpected uptake of DER seen in 
Australia, may negatively affect other features of this desired function.  It is, 
therefore, necessary to be able to create the environment that allows transformation 
to occur, but then also to have some control, so that the positive elements can be 
absorbed and solutions found to any negative elements or unexpected events.  
Westley et al (2011) and Nelson et al (2008) suggest that this management can be 
achieved by opening up the innovation capability of the system at a local level and 
coordinating this innovation to meet an overarching system vision. 
In GB, the energy system has begun to decarbonise and has successfully 
incorporated large-scale RE generation into the grid (BEIS, 2017).  Following the 
definitions from SET, the GB system could be described as having undergone a 
transition as the adaptive capacity of the system was able to absorb some changes, 
and these changes did not negatively affect the desired function of the system. It has 
been able to perpetuate its structure as a centralised system and the adaptations 
needed to protect the system function have been accommodated within the 
centralised governance structure.  However, as discussed in Chapter 1, meeting 
GB’s decarbonisation targets require further changes, including increased use of 
DER and increasing system decentralisation.  This decentralisation requires new 
governance and could be considered as a transformational change as it requires 
‘evolving to a new way of living’, as defined by Walker (2004). Enabling 
decentralisation may need operational and institutional coordination as the traditional 
system evolves (and this is discussed further in Chapters 8 and 9).  Therefore, it is 
necessary to understand how transformational changes, such as decentralisation 
through the uptake of DER, can be managed so that the desired function of the 
energy system is protected, and this may require adaptive governance. 
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2.6   PRINCIPLES FOR ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN ENERGY SYSTEM 
TRANSFORMATION 
Within energy, using lessons from SET, adaptive governance would need to involve 
informal networks of social actors.  Social movements, such as those that initiated 
system change in Denmark and Germany (Morris and Jungjohann, 2016; Toke, 
2011), should be encouraged.  Informal networks could include industry, NGOs, 
academia, consumer groups and social movement representatives, represented at 
all levels of energy system governance to ensure expertise from independent 
sources (e.g. Nelson et al., 2008).  The inclusion of independent representation in 
energy system governance can disperse the influence of incumbent actors and 
industries. These informal networks and social movement groups could create 
spaces for innovation.  The learning and knowledge gained from experimentation 
within these networks and groups, then coordinated and passed throughout the 
hierarchy.  The coordination of knowledge gained may allow for dispersion and 
scaling up of innovative solutions to the challenges that may occur. 
There is a need to view policy as iterative learning.  Although it may not be possible 
to get things right initially, ‘learning by doing’ and sharing these lessons amongst 
these informal networks, both locally, nationally and globally, may help to enable 
transformational change.  While it may be difficult at a national level to experiment 
with policy, the risks may be reduced at a local level, as should these smaller policy 
trials not be successful, the negative political and economic impact is limited. 
However, it should be noted that physical trials stemming from local policy may be 
‘risky’ when considering the effect on the physical energy system as a whole, so 
local trials should still ensure that the desired system function is protected.  
Empowering local actors to create local policy would allow for local solutions, with 
these learnings able to be shared between similar regions (Nelson et al., 2008).  
Having multiple local policy areas may also increase the capacity for transformative 
leadership and social inclusion.   
Adapting the principles from SET for energy systems, this suggests a need for 
increased customer representation and participation in the policymaking and 
regulation processes; that local policy should be empowered so increasing 
innovation potential, with access for all participants to the knowledge gained; that 
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innovation and local policy should be coordinated to meet a national vision of the 
desired outcome of the energy system; and that the physical and operational 
elements should be coordinated to protect the desired system functionality 
(illustrated in Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1  Suggested principles for adaptive governance in energy systems, adapted from the principles for 
adaptive governance in SET (Source: author). 
Adaptive governance principles from SET theory 
Adaptive Governance Principles for energy 
systems 
An increase in social capital 
Customers at the centre of the policymaking 
and regulation process (through increased 
customer representation and participation) 
Policy as hypothesis 
Empowered local policy 
Knowledge sharing 
National vision and target for 
decarbonisation 
Coordination of social capital  
Coordination of innovation; 
Coordination of local policy; 
Coordination between the physical and 
operational elements (distribution, 
transmission, markets) 
 
To achieve a functional transformation, AG suggests that the rules and regulations 
would need a high adaptive capacity.  The speed of rule changes needs to match the 
speed of technological innovation.  Within energy, this suggests that changes to 
regulation may be needed to allow for novel approaches to ‘keeping the lights on’, 
and networks should assess the value of these to the industry.  In Australia, and 
theoretically, at some point elsewhere, consumers now have the power to cause a 
‘death spiral’ for the business models of established electricity monopolies.  
Consumers can, less shockingly, provide resources to energy systems at certain 
times as they are being resource providers in a minor form of the conventional 
utilities.  Consumers ought to be able to access this value, as well as their value for 
their contribution to reducing carbon emissions.  This would suggest a changing role 
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for all actors including networks and retailers, and therefore a change in regulation, 
so that the new roles provide the value for this input. For example, by changing the 
role of institutions, such as the passive distribution system operator (DSO) to an 
active distribution service provider (DSP) by creating a platform which acts as a 
market facilitator, or to move from traditional ‘cost plus’ regulation3 to performance-
based regulation4 (Mitchell et al., 2016), this would then create an institution with the 
adaptive capacity to allow for these changing roles.  
In essence, in order for the global energy community to decarbonise, energy system 
actors must assess if the current energy system is able to transition or whether a 
transformation is needed or is happening.  They will need to adopt policy to allow for 
increased adaptive capacity of a current desired system or for adaptive governance 
to enable a managed transformation to occur.  
 
2.7 SIGNIFICANCE  
Several authors have argued that adaptive governance can enable a current 
transformation within SESs, and there are practical examples for its use in water 
systems (e.g. Dietz et al., 2003; Engle and Lemos, 2010; Westley et al., 2011).  
Although the literature for SET is based on ecological systems, there are many 
similarities between how these ecological systems need to operate to be sustainable 
and that of the new, sustainable, decarbonised and increasingly decentralising 
energy system.  Although recommended as a ‘promising starting point’ (Goldthau, 
2014; Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012), the use of adaptive governance within energy 
is only recently beginning to gain traction (Akamani, 2016; Brisbois, 2020; Geels et 
al., 2019) 
Therefore, this thesis will add to this new approach to energy governance through a 
case study of an energy system that is undergoing an unexpected change, due to 
the rapid uptake of DER.  By empirically examining the relevance of SET for energy 
transitions, with the aim of contributing to theory development, this thesis aims to 
increase the understanding of the concept of transformation and adaptive 
                                              
3 Companies are able to earn extra revenue through increasing efficiency and therefore reducing the 
amount of revenue needed for system costs compared to the requested revenue.  The saved costs 
can then be kept by the company and/or shared with customers.  
4 Extra revenue as a reward can be earned through meeting or outperforming performance based 
targets/outcomes. 
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governance within energy and the extent to which adaptive governance could be 
usefully applied.  It will use the case study to discuss the benefits of local 
empowerment, coordination and vision that AG may allow and which acknowledges 
the complex interactions that take place within an energy system.  The thesis takes 
the key principles from AG in SET theory, discussed in section 2.6, and applies 
these to the NEM (illustrated in Table 8-2, page 167) to understand whether AG may 
be assisting, or could have enabled, the current system change that is happening at 
the distributed level of the electricity system.  Results from the research questions 
(introduced in Section 2.8) will help guide the debate on an approach to adaptive 
governance within energy system change for the electricity industry on a practical 
level, and how these could be applied in GB (summarised in Table 9-2, page 191). 
2.8 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research question 1:  
What is driving the take up of solar PV/storage in eastern Australia? 
Research question 2:  
What has the governance response been to the uptake of DER in eastern Australia? 
Research question 3:  
Following Unruh’s (Unruh, 2000) ideas of carbon lock–in, how does the history of the 
eastern Australian path-dependent coevolution of energy systems and technology 
make it more or less inclined to be adaptive?   
Research question 4: 
To what extent do the principles for adaptive governance from SET theory feature in 
the Australia case study and if present, have they enabled a positive contribution to 
the changes being seen?  If so, how? 
Research question 5: 
What are the regulatory and governance lessons to be learnt for GB? 
 
Research questions 1, 2 and 3 provide the background and context of past and 
current governance in the NEM while research question 4 provides an insight into 
whether elements of adaptive governance were/are present in Australia’s electricity 
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system, and if so, their role in the current changes that are occurring. Question 5 
takes the lessons learnt from the NEM governance approach and uses these to 
suggest an adaptive governance framework for GB electricity decentralisation. 
 
2.9   CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed that the energy system is a complex, essential system.  
SET theory acknowledges this complexity and recognises the need for 
transformability within systems.  By providing flexibility in the governance of the 
system, adaptive governance can enable a current transformation or allow the 
system to transform to a new, desired state even if the original system is ‘locked-in’ 
to an undesirable one.  SET theory, therefore, provides an interesting perspective for 
energy system governance as: 
 Energy systems and ecosystems are both complex and essential systems. 
 SET recognises that time limits exist in transitions. 
 SET theory acknowledges the equal importance of the social, economic, 
political, environmental and technical factors, and the interactions between 
these parameters and designs solutions to complement the local resources. 
 SET recognises the difference between a transition (for a desirable system 
with high adaptive capacity), and a transformation (for an undesirable system 
that has high adaptive capacity and is locked-in to an undesirable path 
trajectory). 
 SET suggests an adaptive governance framework to create and manage 
transformation. 
The thesis will address the research questions by assessing how NEM governance 
received and managed the uptake of DER in eastern Australia.  The thesis will then 
use the results to provide recommendations for principles of adaptive governance, 
adapted from SET theory, for electricity system decentralisation and how adaptive 




As stated in Chapter 1, DER is an important part of energy system decarbonisation 
and these distributed elements need to be incorporated into the current system.  
Chapter 2 has shown that energy systems are complex and involve interactions 
across several parameters and so may need governance to be adaptive to manage 
transformational change. This chapter will show the methodological processes used 
within this thesis to (i) assess the challenges within governance as energy systems 
decentralise, (ii) to establish a theoretical governance framework that enables 
decentralisation, and (iii) show how lessons learnt from the NEM case study could be 
applied to create a practical framework for adaptive governance (AG) for 
decentralisation in the GB energy system. 
The approach to suggesting possible solutions for the challenges associated with 
energy system decentralisation and its governance, and identifying the theoretical 
framework that would best answer these challenges, was taken initially through four 
steps: 
1. Attending meetings, workshops and conferences in GB to understand the 
main issues that were being discussed around decarbonising energy systems. 
2. Initial desk-based research on the NEM, including past and present 
governance, the rise of DER and the political, economic and social 
implications of this rise. 
3. a literature review on transition theory to understand the nature of energy 
system change, and  
4. developing the principles for adaptive governance for energy systems, 
alongside points 1, 2, and 3 that would help inform the research questions, 
and the questions for the case study interviews. 
 
Steps 1 and 2 identified the governance issues for decarbonising energy systems 
and the need for governance to be flexible to accommodate changes that may occur 
in any part of the system.  Step 3 researched transition approaches and then 
identified the most relevant approach for energy system decentralisation.  Step 4 
then developed the principles of adaptive governance for energy systems that would 
inform the case study research. By following steps 1-4, the initial research was able 
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to identify where there are gaps in current knowledge (Webster and Watson, 2002) 
and the major issues surrounding energy system change. The results from these 
four initial steps enabled the five research questions to be refined to consider why 
change is happening in the NEM; whether the adaptive governance principles 
identified in Chapter 2 would/are being beneficial to decentralisation, in comparison 
to the current governance approach; and the lessons that can be learnt for GB 
energy governance:  
RQ1. What is driving the uptake of DER in Australia? 
RQ2.  What has been the governance response to the uptake of DER? 
RQ3.  Following Unruh’s (2000) ideas of carbon lock-in, how does the history of 
the Australian path-dependent coevolution of energy systems and technology 
make it more or less inclined to be adaptive?   
RQ4.  To what extent do the principles for adaptive governance from SET theory 
feature in the Australia case study and if present, how have they enabled a 
positive contribution to the changes being seen?   
RQ5   What are the regulatory and governance lessons to be learnt for GB? 
A further four steps were then undertaken to assess the viability of adaptive 
governance for energy system change. 
5. Desk-based research to identify the institutions, industries and actors where 
the challenges of a change to a more decentralised system, caused by the 
uptake of DER in the NEM, had altered their traditional operations and, 
therefore, to identify the most relevant actors to interview during the case 
study fieldwork. 
6. Semi-structured interviews with government and industry representatives, 
NGOs and academics in the NEM States, allowing a variety of perspectives 
on the DER uptake and the governance responses, to inform a narrative 
around the rise of DER and the challenges it produced. 
7. The organisation of the primary and secondary data using coding software.  
8. Analysis of the coded results to create the narrative around the uptake of 
DER, how this was received within the NEM, and if there were aspects of 
adaptive governance that influenced the current changes that are occurring. 
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3.1 THE USE OF A CASE STUDY AND THE CHOICE OF CASE STUDY AREA   
Research has shown that a singular in-depth case study gives more detail of the 
possible interactions that can occur and that the results may be generalised to 
formulate insights for other similar situations (see Flyvbjerg, 2006). By completing 
interviews with a range of actors within the case study area, a case study is able to 
produce a narrative of how and why an event occurred.  The use of narratives has 
been recommended in social and political science, as producing a story around a 
singular lived experience can provide a glimpse of a possible future where similar 
experiences may be expected (Mattingly, 1991), enabling anticipatory policy 
interventions (Abbott, 1992).   Using both primary and secondary research, this 
thesis has created a narrative around the uptake of DER in Australia. Within this 
narrative the complexities and challenges associated with energy decentralisation, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, are highlighted and as such, the narrative can provide 
policymakers with anticipatory knowledge for future decentralisation strategies.   
However, there are limitations with a singular case study, and although able to 
provide an in-depth view of single event and therefore suggest possible solutions  
based on the SET framework, it would be prudent to use further empirical evidence 
to fully understand the interactions of a SET framework in other energy governance 
contexts.  
To understand the dynamics and challenges of energy system decentralisation, a 
case study of an energy system already experiencing some decentralisation was 
undertaken.  Preliminary desk-based research identified that the NEM is undergoing 
a rapid decentralisation, led by the consumer through the uptake of household DER.  
Australia has four electricity systems, the largest of these systems being the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) of the eastern states (Figure 3-1) covering five 
interconnected state-based networks (the focus of this case study).  The Western 
Electricity Market (WEM) covers south Western Australia.  The Northern Territory 
Electricity Market (NTEM) covers the Northern Territory.  Each of these systems is 
operated through separate markets under the National Electricity Laws (NEL).  The 
North Western Interconnected System (NWIS) is located in northern Western 
Australia and is state-owned and run.   
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Figure 3-1 Australia's four electricity systems (Geoscience Australia and ABARE, 2010) 
It is possible to take lessons learnt from the NEM case study, due to the similarities 
between the GB electricity system and the NEM (Chapter 5 gives an in-depth view of 
the governance and structure of the NEM).  Both the GB and the NEM have an 
overwhelmingly centralised system and governance structure.  Both systems have 
undergone reforms that have left generation and retail as competitive markets, with 
these markets dominated by the ‘big 3’5 in the NEM and the ‘big six’6 in GB.  The 
privatised monopoly elements of supply, in both cases, are regulated by a national 
regulator, the AER in Australia, which is purely an economic regulator and Ofgem, in 
GB, which is both economic regulator and rule maker.   
It is also possible to compare the changes in geographies between the NEM and the 
GB energy system. Geographical changes in the NEM occur over large distances, 
with physical geography remaining the same over many hundreds of kilometres 
before changing.  In GB, the physical geography changes over much shorter 
distances, so although the NEM covers a much larger area, the physical and social 
changes that occur within the energy system boundaries are similar e.g. changes 
                                              
5 AGL, Origin, EnergyAustralia 
6 British Gas, EDF Energy, E. ON, Npower, Scottish Power, and SSE 
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from rural to urban, and landscape variations, so requiring DER and resources that 
are optimal for these particular localities.   
The main difference between GB and the NEM, is that Australia has a federal 
system of government.  The Australian federal system allows the NEM State 
Governments to set, or legislate, and fund State RE targets and subsequent local 
innovations that are beneficial to the particular region.  This ability has helped some 
NEM States to initiate and support DER, and to gain economic and social benefits 
for households, businesses and industries through savings in energy bills (e.g. 
through self-generation), guaranteeing future energy prices (e.g. by investing in self-
generation or through power purchase agreements with utility-scale RE) and by 
opening up new industries (e.g. installation companies and new manufacturing 
plants). 
 
3.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ANSWER THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To answer the initial broad question introduced in Chapter 1, i.e. whether current 
energy system governance is fit for purpose to enable decentralisation and if not, 
what needs to be changed, five research questions were identified following the 
preliminary research.  Addressing these questions would introduce the NEM and the 
current transformation that is taking place; how governance of the NEM has 
responded to the uptake; the history and influence of ideas, institutions and industry 
on the system; how adaptive governance may or may not be assisting in the current 
changes seen in the NEM; and what lessons can be learnt for the GB governance 
approach to enable decentralisation.  The research questions required different 
approaches to the methods of acquiring data.   
To inform and produce rigorous conclusions to the research questions, it was 
necessary to obtain data from a variety of sources.  The data required was both 
qualitative and quantitative and from primary and secondary sources.  Primary data 
was gathered by conducting semi-structured interviews. Secondary data was 
obtained via literature reviews and desk-based analysis. It is suggested that a mixed 
methods approach, using quantitative data and qualitative data from both primary 
and secondary sources, allows the qualitative data to give a greater depth and 
understanding of the results obtained quantitatively (Elwood, 2010).  This section 
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describes the methods used to obtain the data needed to answer the research 
questions.  
3.2.1 Secondary research 
To create a framework for governance that would allow change, transition theories 
were reviewed that could help to answer the challenges of change within complex 
systems and the difficulties of carbon lock-in.  The literature review considered the 
theories from socio-technical transitions and social-ecological transitions and 
identified the transition theory that was most applicable to the changes required for a 
decentralising energy system.  
A further literature review was undertaken to gather the qualitative and quantitative 
data needed to understand the challenges associated with energy system change. 
Qualitative and quantitative data was obtained, for both GB and the NEM, through 
peer-reviewed literature, industry reports and industry websites plus research from 
government, NGOs and the energy press.  The purpose of this data collection was to 
develop an understanding of the issues surrounding changes within energy systems 
in general, both in GB and Australia, and, in Australia, to understand how these 
issues were affecting the NEM.  
Further data collection was needed to track the progress being made in the NEM 
towards the integration of DER.  This data collection took place between September 
2016 and September 2019, to track the rapid changes that were occurring in the 
NEM.  This data was required to highlight both the positive and negative effects of a 
rapid uptake of DER on energy system governance and the system itself. 
Quantitative data was used to understand the economics behind DER uptake.  A mix 
of desk-based quantitative (DER cost analysis, DER uptake statistics, published 
questionnaire results) and qualitative (peer-reviewed literature, industry reports and 
websites) data was used, to initially assess the factors involved in the uptake.  
Secondary research was undertaken both initially, and then continuing until 
September 2019, by reviewing past, current and future governance initiatives in the 
NEM.   Events in parliament, media releases by relevant institutions, and articles 
from the general media were also continuously reviewed throughout the doctoral 
process. 
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3.2.2 Primary research  
Through attendance at IGov and other industry, NGO, and academic workshops and 
conferences, information was gathered on the issues being discussed in regard to 
energy system decarbonisation in GB.  Government consultations were followed and 
responded to, in particular concerning electricity distribution regulation.   The insights 
gained from the discussions and consultations in GB, were used to inform the 
suggested governance framework presented in Chapter 9. 
In addition to the attendance at various energy conferences and workshops in GB 
from 2016-2019, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with energy 
professionals in south-eastern Australia in 2018.  Herbert (2010), suggests that the 
use of empirical data, such as interviews, can be used as a method to enhance and 
validate the data produced from the initial qualitative and quantitative literature 
review.  Semi-structured interviews were chosen as it enabled the interviewees to 
give answers based around the same core questions but with the opportunity for the 
interview to be more open.  The open-endedness offered by this method, rather than 
through a questionnaire, gives the research the possibility of results not foreseen 
from the initial data collection (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). This aim of this 
type of open-ended interview is to obtain different perspectives on the changes 
happening in the energy system.  This would create the narrative around the effects 
of system change on the social, technical, economic, political and environmental 
parameters of the NEM, and the dynamics shaping this change, which could then be 
used to inform future policy decisions elsewhere.   
In total, 34 semi-structured interviews with energy professionals were conducted 
within 30 organisations in south-eastern Australia.  The key actors in the NEM were 
identified during the preliminary data collection and also through recommendations 
from interviewees.  The interviewees came from different backgrounds i.e. 
government, industry, NGOs and academia to give balance to the data.  By 
interviewing a range of individuals from all levels concerned with DER (Table 3-1), 
the research was able to offer a broad range of viewpoints across the research 
questions and create a narrative that recognised the varied interactions and 
complexities of energy transitions.  Where there is a duplication of organisations, this 
is due to interviews taking place within different departments of the same 
organisation, or in the different NEM States. 
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Table 3-1 Interview ees by state and organisation 
 
Each of the interviews began with a brief introduction of the thesis e.g. the theory of 
adaptive governance, a synopsis of the research questions and why the NEM had 
been chosen as a case study.  The interviewee was asked to sign an informed 
consent form which detailed the ethics procedures for anonymity and that the 
interviewee could withdraw consent once the study had concluded (a copy of the 
consent form is available in Appendix 1).  
The initial introduction to the thesis was tailored dependent of the expertise of the 
interviewee.  For example, where the interviewee had academic experience, theory 
was discussed in more detail, whereas for a more technical interviewee this was 
given as a brief overview and the relevant research questions given more priority.  
This allowed the interviewee to understand, and enabled the interview to focus on, 
where the interviewee’s particular expertise could help answer the research 
questions and also to allow them to introduce new ideas relating to the initial 
research.   
The semi-structured nature of the questions asked during the interviews allowed the 
interviewees to answer the research questions dependent on their expertise.  Using 
this method, the answers given tended towards either the economic, social, technical 
or political aspect of the interviewee’s agenda.  For example, when asked about the 
effects of the rapid uptake of DER, an electricity network representative focussed on 
technical challenges, whereas an advocacy representative tended towards 
consumer protection and equity.  This range of perspectives enabled the qualitative 
data to highlight the complex interactions that can occur as energy systems change. 
State Government Industry NGO Academic
ITP Renewables Aus. Institute of Energy
Smart Energy Council
Energy Networks Australia
Dept. of Energy and Mining South Australia Power Networks The Energy Project
Australian Energy Market Operator Uniting Communities
Essential Services Commission of SA ElectraNet
Australian Energy Regulator
Jemena Ltd Consumer Action
Victoria University (Victoria Energy Policy 
Centre)
GreenSync Clean Energy Council
University of Melbourne (Aus/German 
Climate and Energy College)
AGL St. Vincent de Paul Society
Dept. of Energy
Energy Consumers Australia








Australian National University (Energy 
Change Institute)
University of South Australia
University of Technology (Institute of 
Sustainable Futures)
Public Interest Advocacy Centre
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Each interviewee was assigned a code (Table 3-2) showing the place of interview 
and their occupation e.g. S1ac is an academic interviewee from Sydney.  The data 
from the interviews was then collated using NVivo (section 3.3.1) and assessed to 
understand if adaptive governance processes were involved in the rapid uptake of 
DER and whether adaptive governance is enabling the current changes within the 
system.  The results of the case study of NEM energy governance, and the effects of 
a rapid uptake of DER, were then used to formulate lessons learnt for energy 
governance in GB.  
Table 3-2  Affiliation of interviewees and their identification codes e.g. S5 NEM in - national government energy 
institution representative based in Sydney. 
 
 
3.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
3.3.1 Qualitative data 
NVivo software was used to analyse the qualitative data gathered during the 
interviews.  NVivo software has been designed to support both qualitative and mixed 
methods research to ‘organize, analyse and find insights in unstructured, or 
qualitative data’ (QSR International, 2017).  The software can import data from a 
variety of sources such as Office, online surveys, web data and social media.  The 
author is then able to use code-based software to analyse relationships in the data 
faster and more accurately than would be possible through other methods. 
Each of the interviews was coded, and sub-coded, to find common themes 
throughout the data.  Within NVivo the researcher is able to create a ‘node’ into 
which the relevant data can be stored.  The initial nodes were the Chapter headings, 
Sydney (S) Canberra (C) Melbourne (M) Adelaide (A)
1 Academic (3 interviewees) (ac) National regulator (Nreg) industry (in) State regulator (Sreg)
2
National Government advocacy (2 
interviewees) (Gad)
National regulator (Nreg) advocacy (ad) advocacy (ad)
3 industry (in) NGO industry (in) NGO
4 State Government (Sgov) Electricity networks (ENA) NGO academic (ac)
5
National Government energy 
institution (NEM in)
academic (ac) Academic (4 interviewees) (ac) Distribution network (dn)
6 State government (Sgov) Distribution network (dn) Transmission network (tn)
7 advocacy (ad) NGO
8 academic (ac)
National Government energy 
institution (NEM in)
9 State regulator (Sreg)
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informed by the research questions and based around the various aspects of 
complex systems as highlighted in the literature.  The interviews were then coded by 
taking information relevant to the chapter and creating a sub-node within the chapter 
node.  New sub-nodes were created for each new piece of information and where 
applicable, information was stored in a sub-node that had already been created.  
These sub-nodes then informed the sub-headings within the chapters, with the 
relevant quotes used to enhance and substantiate the secondary data, and vice 
versa.  An example of the sub-nodes for Chapter 4 is available in Appendix II (note 
that after coding the chapters were moved, so Chapter 4 appears as Chapter 6 in 
NVivo). 
3.3.2 Quantitative data 
The numerical analysis for the costs of a PV and battery system was undertaken 
using Excel and simple mathematical methods.  The results of industry 
questionnaires were used to understand further drivers for DER uptake. The results 
of the quantitative analysis are available in Chapter 4.   
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has introduced the research questions used to investigate the uptake of 
DER in the NEM; the governance response to this uptake; institutional and political 
influence over NEM governance, a transition approach to best answer any 
challenges that have arisen; and how lessons learnt can be applied to GB energy 
system change. 
Using a mixed-methods approach, primary and secondary data was used to produce 
a narrative of energy system change in a country where a rapid uptake of DER has 
taken place.  The results of the narrative were then used as a method to anticipate 
possible governance challenges that may occur in GB, as GB increases 
decentralisation.  These results, in conjunction with the transition theory chosen from 
the literature review, were applied to provide a possible framework to assist in 
energy system decentralisation in GB.  
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4. DRIVERS FOR THE UPTAKE OF DER 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Australia leads the world in the uptake of domestic solar PV.  In 2018, an average of 
25% of households in Australia had installed PV systems (APVI, 2019a) and the 
state of South Australia has one of the highest shares of variable renewable (large 
and small-scale) electricity generation in the world, at 42% of generation capacity 
(Blakers et al., 2019; Climate Action Tracker, 2018). 
This thesis is concentrating on the decentralisation of energy – a central part of 
energy system decarbonisation – rather than the adoption of large-scale renewable 
energy technologies.  Therefore, this chapter will describe the drivers for distributed 
energy resources (DER) in Australia and the NEM, and how Australia became the 
world leader in the percentage of households installing PV.  There are multiple 
drivers for DER uptake in the NEM – the solar resource (section 4.1), DER subsidies 
(section 4.2), high energy prices (section 4.3), reducing technology costs (section 4.4 
and section 4.7), climatic events (section 4.6), consumer trust (section 4.8) and 
consumer financial considerations (section 4.9).  These multiple drivers are 
discussed by presenting an overview of the initial renewable energy policies that 
were put in place at the national and State level (other RE policy will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6); discussing other unrelated events happening at the same 
time which culminated in higher than expected adoption rates; commenting on how 
high prices, confusing tariff structures and poor customer service have made energy 




4.1   AUSTRALIA’S SOLAR RESOURCE 
Australia has the highest solar irradiation of any continent (Figure 4-1), with solar 
irradiation in the NEM, between 1300 and 2100 kWh/m2.  This in comparison to GB, 
where average solar irradiation is between 750 and 1100 kWh/m2 (Dhimish et al., 
2018). The excellent solar resource can produce capacity factors7 of around 30% in 
summer and 15%-18% in winter (AEMO, 2016a).  In Australia, a 1 kW domestic 
solar PV system can produce an average of between 3.5 -5.0 kWh per day, 
dependent on location, or an average of 25-40% of a typical Australian households 
energy needs (Clean Energy Council, 2011). 
                                              
7 The amount of power produced, compared to the maximum power that could be achieved if the plant 
was able to permanently generate at its maximum rated capacity (e.g. if a 2MW wind turbine was able 
to generate 2MW of power, 24 hrs/day, 365 days/year, compared to its actual production).  
Figure 4-1 Average annual global horizontal irradiation for Australia  (Solargis, 2013) 
66 
4.2 SMALL-SCALE RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY 
In 2008 as part of their own renewable energy targets, and to encourage early 
adopters at a household and commercial level, each of the Australian States 
introduced incentives for small-scale solar (<100kW). Interviewees described the 
initial process of deciding on the type of incentive as lacking much deep 
consideration.  The subsidy amount was decided on by doubling the then retail 
electricity price, and then creating either a net or gross feed-in-tariff (FiT) dependent 
on which type the State government thought would be better for consumers. 
‘They decided to do this by a straight subsidy, actually a cross-subsidy, 
where they would pay mums and dads twice the then regulated retail price 
for installing PV systems.  So, for every kWh sent out, they would receive, 
at the time it was 44c [the retail price].   
Interview A1 Sreg 
‘That was actually a bit of a stuff up in NSW, where the advice was you 
could either have a net feed-in-tariff, where you get for the net amount of 
solar that you put out to the grid at 60c/kWh, or you could have a gross 
feed-in-tariff at a much lower level, about 20 or 30c/kWh.  In the 
processes, they then thought, "Let's do something that really distinguishes 
ourselves and do 60c/kWh." "Is that net or gross?" "Which is better?" 
"Well gross is better." "We'll do that".’ 
Interview S/1 ac 
The state-designed schemes were a Solar Bonus Scheme (SBS) in New South 
Wales (NSW) and a Premium feed-in-tariff (FiT) in Tasmania (TAS) and the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT).  The SBS and Premium FiT paid between 
44c/kWh and 60c/kWh dependent on state-regulated tariffs for all PV generated 
electricity. South Australia (SA), The Northern Territory (NT), Western Australia (WA) 
and Queensland (QLD) had a net FiT which paid 44-60c/kWh for excess electricity 
generation that was fed back into the grid.    
All State schemes were initially open to an unlimited size of domestic system but 
then curtailed to 5kW as a national RET scheme was designed to encourage larger 
RE systems (see section 6.4.1).  In 2012, the schemes closed to new entrants and 
the tariff reduced to around 8c/kWh, as the amount of subsidy being paid was 
considered to be unsustainable.  Registered systems installed before the 2012 
deadline would receive the initial Premium or Net FiT, or SBS, until 2028.  The 
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scheme was more successful than initially planned, with the original target of 15MW 
met within a month.  
‘They took that bill to parliament and somewhere a couple of Greens, 
people in the other house here said, 'love the scheme, great idea but 
rather than a 5 year closed scheme capped at 15MW or whatever it was, 
it will be a 20-year scheme open to everyone, small business, residential 
customer, anyone who uses up to 160MWh per annum gets this thing', 
which drove somewhat of an uptake. I think they surpassed the 15MW 
within a month.  Now we are at 800MW/750MW whatever we are at.  
They did close down entry to those schemes eventually but if you were on 
the scheme you were on it until 2028.  So that subsidy thing happened, it 
happened in a way that was slightly unplanned and uncontrolled I think.’ 
Interview A1 Sreg 
In 2011, the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) was introduced (to run 
until 2030) as a measure to encourage individuals and small businesses to invest in 
eligible renewable energy (RE) systems (CER, 2018).  SRES certificates are 
produced for new renewable generation by solar PV, wind or hydro and for the 
energy displaced by a solar water heater or heat pump over the course of a 
designated period.  The certificates can be generated by the owner of the eligible 
technology, or by an installer who has been assigned the right to generate the 
certificate by the owner.  As one certificate is equal to 1MWh, small-scale RE 
installers can aggregate smaller RE systems to reach the 1MWh target and pass on 
savings to the customer.  The certificates are sold to energy retailers, who are 
required to surrender a certain number of certificates each year, through a spot 
market or a Government Clearing House (RET, 2018).  The value of the certificates 
is dependent on the spot market price, currently $35.50/MWh.  Alternatively, 
certificates can be traded through the government Clearing House at $40/MWh.  
Certificates will only be traded through the Clearing House if there are no certificates 
available through the spot market.  The added benefit of the scheme is that it gives 
the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) visibility of the location and density 
of behind-the-meter RE, which allows for better forecasting for grid demand. 
 
4.3 RISING ENERGY PRICES 
In 2010-2012 there was a steep rise in the cost of energy.  Various factors combined 
to cause this rise:  
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1. Unneeded network augmentation 
2. retirement of old coal thermal plant and  
3. switching to gas generation for gas peaking plants and baseload power at a 
time when global gas prices were increasing (IEA, 2019b).   
4.3.1 Unneeded network augmentation 
Industry forecasts had predicted an increase in electricity demand which would 
require new infrastructure and generating capacity (Saddler, 2017).  In fact, demand 
fell which meant that electricity companies invested in unneeded infrastructure 
(ibid.). The incorrectly forecast increase in demand, allowed the electricity networks 
to augment their power lines for an expected increase in a one-way flow of energy.  
These investments then formed part of the networks regulated asset base (RAB).  
Criticism has been made of the fact that some of Australia’s network businesses are 
still publicly owned (see section 5.2.2) and that it is then in the interest of the 
government, and as such the State’s technical regulator, to increase the reliability 
threshold, which then allows the state government to raise revenue from an ever-
increasing RAB (Kuiper, 2015).   
‘I would rather be off for an hour and a half, rather than paying $100 extra 
a year.  So that is what we do as well saying, 'What are you prepared to 
pay, what are the trade-offs here?’. There is a whole load of science of 
figures to pay studies.  But we could just say sort it, gold plate it, and then, 
of course, they will, and they get a return on it because it is a capital 
investment. So, this is what happened in the 2000s, this is what we were 
trying to avoid, is the gold-plating.’ 
Interview A1 Sreg 
The return on these investments accounts for more than half of the network 
businesses total revenue (Saddler, 2017).  This high revenue, and hence a 
continuing high RAB, leads to high network charges for consumers, leading to the 
criticism from Kuiper (2015), that state interests are in direct conflict with consumer 
interests.  In the NEM, the network charges currently make up around 40% of 
customers’ bills (Figure 4-2) (AEMC, 2018a), this in comparison to network charges 
in GB, which currently stand at 23% of the total kWh charge (Ofgem, 2020). 
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Figure 4-2 Electricity price trends 2017/18 (methodology for residual costs available in the AEMC 2018 
Residential Electricity Price Trends Review (source: AEMC, 2018)) 
4.3.2 Retirement of old coal thermal plant and the switch to gas 
In the 2000s, old coal thermal power plants were retired and replaced with combined 
cycle gas thermal power plants (CCGT).  In Queensland between 2000 and 2010, 
State policy required retailers to obtain their electricity from gas generators, as the 
State government saw gas as a transition fuel and to take advantage of the new coal 
seam gas industry.   
‘In Queensland, the state government, they basically introduced a portfolio 
standard obligation to gas, which was 13%, then 15% on retailers, that 
they had to source their electricity from gas generators.  So that is why 
there is a whole fleet of, several CCGT and some OCGT, all were built.  
But the Queensland government did that as a sort of incentive for the 
development of the coal seam gas industry. So after about two years, 
from about 2013-15, something like that, when there were masses of very, 
very cheap gas, what they call ramp gas, because as the production of 
ramping up there was nowhere for it to go, so it was available very 
cheaply for gas generators, and then as soon as the LNG came on board, 
the price went up and scarcity went up.’ 
Interview C5 ac 
’ 
The other States also saw gas as a transition fuel, as gas-generated electricity 
produced fewer emissions than that from coal. Due to the Queensland government’s 
support of the coal seam gas industry, domestic gas was abundant at this time, and 







QLD NSW ACT VIC SA TAS
Cost Component proportion of retail electricity 
price in 2017/18
network cost retail and wholesale cost
environmental policies cost residual costs
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an increase in global gas prices which, as the number of CCGT plants were 
increasing in the NEM, raised retail prices for consumers. The increase in global gas 
prices also led to the development of three LNG export projects in Queensland.  
These export developments ultimately limited the availability of local gas for the 
domestic gas market.  This decrease in the supply of domestically available gas 
caused domestic wholesale gas prices to rise further, affecting the cost of electricity 
supplied by gas generation in the NEM (Oakley Greenwood, 2016)   
Forecasts by the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) (Figure 4-3) predict 
more increases for residential electricity prices in 2020, between 15-20% higher than 
2016 levels.  Future price rises have been forecast due to a continuing reliance on 
gas for future electricity supply.  In particular, South Australia (SA) and Queensland 
(QLD) are more reliant on gas generation for baseload demand.  It is also forecast 
that commercial and industrial users could see increases in electricity prices of 20-
40% compared to 2016 levels by 2037 (Parisot and Nidras, 2016). 
 
Figure 4-3 Real indexed residential retail prices - historical and forecast, neutral scenario (2016=1.00) (source: 
Parisot and Nidras, 2016) 
 
4.4 REDUCING COSTS FOR SOLAR 
Between the years of 2008 to 2014, the global price of solar PV modules declined by 
a staggering 79% (Jäger-Waldau, 2017).  In Australia, prior to subsidy, average 
system price (the cost of PV panel plus associated equipment) fell from $12/W in 
2008 to $6/W in 2010 and $3.10/W in 2013 (Johnston et al., 2014) (Figure 4-4).  This 
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reduction in the cost of a system, plus subsidy from SRES payments and the 
generous FiT rate, saw a record capacity installed from domestic PV systems 
between 2010 and 2012 (Figure 4-5). 
 
Figure 4-4 Price evolution of PV Panels and Systems (Johnston and Egan, 2016) 
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Figure 4-5   Monthly data for PV installations in Australia with the record installs  for small-scale PV in June 2012 
(and also showing further record installs in 2018) (Source: http://pv-map.apvi.org.au/postcode) 
This ‘solar rush’ started a boom for the solar PV installation industry.  The amount of 
solar PV installed between 2008 and 2012 led to 11,600 jobs being created in the 
installation industry (UTS, 2016). The competition between installers led to increased 
efficiencies in installation techniques, and helped Australia reach the lowest 
domestic installation costs globally (IEA, 2015).   
‘There has also been this boom and bust for them.  So, although it 
[varying energy policies] has killed off the manufacturing, it meant that 
those who have survived have had to be really efficient.  Not perhaps the 
smartest way to drive efficiencies, but it is an efficient installation industry 
and pretty low cost.’ 
Interview S1 ac 
 
4.5 THE UNEXPECTED SUCCESS OF DER 
By the end of 2012, the combination of excellent resource, high subsidies, high 
energy prices, falling module costs and cheap installation rates saw Australia leading 
the world with the highest percentage of households with solar PV installed, an 
average of 15% of households across the country (AEC, 2016).  This also meant 
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current FiT rates would be unsustainable as more money than expected was being 
paid in subsidies (due to the unexpected rapid take-up of solar, with the expected 
15MW being met within a month (see section 4.2)).  The costs of these subsidies 
were paid for by all energy consumers as part of their household bills (Wyndham and 
Rutovitz, 2016).   
As the costs for solar installations kept reducing, the states quickly sought to address 
the problem of high subsidies and reduced the FiT rate.  The reductions in the FIT 
rate still left anyone installing the system under the new rate with a typical three- to 
four-year payback period on the installation costs of the system. 
‘The impetus in Australia for FiTs has now more or less dropped away 
and that is because the price of renewables, the price of solar has 
become so cheap, that even with the pretty small FiTs that are offered it is 
financially viable.  So the need for FiTs is gone’ 
Interview C3 NGO 
In 2013, FiT rates across all States were reduced and changed to a Net FiT (with the 
exception of Queensland) so that householders would only be paid for what they 
exported to the grid.  Following even more reductions in the cost of a PV system, on 
the 31st December 2016, all SBS and FiT schemes in all the states ended, as PV 
system costs were affordable without the use of subsidies.  Only those in receipt of 
the initial pre-2012 Premium FiT payments had these payments grandfathered.  FiTs 
are now paid by the retailer with no mandatory minimum requirement.  The states 
can set minimums or provide benchmark ranges as a guide for retailers if they wish 
(Table 4-1). 
Table 4-1  2019 FiT rates for NEM states  (Source: Energy Matters, 2019) 
State Scheme Rate c/kWh Max size 










New South Wales Recommended 
benchmark range for 
retailers 





No minimum Depends on retailer n/a 
Victoria Mandatory minimum 9.9 <100kW 
South Australia No minimum Depends on retailer First 45kWh per 
day 






4.6 CLIMATIC EVENTS CAUSE FURTHER DER UPTAKE 
On the 28th September 2016, storms in northern South Australia, including tornados 
with wind speeds in the range of 190-260 km/h caused a state-wide blackout.  The 
storm caused multiple network faults and downed three major transmission lines.  
The resulting voltage disturbances caused settings on the wind generators to reduce 
their output.  This then required a necessary increase in imports through the 
Heywood interconnector from Victoria which caused a loss of synchronism and led to 
one of the interconnectors tripping.  The frequency control ancillary services (FCAS) 
(see section 7.1.3.2) capability of the gas generators – which should have stopped a 
collapse of system frequency was unable to respond at the required speed AND the 
system restart ancillary services (SRAS) – which also should have stopped a 
collapse of system frequency – were unable to start due to unexplained failures 
which led to a collapse of electricity system frequency (Manitoba HVDC Research 
Centre, 2017).  The update report (AEMO, 2017a) from AEMO, and also a recent 
review by the Chief Scientist, Alan Finkel  (Finkel et al., 2017), have recommended 
that value services for FCAS and SRAS from distributed energy and other storage 
technologies should be investigated. 
In addition, on February 8th 2017, a heatwave with temperatures of 41.6⁰C 
left 90,000 homes (AEMO, 2017b) in South Australia without power as AEMO 
committed to load-shedding due to failures of its fossil fuel generators. The demand 
forecasts they had received had not anticipated the cooling demand for the period 
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and the reduced wind power due to a drop in wind speed. A 165MW gas plant was 
‘unavailable’ and unable to start-up in the time requested, needing 4 hours’ notice, 
leaving homes without power in the evening on one of the hottest days of the 
summer. 
These two events happened in an Australian State which has over 30% of 
households with rooftop PV and in which installing combined domestic solar and 
storage is cheaper than buying grid electricity. As can be seen from Figure 4-5, since 
2017 there has been a significant rise in the number of domestic and commercial PV 
installations, which can be attributed in some way to these events. 
 
4.7 NEW STORAGE OPTIONS 
At the end of 2016, there was also an announcement by Tesla that they would be 
introducing their new Powerwall 2.0 in Australia at the same price as the Powerwall 
1.  This essentially halved the cost of storage in Australia as the Powerwall 2.0 had 
double the storage capability.  The result of this meant that in some states installing 
solar PV plus storage became competitive with grid-supplied electricity.  The 
reducing costs of solar and storage in the NEM have now taken DER away from 
being considered a new technology.  DER is now seen as a mainstream method of 
guaranteeing both energy reliability and affordability.  
‘The penny really dropped for me when I was reading our Financial 
Review, our version of the Financial Times, a conservative, pro-market 
paper and it had this big half-page story in it, late last year, with two very 
blue-collar mine-workers sitting in their house drinking cold beers, and 
there was a blackout, and they were stoked they were drinking cold, 
refrigerated beers because they had solar and batteries.  These guys 
didn't give a shit about the environment, this is just mainstream 
technology now.’ 
Interview S2-1 Gad 
In Figure 4-6, the cost of the PV/storage system in the NEM states has been 
calculated for a 10 year lifetime (the average lifespan of a battery system), however, 
if costs were to be spread over a 20 year lifetime, QLD and TAS would also see DER 
costs cheaper than retail prices. These figures do not include government FiT 
schemes, to indicate the cost of the system assuming the customer wanted to 
disconnect from the grid.  In SA, owning a solar and storage system is cheaper than 
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any retail offer and has reached grid parity, a fact that was also evaluated by one of 
the interviewees. 
‘I did some studies when the Tesla Powerwall came out in SA.  I have got 
a database of all the retail prices which I update every 6 hours, so I have 
got all the offers, there are 5300 in the NEM, so I have run these sums for 
10 year Tesla and 25 year PV, PV lasts for all intents and purposes, but it 
doesn't matter, and as at the end of 2016 when the Tesla Powerwall came 
out, it was cheaper than any grid offer in South Australia.’ 
Interview M8 ac 
In AEMO’s South Australian Electricity Report (AEMO, 2016b), with figures based on 
information available until July 2016, expected uptake of combined PV and storage 
systems was predicted to begin slowly and not see growth until after 2020.  The 
report also predicted that retrofit of storage systems would be uneconomical. 
However nationally in 2016, 6,750 storage units were installed, up from the previous 
year’s figure of 500, and this with no government or policy support.  It had been 
estimated that in 2017, due to the late arrival of the Powerwall 2.0 and new 
technology which will ease the retrofitting and installation of storage units, that 
Australia could install as many as 20,000 domestic scale units (Morris, 2017).  A 
report from the Clean Energy Council (2018) using figures from SunWiz stated that 
the number of installations (as at the end of 2017) stood at 28,000 with 12 per cent 




Figure 4-6  Cost of a solar/storage system (based on Powerwall 2.0 cost) assuming a lifespan of 10 years for 
both (after 10 years costs drop to $0), costs for PV taken from solar choice.net.au and solar resource and 
household electricity use for each of the capital cities calculated for each of the NEM states.  No allowance has 
been made for FiT payments to give an idea of the economics of disconnecting from the grid (source: author)  
 
4.8 CONSUMERS PUSH FOR MORE CONTROL OVER THEIR ENERGY 
REQUIREMENTS 
Energy Consumers Australia (ECA), a government body representing consumers in 
the National Energy Market (NEM) run a biennial Consumer Sentiment Survey 
(Essential Research, 2017).  In 2017 findings included (compared with the previous 
survey in 2016): 
 A reduction in the satisfaction with value for money of electricity, with the 
decrease in the ACT at 11% and in Victoria at 11%. 
 A reduction in the satisfaction of reliability across all energy markets. 
 A reduction in the level of competition 
 Only 21% of consumers had confidence that the energy market was working 
in their interests. 
ECA also noted that very few customers were switching between energy companies.  
Reasons given for this was the huge array of deals available, with a range of 
discounts and different rates for paying on time or if you have solar etc.  The 
confusion still occurred when using government comparison websites, which could 













comparison of retail electricity prices in the NEM states 
and solar/storage system costs 2016
highest retail price (Dec 2016) lowest retail price (Dec 2016) cost of storage + cost of system
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‘So many, impossible to understand.  I've tried to, various people over the 
years have tried to extract data from these organisations so they can 
understand bills and so on.  It is deliberately complicated.’ 
Interview C3 NGO 
‘Yes, when it takes thirty-four steps to go through the Victorian Energy 
Compare website and then you’re presented with.  When you have Ron 
Ben David, when they released their report, their review of the market last 
year, said ‘you shouldn't need a degree in physics to choose the best 
energy plan for you’.  When he says, 'I couldn't work out what my bes t 
plan was’.’ 
Interview M7 ad 
Until July 2018, retailers were able to offer discounts that, once the discount period 
ended, would cost the customer more than the standing offer price for electricity. 
Some of the discounts were criticised as they ended if the customer was late paying 
a bill, so effectively creating a high late-payment fee. 
‘I think the major thing that drives us, that we think is ridiculous is the way 
in which the contracts have these discounts.  Marketed with discounts that 
last for a year, then disengage it and then fall-off and then they are 
applying a loyalty tax.  The discounts themselves are all conditional on 
paying on time.  So effectively it is a 30-40% late payment fee if you are a 
week late, or a day late.’ 
Interview M7 ad 
The confusion of rates, and a lack of trust in energy retailers and the energy market, 
has driven some households to install PV as a method of controlling both the cost of 
energy and to give them a feeling of energy independence. 
 ‘…..it is also getting into everyone’s head that solar on your roof is 
cheaper and I think there is also, at the household level, there is a kind of 
emotional thing about a desire to be more independent, to get off the grid, 
not many people actually get off the grid, the notion that you are a bit 
more independent..’ 
Interview M4 NGO 
‘And there is this perfect storm that energy providers are to blame a little, 
that the market has become so complex, and mainstream energy has 
become so expensive and has become such a pressure point now for 
people, that people are trying to gain some kind of control over their 
energy costs and so the solar industry plays very well into that.’ 
Interview M7 ad 
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Surveys conducted by the NSW government into the current uptake of storage also 
noted customer control as an increasing focus for installing batteries. 
‘What we were researching for the guide, was that more people were 
interested in it because of a sense of independence, or taking control of 
their energy use, as tariffs change and because it feels like a tangible way 
to use something you've generated yourself.  It's largely being considered 
by people with solar panels and so it is being seen as the natural next 
step, and that independence was really coming through a lot.’ 
Interview S6 Sgov 
 
4.9 FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AS A DRIVER FOR PV INSTALLATION 
The primary reasons for the majority of households to install DER are to reduce bills 
and manage future electricity price rises (Bondio et al., 2018) (Figure 4-7).  
Environmental concerns are a motivation, but financial considerations are a top 
priority (ibid.). The rising costs of electricity, and the idea of taking control of your 
energy needs, particularly benefits those households who are asset rich and cash 
poor (Hannam, 2019).  This allows households, such as retirees and middle-income 
families, to raise the capital needed to install a system whilst reducing their monthly 
cash expenditure. 
‘So, a lot of pensioners are asset rich and income poor and get a 
concession which probably overcompensates them.  So a lot of them 
have, one of the great theories for PV in areas has actually been in 
retirees where they get to get rid of some of their capital so that then helps 
them, not reduce their pension, but it permanently reduces their bills so 
they get a double benefit.  And then they get a concession on a bill that 
they don't have to pay, they are not paying any money on.’ 
Interview A2 ad 
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Figure 4-7 Motivational factors for adoption of PV in Queensland households 2014 and 2015 (Source: Bondio et 
al., 2018) 
The need to provide financial stability has seen an increase in the number of larger 
systems being installed, particularly in the 10-100kW range.  This rise has been 
attributed to business and small commercial premises installing solar and, in some 
cases, battery storage, to reduce the price volatility of their energy bills (Figure 4-5) 
(Diss, 2017; Roberts et al., 2018).   
‘Originally it grew with very generous FiTs but those have all disappeared 
basically and it stands on its own two feet as an investment now.  What is 
happening now, is that the business and commercial customers, it is 
becoming cost-effective for them to put in solar.  So, there has been a 
huge rise, the strongest growing sector now is the 50kW-2MW.’ 
Interview A8 NEM in 
 
4.10  DISCUSSION 
The combination of rising electricity prices, reliability concerns, consumers’ 
confidence in the energy market at an all-time low, and the favourable economics of 
owning PV and storage, has seen a rapid uptake of DER in Australia.  The speed of 
the uptake was unexpected and driven by a combination of predictable (e.g. tariffs 
scheme) and unpredictable events (e.g. falling costs and climatic events), leading to 
consequences in other parts of the system (discussed further in Chapter 7). The 
initial rise was in part due to the generous FiT scheme, but the falling costs of DER 
technologies and the low installation costs have created a market for DER that is 
now competitive with grid-supplied electricity, even without any government subsidy.  
81 
The favourable economics of PV in Australia helped contribute to the record 
installations throughout 2017 and 2018.  The size of PV systems has also increased 
with the average system now 6.9kW due to an increase in the small business and 
commercial market (Figure 4-5) (AEC, 2019). 
By the end of 2017, the Clean Energy Council (CEC, 2018), using data from SunWiz, 
reported that 28,000 battery storage systems had been installed. SunWiz estimated 
that 42% of this figure was in NSW, with NSW in the same period installing more 
rooftop solar per month than the other State (Parkinson, 2018a).  To complement 
households existing PV generation, some States have announced plans to subsidise 
battery storage and estimates from the Clean Energy Council have suggested that 
by the end of 2019 there could be 70,000 household battery systems in Australia, 
accounting for 30% of the global household battery market (Clean Energy Council, 
2019).  
In 2019, small scale PV (systems under 100 kW), split into two categories have an 
installed capacity of: 
 commercial systems (10-100kW) - 1611MW  
 residential systems (under 10kW) - 6863.7MW (APVI, 2019b). 
 
In 2019, renewable generation accounted for 21% of electricity generation in 
Australia, with 4.5% attributed to small scale (<100kW) solar PV (Clean Energy 
Council, 2019).  Due to the lack of trust in energy companies and the need to control 
against possible future energy price rises, combined with the falling costs of owning 
DER, it can be expected that this trend, especially within the business and 
commercial sector, will continue. However, as will be discussed further in Chapters 7 
through to 9 and has been noted in Chapter 1, trust in the energy industry will be 
essential if the uptake of solar and storage is to benefit all energy users. 
Chapter 2 discussed that the introduction of new objects into a complex system, 
such as those described in this chapter, may create emergent or disruptive 
consequences that may affect the system’s desired function. SET suggests that 
adaptive capacity is needed either within the system to manage a transition while 
maintaining the current desired function, or within system governance to manage a 
transformation to a new desired state.  Government energy policy decides the 
82 
desired function of the system, and the innovation capability within the system 
processes enables the adaptiveness of the system to react to these emergent or 
disruptive consequences. By following how NEM governance managed the 
repercussions of this unexpected event within its system processes, lessons can be 
learnt for how to manage a transition or transformation and to identify possible 
challenges that may occur in similar systems.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand the desired function of the NEM and if/how political, economic, technical 
and social innovation managed the introduction of DER, and whether a transition or 
transformation has occurred. 
 
4.11    CONCLUSION 
Australia’s initial FiT policy hoped to see 15MW of solar PV installed but, due to a 
combination of expected and unexpected synergistic events, the adoption rates were 
far more dramatic.  The consequential effects of a rapidly expanding PV market saw 
a reduction in installation costs, and a competitive market created for the storage 
industry, further reducing the price of a household DER system.  Costs are now so 
competitive that owning PV, and also battery storage, has reached grid parity in 
some localities encouraging the traditional consumer of electricity to ‘take control’ of 
their energy use.  Although this can be seen as a success, in that Australia far 
surpassed the original intention of their policies for small-scale PV, the unexpected 
rapid uptake within the distributed area of the system has caused challenges within 
the NEM.  These challenges are due, in part, to the current centralised governance 
structure (discussed in Chapter 5) and the influence of the coal industry on national 
energy policy (discussed in Chapter 6).  How these challenges have affected the 
technical, economic, social and political parameters of the NEM is discussed further 





5. THE AUSTRALIAN ENERGY SYSTEM AND ITS 
GOVERNANCE 
Australia’s energy systems underwent a series of reforms from the 1990s to the 
present time (Energy Reform Implementation Group, 2007; Hilmer et al., 1993; 
Parer, 2002) which have culminated in a governance structure designed to maximise 
the economic and operational efficiency of a centralised energy system.  Further 
reviews (Finkel et al., 2017) have suggested new measures for reliability, security 
and emissions reduction in the National Electricity Market (NEM). 
This chapter will chart the energy market reforms which have led to the current 
centralised system structure and governance and introduce the current institutions 
within the NEM. During the energy reforms some energy assets, in some States, 
remained under State ownership.  This chapter will show the importance of these 
assets to State governments and discuss how these vested interests within 
electricity supply have caused energy prices to be higher than anticipated.  
Multiple institutions are introduced within this chapter.  For ease of identification, 
current institutions, and their responsibilities, have been highlighted in bold within the 
main text (Table 5-1 provides a summary of the institutions).  A figure showing the 
current governance structure is available on page 92. 
Table 5-1  Reference table for the current institutions operating in the NEM 
Current Institution Responsibility 
COAG – Council of Australian 
Governments 
National policy 
AEMC – Australian Energy Market 
Commission 
Rulemaking, reviews and market developments 
AER – Australian Energy Regulator 
Economic regulator for retail (except Victoria), transmission 
and distribution 
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AEMO – Australian Energy Market 
Operator 
Electricity and gas system operator and transmission 
planner 
COAG Energy Council National energy policy 
ECA – Energy Consumers Australia Consumer advocacy  
ESB – Energy Security Board 
To oversee the implementation of the Finkel Review and 




5.1 ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM 
To understand the current structure of the NEM, it is necessary to look at the history 
of energy reform that happened within the region and began with the establishment 
of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 1991. COAG members are 
the Prime Minister, State and Territory Premiers and Chief Ministers, and the 
President of the Australian Local Government Association.  
In the 1990s, Australia’s energy market reforms followed a time of free-market ideas 
that was happening both internationally and in Australia in the 1970s and early ’80s, 
with COAG’s role to drive microeconomic reform in the energy, communications, 
transport and water industries (AEMC, 2014).  Part of this drive was to conduct a 
review of energy and competition policy with, in the case of the electricity industry, 
the facility to encourage greater connection between the states.   
In 1991, the Industry Commission, in their Energy Generation and Distribution report 
(Industry Commission, 1991), found that improvements could be made to the 
electricity supply industry which could potentially yield a 1.25% increase in GDP.  It 
recommended restructuring the industry from the numerous vertically integrated 
state-owned corporations and enhancement and extension of the interconnected 
systems (AEMC, 2014).  
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5.1.1 The Hilmer Review 
In 1993, the Hilmer Review of National Competition Policy (Hilmer et al., 1993) 
suggested that to encourage competition, and be able to progress using Codes of 
Conduct into a new privatised era, government-owned monopoly companies should 
be restructured.   
The reform process started as a State-based process, with each State responsible 
for restructuring, trialling a competitive market and providing an economic and 
technical regulator.  Each State would follow common guidelines regarding retail, 
distribution, transmission and generation.  The State market trials were gradually 
transitioned between 1991-97 to become the National Electricity Market (NEM) of the 
eastern States of Australia i.e. Queensland (QLD), New South Wales (NSW), the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Victoria (VIC), South Australia (SA) and Tasmania 
(TAS). 
In 1996, after consultation with industry, a National Electricity Code was passed 
(superseded in 2005 by the National Electricity Rules), which contained the market 
rules, to facilitate the move to the NEM. The code was contained within the National 
Electricity Law (NEL), which defined the statutory powers and the legal framework of 
the NEM, contained in a Schedule to the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 
1996.  Any future changes to the legal framework must be passed in South Australia 
first before becoming law in the other States.   
As part of the new statute, two national bodies were formed - the National Electricity 
Code Administrator (NECA), whose functions were to monitor and enforce 
compliance of the code and to establish procedures and rule changes, and the 
National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO), whose two principal 
roles were power systems operation and planning, and market operation and 
development.  This was followed in 1998 by the commencement of the NEM in each 
of the member states (Queensland (QLD), New South Wales (NSW), the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT), Victoria (VIC) and South Australia (SA), (Tasmania (TAS) 
joined the NEM in 2005 following the establishment of the BassLink interconnector)). 
In 2001, COAG established the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) to oversee 
national energy policy to include convergence issues and environmental impacts. 
COAG also recognized the NEM Ministers Forum (NEMMF) comprising Ministers 
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from the NEM states which provided policy and governance responsibilities for the 
NEM. During this time, COAG sought an independent review on the NEM, as there 
had been some criticism of the market. Some States, in particular SA, found 
generators having increased market power and an increase of network asset values 
(due to wrongly perceived future capacity and also regulated interconnectors not 
facing market incentives) causing a sharp rise in electricity prices (Parer 2002).  This 
culminated in 2002 with the Parer Review - Towards a Truly National and Efficient 
Energy Market (Parer, 2002).   
5.1.2 The Parer Review 
The Parer Review found that, although there had been positive outcomes regarding 
(i) integration of markets, (ii) investment and productivity and (iii) security and 
reliability of supply, there were overlaps and confusion within governance and 
regulation.  Parer (2002), recommended that new, separate, governance institutions 
be established for regulation and rules and the oversight of the NEM.  There were 
also concerns regarding the gross pool market, transmission, financial contract 
market and issues with demand-side participation.  It was also felt that carbon 
reduction measures were inadequate and confused, and recommended an 
economy-wide emissions trading scheme (ETS), with current schemes to be 
replaced by this ETS, but with intensive energy users excluded until all Australia’s 
competitors introduced similar schemes, however the ETS was never introduced. 
In 2003, the MCE provided a report to COAG - the Reform of Energy Markets, as a 
second phase of the market reform process that led to the Australian Energy Market 
Agreement (AEMA).  Under this agreement, in 2004 there was a transition to a new 
governance and regulation regime.  The NEMMF was to be absorbed into the MCE, 
with the MCE assuming their electricity market policy role.  The Australian Energy 
Market Commission (AEMC) (under State law8) was established.  They were to be 
accountable to the MCE, and to replace and take responsibility for, the functions 
previously performed by NECA, with core functions to be rulemaking (code 
changes) and to undertake reviews and market developments.  It would have no 
                                              
8 Australian Energy Market Commission Establishment Act 2004 (SA). 
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regulatory function, as the newly formed Australian Energy Regulator (AER) would 
now undertake this role (under Commonwealth law9).   
The AER would now have responsibility for the economic regulation of the 
electricity wholesale market and transmission networks and key rule 
enforcement functions.  Under the new National Electricity Law (NEL) and National 
Electricity Code (NEC), the AER would undertake the electricity (and later gas) 
regulatory roles from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) (remaining a constituent part of the ACCC whilst operating as a separate 
legal entity), and that previously undertaken by NECA. The AER function was to 
regulate prices for the transmission networks, reviewed on a five-year basis, to 
ensure that network expenditure satisfied one of two conditions, either that 
which would be deemed necessary to ensure reliability standards or to 
maximise the economic benefits to producers and consumers of the NEM , out 
of all feasible options identified (ACIL Tasman 2010).  NEMMCO would remain 
responsible for the operation and administration of the power system and the 
electricity wholesale spot market of the NEM.   
For electricity transmission, new planning functions were developed to include an 
Annual National Transmission Statement (ANTS), regulatory tests including the 
economic benefits of increased competition, regulatory tests for assessing wholesale 
market boundaries and market-based incentives for transmission performance. 
There was also a call for options for a demand-side response pool within the NEM 
and a cost-benefit analysis to 
 ‘Encourage efficient provision of reliable, competitively priced energy services 
to Australians, underpinning wealth and job creation and improved quality of 
life, taking into account the needs of regional, rural and remote areas; 
 Encourage responsible development of Australia's energy resources, 
technology and expertise, their efficient use by industries and households and 
their exploitation in export markets; and 
                                              
9
 Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Energy Market) Act 2004 (The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has been replaced by the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)). 
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 Mitigate local and global environmental impacts, notably greenhouse impacts, 
of energy production, transformation, supply and use’ (Ministerial Council on 
Energy, 2003).  
 
Demand-side response was finally introduced in 2018, as a Demand Management 
Incentive Scheme (DMIS) (this is described in more detail in Section 5.1.4). 
5.1.3 The Energy Reform Implementation Group 
In 2007, the Energy Reform Implementation Group (ERIG), established by the 
COAG Energy Council to recommend further reforms to the energy industry, 
presented its final report to COAG - Energy Reform, the way forward for Australia 
(Energy Reform Implementation Group 2007).  It found that there were three main 
threats to competition i.e. (i) barriers to market entry, (ii) governance inadequacies 
and (iii) regulatory inadequacies.  ERIG suggested that these threats would hinder 
the economic success within the national energy industry.  Following this review, in 
2008 the AER also became the economic regulator of electricity distribution 
networks in the NEM and regulated the 11 covered distribution networks.     
 The following year it then also took responsibility for retail functions within the NEM 
to include:  
 gatekeeper for authorisation and exemptions 
 publishing standing tariffs 
 undertaking monitoring and enforcement in the areas of: customer financial 
hardship, compliance with terms of regulated contracts and rules, marketing 
conduct, issue guidance to market participants on the application of the new 
framework and the AER’s enforcement strategy (AER 2008). 
 
In 2009, the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) took on the role 
previously undertaken by NEMMCO and also became the gas market system 
operator in NSW, ACT, QLD, VIC and SA.  Part of its function as operator was also 
as transmission network planner (TNP) with regulation for the TNSP’s by the AER 
and to publish an annual National Transmission Network Development Plan 
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(NTNDP) (to replace the ANTS) which would include future development 
strategies for the networks. 
In 2011, the National Energy Customer Framework (NECF) was formally established 
which contained the new National Energy Retail Law (NERL), the National Energy 
Retail Regulations and the National Energy Retail Rules.  This new legislation was to 
be passed nationally to replace state- and territory-based energy retail laws to 
harmonise protective legislation and reduce operating costs for the energy 
businesses operating across different states, and from 2012 regulated by the AER.  
Currently, four of the country’s States and Territories have adopted the NECF (ACT, 
SA, QLD and NSW). For the remaining State’s (VIC, TAS, NT, WA), of which VIC 
and TAS are the only NEM States, energy retail continues to be regulated by the 
State regulator.   
As part of COAG’s streamlining initiatives, it merged the MCE with the Ministerial 
Council on Minerals and Petroleum Resources (MCMPR) to become the Standing 
Council on Energy and Resources (SCER) with the MCE’s responsibilities for energy 
efficiency moved to the Select Council on Climate Change (SCCC).  In 2013, these 
two national bodies were merged to better integrate energy and climate policies and 
became the COAG Energy Council.   
In 2015, Energy Consumers Australia (ECA) was established as a non-for-profit 
advocacy set up by the COAG Energy Council and funded through AEMO to 
represent the long-term interests of residential and small businesses 
customers within the NEM.  It also provides advice on energy issues to 
consumers and represents their views to the Council. They work in conjunction 
with stakeholders from the energy industry, energy ombudsman, government and 
market bodies, the research community and media (ECA, 2016).  The current 
governance structure of the NEM is depicted in Figure 5-1. 
5.1.4 The Finkel Review  
Following a blackout of SA’s power system in September 2016 (as discussed in 
Section 4.6) the federal government undertook a review of the governance of the 
NEM.  The review was undertaken by the Office of Australia’s Chief Scientist – Dr 
Alan Finkel. The review - An Independent Review into the Future Security of the 
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National Electricity Market: Blueprint for the Future (Finkel et al., 2017) -  made 
recommendations on the themes of: 
 increased energy security within the NEM for increased penetration of 
variable renewable resources, including valuing frequency response, 
synthetic inertia, demand response and voltage control, and also 
cybersecurity due to the increase of IT services within the system;  
 policy stability with recommendations for a long-ranging Clean Energy 
Target (CET) which would see certificates issued for all types of generation, 
with more certificates issued for the least polluting technologies;  
 efficiency within the gas markets to ensure that electricity generators can 
maintain reliability of supply  
 improved system planning to include a transmission and distribution plan to 
recognize areas of future economically viable VRE penetration, also a review 
of regulation to remove the incentives for networks to prioritise over non-
network solutions 
 rewarding consumers including the facilitation of a DER market and a 
change in role for the distribution networks to provide a platform for new 
technologies 
 stronger governance to include the establishment of an Energy Security 
Board (ESB) to oversee the implementation of the plan and to be a 
single point of responsibility and accountability between market 
institutions and the Energy Council. This area will also review the rule-
change process to accommodate the rapidly changing energy market. 
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In total there were 50 recommendations contained within the main points above.  In 
July 2017, the review was presented to the COAG Energy Council for approval and 
49 out of the 50 recommendations were approved.  The council concluded that the 
CET would need further consideration. The ESB was appointed in September 2017 
and consists of the CEO from each of the AEMC, the AER and AEMO and an 
independent Chair and Deputy Chair.  At the end of 2017, the ESB announced plans 
for a National Energy Guarantee (NEG) instead of the recommended CET.  The 
plans have now been dismissed and there is currently no national energy policy in 
place for large scale renewable generation post-2020, or for any emissions 
reduction.   
In 2017, the AER announced its Demand Management Incentive Scheme (DMIS) 
and innovation allowance mechanism for distribution network service providers 
(DNSP).  The scheme would incentivise the DNSP to deliver non-network solutions 
that would lead to savings for retail customers and open competitive markets for new 
business models such as DER aggregators (AER, 2017).  The innovation allowance 
mechanism would be a fund for innovative projects based on demand management 
and efficiency.   
 AEMO published its first Integrated System Plan (ISP) in 2018 (AEMO, 2018a).  The 
ISP identified (i) areas of transmission investment to include the scoping of an 
interconnector between SA and NSW; (ii) renewable energy zones (REZ) which had 
transmission capacity available and also that may require transmission upgrades; (iii) 
the value of DER to the NEM and to electricity customers; (iv) power system 
requirements for a grid that had increased renewable penetration and (v) short-, 
medium- and long-term developments required to enhance the NEM for the 
transition to renewable generation. 
In 2019, a new steering group - the Distributed Energy Integration Program (DEIP) -  
was initiated (ARENA, 2019a).  The DEIP brings together industry and organisations 
involved in the energy system and clean energy transitions.  Following the rise in 
DER in Australia, the group seeks to deliver a program aimed at maximising the 




Figure 5-1 Electricity network governance structure of the NEM in eastern Australia showing national, regional 
and local governance. The arrows indicate channels of communication and responsibility.   (Source: Author) 
 
 
5.2 THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET 
The NEM is now a transmission and distribution grid covering 5 interconnected state-
based networks (SA, TAS, VIC, NSW (including the ACT) and QLD), covering a 
distance of approximately 5,000 km, regulated by the AER, with the energy market 
operated by AEMO under the rules created by the AEMC.  AEMO operates an 
energy-only gross pool market with 5-minute spot prices averaged for half-hourly 
periods in each of the six states.  Bids are taken for each of the six trading intervals 
and the averaged spot price is received by all generators dispatched in the trading 
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interval. A recent rule change, which will take effect in 2021, is to reduce the 
settlement period from thirty minutes to five minutes to provide a better signal for 
investment into the market for new technologies and business models, such as 
batteries and demand response (AEMC, 2017).  It has been suggested that this 
change will also reduce the ‘gaming’ of the half-hourly settlement by gas peaking 
generators and should, therefore, reduce prices (McConnell and Sandiford, 2016; 
Parkinson, 2016).  Risks in price volatility are reduced using hedges, options and 
futures contracts (AEMO, 2016(c)). 
5.2.1 Supply networks 
Ownership of transmission and distribution assets within the NEM is shared between 
private and state actors (Table 5-2).  Queensland’s transmission and distribution 
assets are state-owned, New South Wales still has part ownership of two of the three 
distribution businesses and Tasmania’s transmission and distribution is state-owned.    
Table 5-2 NEM States netw ork ow nership and regulatory roles (AER, 2013) 
 QLD NSW ACT VIC SA TAS 




















































































































































Regulation for energy supply (generation, distribution, transmission and retail) is 
primarily the responsibility of the AER.  However, the state regulators still have a 
responsibility in ensuring compliance with the codes, rules and licensing agreements 
and setting network reliability and safety standards.  State regulators are also 
responsible for either setting a mandatory FiT for solar or recommending a guide FiT 
for the energy retailers.  Victoria’s Essential Services Commission and the 
Tasmanian Economic Regulator still regulate retail pricing due to not joining the 
NECF (Table 5-2).  The regulation period for transmission and distribution is 
dependent on when the state transferred its regulatory powers from the state 
regulators to the AER.  Currently, there is a misalignment between both transmission 
and distribution regulatory periods, and also within transmission and distribution, with 
limited synchronisation of any of the regulatory periods (Table 5-3). 
This misalignment between regulatory periods was raised by some, during the 
interviews for this thesis, as a challenge.  As business plans are assessed at 
different times, this led to difficulties in creating competition between the businesses 
as the benchmarking process was limited.  Also, should changes be required within 
regulation, this would then apply to different States at different times allowing 
positive changes to benefit some customers sooner.  One interviewee suggested 
that aligning the distribution and transmission in each state would ease the joint 
planning that is needed due to changing energy flows on both the transmission and 
distribution networks. 
‘…we actually thought it made more sense to align the transmission and 
distribution in a region which could help the interplay when you are 
involved in joint planning at that level.’ 
 (A6 tn).  
Table 5-3  Regulatory periods for electricity transmission and distribution (AER, 2018a). 
State/Territory Service Provider Regulatory Control Period 
    Date Length 
Electricity Transmission 
Vic Ausnet Services 1 Apr 2022 - 30 March 2027 5 yrs 
Qld PowerLink 1 Jul 2022 - 30 Jun 2027 5 yrs 
NSW TransGrid 1 Jul 2023 - 30 Jun 2028 5 yrs 
SA ElectraNet 1 Jul 2018 - 30 Jun 2023 5 yrs 
Vic/SA MurrayLink 1 Jul 2018 - 30 Jun 2023 5 yrs 
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5.2.2 Vested interests in the NEM 
Although the energy industry underwent privatisation, not all energy assets in the 
NEM are privately owned.  The states of NSW, QLD and TAS still have energy 
assets under public ownership. Tasmania’s energy system is fully state-owned.  In 
NSW the government have part-ownership of two of the three distribution 
businesses.  QLD owns the transmission and distribution businesses and 65% of the 
state’s generation capacity.  Due to the extreme rural nature of QLD’s electricity 
system, the state government subsidises the rural electricity customers through its 
government-owned retail business, Ergon Energy (QCA, 2019), which is part of the 
Ergon Energy Network (Ergon Energy, 2019).  This allows rural Queenslanders to 
pay a regulated retail price (as the prices based on actual costs would be 
unaffordable).  Apart from customers in the south-east of QLD, who can buy 
electricity supply from a competitive retail market, the only retailer available to QLD 
customers is Ergon Energy. As well as the economic element, the political element 
also needs to be considered as revenue from the State-owned energy assets helps 
to fund State expenditure on education, health and welfare.   
‘So the treasury department in each of these states, massively, are the 
most powerful in each bureaucracy, will basically look at the Minister in 
the eye and say, 'Look I understand that we need to improve energy 
efficiency, or we need to introduce some measures to manage demand, 
but if you do this minister, we are not going to sell as much electricity, and 
how are going to fund the hospital you just talked about?’ 
Interview C3 NGO 
Tas TasNetworks 1 Jul 2019 - 20 Jun 2024 5 yrs 
NSW/Qld DirectLink 1 Jul 2020 - 30 Jun 2025 5 yrs 
Electricity Distribution 
Vic 
CitiPower, Powercor, Jemena, 
AusNet Services, United 
Energy 
1 Jan 2021 - 31 Dec 2025 5 yrs 
Tas TasNetworks 1 Jul 2019 - 30 Jun 2024 5 yrs 
NT Power and Water 1 Jul 2019 - 30 Jun 2024 5 yrs 
NSW 
Ausgrid, Endeavor Energy, 
Essential Energy 
1 Jul 2019 - 30 Jun 2024 5 yrs 
ACT Evoenergy 1 Jul 2019 - 30 Jun 2024 5 yrs 
Qld/SA 
Energex, Ergon Energy, SA 
Power Networks 
1 Jul 2020 - 30 Jun 2025 5 yrs 
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The State governments who still have some ownership of network assets (NSW and 
QLD) have seen a benefit from increasing network reliability.  As discussed in 
section 4.3.1, increasing reliability allows the State-owned network to invest in assets 
which increases the value of the regulated asset base, and therefore the regulated 
return on this investment.   
The introduction of the DMIS (Section 5.1.4) for the DNSPs will incentivise the 
distribution networks to reduce capital expenditure.  The reduction in capital 
expenditure will result in cheaper retail costs for customers but will also reduce the 
revenue from the regulated rate of return for the publicly owned networks. However, 
the revenue from the incentive scheme should counteract this loss in revenue, 
particularly for Queensland, which has a high rate of DER ownership and a majority 
rural customer base.  
Some have argued that the NEM and its current governance structure was world-
renowned, but due to the current changes to generation technologies and ownership 
through a rapid uptake of DER, and the lack of clear national energy policy, the NEM 
is currently experiencing a deterioration in its operation (Simshauser, 2018).  
 ‘We have pooled an entire architecture of lawyers, regulators and others 
around a 1990 model and all this stuff, who does that and why? It does 
need a refresh.’ 
 Interview A1 Sreg 
The rise of DER has created a need to reform the energy system so that DER can 
work alongside centralised assets and help to ensure system reliability and security, 
which would also create benefits for DER owners.   
‘…things have changed, and it is not this very simple business as usual 
model anymore, so we are not in a steady-state by any definition.  So, 
decision making, this very rigid decision-making process, trying to deal 
with this very volatile industry’  
Interview M9 Sreg 
The Finkel review, following the system black event, suggested that the NEM would 
need further reform to ensure the reliability and security of the energy system.  The 
introduction of the ESB was seen as a way to bring together the governance 
institutions to help reach a common goal – that of a reliable, secure electricity system 
which would benefit customers and allow the inclusion of new, clean technologies, 
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but there has been resistance to the reforms due, in part, to incumbent interests 
within the current institutions. 
 ‘…the view that within the institutions, the role of the different institutions, 
the one which is the big obstacle is the Energy Market Commission and 
one person in particular, the chair, the chief executive who designed the 
original scheme.’ 
Interview C5 ac 
The political and economic interests of the States have led to difficulties with 
legislative changes within the NEM.   Any changes to legislation have to be agreed 
upon by the COAG Energy Council. The membership of the council includes 
ministerial representatives from the national and State governments.  This has led to 
State politics becoming linked to energy legislation and the vested interests of some 
States slowing the legislative changes needed for a rapidly changing system.   
 ‘So, you have got this whole national framework with State ministers still 
thinking they are responsible and so intervening in various ways.  So this 
very rigid system, operating on a very volatile market, then the political 
context which was meant to enable that rigid system, is not enabling it in 
the way that was envisaged 10 or 12 or 15 years ago when all of this was 
being set up.’ 
Interview M9 Sreg 
The vested interests and incumbency within energy (Lockwood et al., 2017; Lowes 
et al., 2017), and as seen within the NEM, makes change difficult.  The difficulty 
comes from the fact that unless there is a change to the rules and regulations within 
the system – how the companies make a profit – then there is no need for the 
incumbents to do anything differently (Mitchell, 2008).  Changing the way these 
actors operate will require leadership from government, but vested interests within 
some of the State governments have slowed the rule-change process in a period 
when rapid change is needed. 
‘But sometimes things get very slow because they have to get signed off 
by all the state ministers and the federal minister and if a couple of them 
disagree then it doesn’t get through and that can slow things down 
enormously.  Particularly since, you have even got on top of that, you 
have got other issues like some States own most of the electricity system, 
where in other States it has been privatised.  So there will be different 
interests at play dependent on if the government is the major shareholder 
or if they are the regulator.’ 
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Interview M4 NGO 
 
The vested interests of State governments in other areas of the energy system have 
also led to differing State renewable energy targets (RET), and this is discussed 
further in section 6.4.4. 
 
5.3  DISCUSSION 
The culmination of the Hilmer, Parer and ERIG reviews, shows the evolution of the 
NEM from State-based electricity grids, markets and regulation, to the current top-
down, centralised governance structure (Figure 5-1) designed to maximise the 
economic and operational efficiency of the electricity system.  Although the Hilmer 
review also attempted to introduce decarbonisation through a Clean Energy Target, 
the current desired function of the NEM does not include decarbonisation within its 
remit (AEMC, 2019a) but concentrates solely on reliability and affordability.  
However, national and State energy policy incentivises the use of RE in the energy 
system, and is discussed in the following chapter. 
For energy systems to change from their current, fossil fuel-based, centralised 
structure to one which is decarbonised and increasingly incorporates decentralised 
assets, it has been suggested that the governance of the system will also need to 
change (Mitchell et al., 2016; Stirling, 2014b), and that in order to manage a 
transformation, this governance would need to be adaptive (Walker et al., 2004).  
There has been some form of change from the Finkel review, with the creation of the 
ESB and the implementation of the ISP and DMIS, and the DEIP is a welcome 
addition and could be seen as a move towards more adaptive processes, as 
suggested by SET theory (Folke et al., 2005; Hodbod and Adger, 2014; Walker et 
al., 2004).  However, due to the rapid changes that are currently happening at the 
distributed level of the NEM (see Chapter 4), governance of the NEM is becoming 
unfit for purpose and more governance changes, such as the DEIP, may be needed, 
and quickly, to allow for the positive inclusion of DER. 
Due to the vested interests of some State governments and the level of incumbency 
within the NEM institutions, it could be suggested that the NEM is in a state of 
carbon lock-in, as described by Unruh (2000).  While Stirling (2014b) suggests that 
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transformational institutional change is needed to overcome this incumbency, SET 
suggests principles that allows transformation to occur, moving the system to a new 
desired state.  However, moving to a new desired state e.g. decarbonised, may be 
difficult to apply when institutions and governments are benefiting from the current 
system.  The lack of a decarbonisation objective for the NEM suggests that the NEM 
institutions do not see a need to change the desired function of the system, so 
limiting the transformational and institutional change needed.  It may be that the 
NEM institutions expect that the adaptive capacity within the system is able allow for 
a transition without the need for major changes to system governance?  
 
5.4   CONCLUSION 
As can be seen from the history of Australia’s energy system and the reforms that 
have happened within the NEM, the energy system is in a state of constant evolution 
and so the governance surrounding the system needs to reflect this.  Unlike the 
historical transitions discussed in Chapter 2, the current shift to a decentralising 
system, as described in Chapter 4, is happening much more rapidly, and therefore 
governance will need to be adaptive to allow for this rapid change. 
The Finkel review is an attempt to make further reforms to allow the system to gain 
the benefits that decentralisation may bring, whilst providing energy security and 
reliability.  The creation of the ESB has allowed the institutions of the NEM to work 
together towards the Finkel review goals, although there is some incumbent 
resistance to change.  The ISP allows for long term planning, the DMIS is an avenue 
for new business models to enter the market and the DEIP will allow collaboration 
and learning for the incorporation of DER.  The Finkel review recognises that the 
energy system is changing, and makes recommendations for new institutions, new 
regulatory procedures, and new markets, and could be considered a national vision 
for the NEM.  However, by not agreeing on a CET, or any other emissions policy, or 
having any RET past 2020, there is no urgency on implementing the Finkel 
recommendations, suggesting that there is limited governmental support towards 
transformational change, which could be attributed to the incumbency and vested 
interests within the NEM institutions and state governments. 
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6. THE COAL INDUSTRY IN AUSTRALIA AND ITS 
INFLUENCE OVER ENERGY POLICY 
The previous chapter introduced the various institutions within the NEM and the 
duties of these institutions.  Within the chapter, it was noted that the COAG Energy 
Council, which is ultimately responsible for the country’s energy policy, is not only 
concerned with the electricity industry and therefore its decarbonisation agenda, but 
also with other energy industries, such as petroleum, gas and coal.  The chapter also 
recognised that despite recommendations within two major reviews of the NEM, the 
Australian federal government is reluctant to introduce any of the suggested 
emissions reduction policies.  This chapter will introduce, and discuss, how coal 
industry influence within Australian politics has created a form of ‘lock-in’, as 
discussed within transition literature (e.g. Folke et al., 2010; Unruh, 2000), and how 
the federal system of government has allowed some States to partly overcome this 
lock-in. 
Australia was one of the last countries to sign to the Kyoto protocol, not ratifying the 
agreement until December 2007 (Parliament of Australia, 2010) when there was a 
change of government from the right-wing Liberal coalition party to the centrist Labor 
Party, under Kevin Rudd.  In 2016, Australia finally ratified the Paris Agreement.  
Despite Australia ratifying both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, due to 
their support of the coal industry, the current government has shown reluctance to 
create any new emissions or renewable energy policy to replace the current 
Renewable Energy Target, which ends in 2020.  The lack of current national climate 
policy means that Australia may not meet its Paris targets (Climate Action Tracker, 
2018; Murphy, 2019b; Blakers et al., 2019; Hare, 2019).   
The coal industry’s influence over Australia’s energy and climate policy can be 
traced through its role in Australia’s social, political and economic history (Baer, 
2015; Peel et al., 2014); it’s present importance to Australia’s GDP as Australia’s 
leading energy export, with 90% of Australia’s black coal production exported to the 
Asian market (Office of the Chief Economist, 2016); and coal being the dominant 
resource for electricity generation in the NEM (Department of the Environment and 
Energy, 2018).  However, Australia’s federal system of government has enabled 
101 
some States to introduce State renewable energy targets (RETs), counter to the 
national government's position.  This chapter will briefly trace the history of coal in 
Australia (section 6.1) and how the co-evolution of coal and the energy industry has 
influenced Australia’s energy policy (section 6.4). 
 
6.1    A BRIEF HISTORY OF COAL IN AUSTRALIA 
‘We are coal, we are underpinned by coal exports.  The concept of 
the world moving off coal is a frightening prospect for Australia. ‘ 
Interview C3 NGO 
 
The first coal mines were established in New South Wales (NSW) in 1801.  Coal 
mines and timber became the property of the Crown as colonial Britain saw the 
wealth of coal in the NSW area as an enabler of steam shipping in the global south 
(Baer, 2015), an important revenue source for Great Britain.  Over the following 
years, the other States established their own government-run coal mining companies 
and coal became an important resource for shipping, rail and power in the Asian 
Pacific rim.  Promoting further industrialisation, Victoria (VIC) began generating 
electricity from coal, a policy which was soon copied by NSW, Queensland (QLD) 
and Western Australia (WA).  Following WW2, the mining industry was seen as a 
way to develop nationally and internationally, and in the 1950-60s Australia opened a 
new market, exporting coal to Japan (Baer, 2015). 
Australia is now one of the world’s largest coal producers (Lucas, 2016) and since 
the 1970s it has concentrated its efforts on the coal export market (Figure 6-1), 
principally to Asia. 
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Figure 6-1  Australian energy flows 2013-14.  The majority of energy in Australia is exported, primarily coal 
exports (CER, 2015) 
All political parties, at both the federal and State level, have subsidised infrastructure 
projects, such as electricity generation, ports and harbours to support the coal 
industry (Baer, 2015; Peel et al., 2014).  Government support for the coal industry 
had been unilateral and as one commentator noted (referring to 2007), 
‘There was Marcus Ferguson who was the resources minister for the 
Labor Party and Ian MacFarlane was the Resources Minster for the 
Coalition, and basically, they were like best mates in a way. They 
weren’t best mates, but they were.  If you just looked at a quote and 
you said, 'Is that Labor or Liberal?', you could never tell.’. 
Interview C3 NGO 
 
At its peak in 2012, Australia’s coal industry employed more than 63,000 people and 
generated $210 billion in export revenue (Lucas, 2016). Demand grew from markets 
in China, India, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan for thermal coal for electricity 
generation and metallurgical coal for the steel industry.  Since 2012, global demand 
for coal has been falling (Lucas, 2016; Sharma, 2019) but Australia is still seeing an 
increase in its exports (Department of the Environment and Energy, 2018) (Figure 
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6-2) as demand from the Asia regions continues (IEA, 2018).  Some States 
continued to provide subsidies to increase coal production for the expected rise in 
exports (Peel et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 6-2  Australian Energy Balance, Australian energy statistics, table J (Department of the Environment and 
Energy, 2018) 
6.2 COAL AND THE STATES 
‘The coal industry is a massive part of the economy, especially in 
Queensland, and the election revolves around Queensland, it always 
does.  In the last several elections, whoever wins Queensland, wins.’ 
Interview C3 NGO 
 
Australia has a federal system of government and coal remains an important income 
source for the State governments.  The national government sets the general sales 
tax (GST) and income tax, the revenue from which is then distributed between the 
States.  The State and Territorial governments can gain additional revenue for their 
treasury from other sources.  These sources include mining leases and permits, as 
well as government-owned energy utilities, such as network businesses and 
electricity generation (Baer, 2015).  
New South Wales and Queensland have the majority of the country’s coal mines, 
with royalties accounting for 10% of government revenue for Queensland 
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from coal (Cleary, 2015). The importance of coal to the revenues of State and 
national government has put the coal industry in Australia in a powerful position. 
‘those big mining and the coal industry and other stuff have got the ears of 
government.  The traditional industries who are really ... they have 
embedded themselves in terms of donations, when you look at what is 
going on in America it is the same sort of thing, and it is a vested interest 
for them’ 
Interview C4 ENA 
6.3 COAL AND ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
The abundant supply of brown and black coal led to coal being the dominant source 
of fuel for electricity generation in Australia (Department of the Environment and 
Energy, 2019).  Australia has one of the highest per capita emissions profiles due to 
the carbon intensity of its energy system (Lucas, 2016).  In 2014-15, 63% of 
Australia’s electricity generation in the NEM was provided by coal (Office of the Chief 
Economist, 2016).  In 2018, this had risen to 67% (Department of the Environment 
and Energy, 2019) despite the closure of a major coal generator in Victoria and 
Australia’s commitment to meet the decarbonisation targets of the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Paris Agreement. 
Generation sources for each state are made up mostly of coal and/or gas, except for 
Tasmania whose primary source of electrical power comes from hydro (Figure 6-3).   
In Queensland, the state owns almost 50% of the coal generation assets 
(Queensland Government, 2019).   
 
Figure 6-3  Electricity generation by fuel type, and by state and territory, 2016-17 (Department of the Environment 
and Energy, 2018) 
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In contradiction to the need to phase out coal by 2050 (IPCC, 2018), the national 
government are promoting coal power plants as a means to provide security and 
reliability to the Australian energy system (Liberal Party of Australia, 2019a) as a 
source of baseload power generation, and its ability to provide inertia (see section 
7.1.3).    
Although cheap as a fuel stock in Australia, the falling costs of solar, wind and 
battery storage (Johnston et al., 2014; Lazard, 2018) has meant that renewable 
technologies are now economically competitive with new-build coal plants. The 
growth of renewable generation in Australia, and government policy towards new-
build coal, has caused controversy within the industry.  AGL, one of Australia’s 
largest ‘gentailers’ (retailers who also own generation assets), is due to close its 
Liddell coal power plant in 2025.  Rather than replace Liddell with a new coal power 
plant, AGL recommended replacing the capacity shortfall by using renewable and 
dispatchable technologies, such as renewable generation (e.g. solar or wind), 
batteries and modular gas generators (see Dunstan et al., 2017).  AGL stated that it 
would be uneconomical for them to continue operating Liddell and that coal plants 
are the wrong technology for the changing energy system, yet the present 
government are attempting to broker an arrangement with AGL to keep the plant 
open past the decommissioning date (Yaxley and Lowery, 2017). 
‘So we made the decision to close Liddell for a couple of reasons, the first 
is the carbon risk, and the second is as power plants get towards the 50 
year age thing they need to be shut down because they are less reliable, 
but also it is the wrong technology for the changing market.  So, in 
Australia, you have got more non-firm or variable renewables coming in.  
You have got a reduction in energy demand, but you have got capacity 
demand still being quite robust if not increasing.  So, by definition, that 
means the type of plant you want in the market is quick-start, flexible, 
dispatchable, not a baseload coal-fired power station.’ 
Interview S3 in 
The expected continued use of coal for electricity generation from the Asia region 
(IEA, 2018) has led the Queensland government to negotiate with the Adani coal 
mining company about underwriting a controversial new coal mine in the Galilee 
Basin to de-risk the investment  (#StopAdani, 2019; Murphy, 2019b; Slezak, 2017; 
West, 2017). However, other private major and minor coal mining producers have 
been postponing expansion plans due to (i) the reduction in the global coal export 
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price, (ii) the uncertainty of the overseas markets, (iii) environmental sustainability 
and climate concerns,  and (iv) the economic viability of coal versus renewable 
generation (Cleary, 2015; EIA, 2019; Lucas, 2016).  Increasingly, even as state 
governments have continued subsidising the coal industry ($17.6 billion between 
2008-14 (Peel et al., 2014)), the threat of stranded assets is becoming an 
increasingly real prospect (Lucas, 2016).  Yet, despite the uncertainty of the future of 
coal in a global context, the energy and climate policies of the federal government, 
and some States, still reflect support for the country’s coal industry.   
This section has shown that Australia continues to support the coal industry despite 
ratifying the Paris Agreement and the uncertainty of the overseas export market.   
Although burning coal for electricity generation is one of the principal causes of 
climate change, the importance of coal to the revenues of both the National and 
State governments has caused ambiguity in the support for renewable energy in 
Australia, dependent on the political leanings of the serving government at both 
national and State level.  This will be discussed further in the next section. 
 
6.4 AUSTRALIA’S RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY 
6.4.1 The Renewable Energy Target 
Although not ratifying the Kyoto protocol in 1996, in 1997 Australia’s Liberal-National 
Coalition government, under the leadership of John Howard announced a Mandatory 
Renewable Energy Target (MRET) in their statement ‘Safeguarding the Future: 
Australia’s response to Climate Change’ (Howard, 1997).  The MRET stated that 
retailers would be expected to source an extra 2% of electricity generation from 
renewable sources by 2010, an additional 9,500 GWh above the 1997 baseline. This 
is in comparison to the European Union, which at the same time had set itself a 
target of 12% of energy consumption to be met by renewable sources by 2010 
(EUR-Lex, 2007).  In 2000, the Renewable Energy Target (RET) under the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 was passed. The Act commenced in 
January 2001 and was to run until 2021.  The Act applied a certificate trading 
scheme to encourage new entrants of clean generation into the market.  The 
scheme required electricity retailers to surrender a certain number of certificates per 
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year.  Each certificate is equivalent to 1MWh of renewable energy generation (CER, 
2016).   
The MRET target was achieved in 2006, but the Howard Government made no 
announcements to increase the target.  Following this stagnation, the states of 
Victoria (VIC), South Australia (SA) and New South Wales (NSW) voluntarily 
committed to State renewable energy generation targets with VIC – 10% by 2016, 
SA– 20% by 2020 and NSW – 10% by 2010.  In 2009, the new Labor Government, 
led by Kevin Rudd, announced an increase to the MRET to 20% of total generation, 
or 41,000 GWh, now to end in 2020.  The improved MRET scheme also extended 
the certificate scheme to include domestic renewables. 
In 2011, the MRET was split into two parts.  The Large-scale Renewable Energy 
Target (LRET) was introduced to encourage the growth of large-scale renewables to 
achieve the majority of the 2020 target of 41,000 GWh.  The Small-scale Renewable 
Energy Scheme (SRES), which ends in 2030, is uncapped and introduced as a 
financial incentive for distributed generation and heating solutions (CER, 2016).  
Regulation and administration for both the LRET and SRES are carried out by the 
Clean Energy Regulator10.    
In 2015, the now Liberal-National coalition government requested a change to the 
LRET following a reduction in forecast electricity demand, and The Renewable 
Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2015 was agreed.  The amendment was 
delivered as the original target of 41,000 GWh would be more than 20% of total 
energy output by 2020 (because of reduced demand), the agreed total the MRET 
was intended to deliver (Froome, 2015).  The Liberal-National coalition (who 
regained power under Tony Abbott from Labor in 2013) had originally sought to 
reduce the LRET to 27,000 GWh but this was raised to 33,000 GWh as a 
compromise to the Labor opposition and the renewables industry.   
6.4.2 Emissions reduction 
In both the Parer review (Parer, 2002) (section 5.1.2) and the Finkel review (Finkel et 
al., 2017) (section 5.1.4) there were recommendations regarding emissions 
reductions.  However, the use of either a carbon price or an emissions reduction 
                                              
10 Established 2012 as an independent statutory body under the Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 
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policy has not been forthcoming, partly due to the success of the Liberal campaign 
against the ‘carbon tax’. 
‘The Tony Abbot campaign against, on what he successfully characterised 
as a Carbon Tax, was so successful.  It is difficult to convey to someone 
who wasn't here just how unbelievably successful that was and how badly 
Labor managed to defend their position.  So, Tony Abbott just hammered 
on that issue and the legacy role will last for years to come’. 
Interview C3 NGO 
After Australia finally ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2007, the Labor government 
proposed an emissions cap and trade scheme.  The scheme was not passed 
through parliament and it was not until 2011 that the Gillard Labor government was 
able to pass a carbon pricing scheme.  The scheme became a major theme in the 
2013 federal election with Tony Abbott, the Liberal leader suggesting that if the 
Labor party were to stay in Government then the price on carbon would cost 
Australian families $550 per year (Griffiths, 2013).  Abbott's view had the backing of 
the Minerals Council and little support for the scheme was issued from the business 
community. 
‘….the business community did a terrible job of sticking to its guns during 
the Tony Abbott anti-carbon price debate.  The business community 
always had said that they wanted a well-designed emissions trading 
scheme.  They got that, and even though that was still their policy 
position, just because of the intensity of the political fight here, no one 
stuck to their guns.  They didn't kind of counter their position, but they 
went silent.’ 
Interview S3 in 
Interviewees also noted that the success of the Abbott campaign has meant that any 
sort of carbon price, or emissions scheme, is still considered to be too politically 
risky, which can be seen within the Government's rejection of any type of emissions 
or RE policy.   
‘I think the challenge that is coming from the current commonwealth 
government is there are political constraints within their own party, so they 
can't have a carbon price, they can't have a permanent trading scheme’ 
Interview A2 ad 
‘So, we had Bob Hudson supporting renewables for a long time even 
though Carbon Price is something you can't talk about at all here, 
otherwise you get gunned down.’ 
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Interview A7 NGO 
Following the rejection of the Clean Energy Target in the Finkel review, the ESB 
proposed a National Energy Guarantee (NEG), which would include an emissions 
obligation and a reliability obligation.  However, the emissions obligation was 
removed from the NEG and remaining policy now concentrates on reliability, which, 
for the national government, means investment in extending the life of the country’s 
coal and gas generators (Murphy, 2018b). 
6.4.3 National energy policy 
In the 2019 federal election, there was a definitive split in the energy policies of the 
two major parties.  There was a deeper commitment from the Labor Party to 
decarbonisation, as their Energy Policy Action Plan showed (Australian Labor Party, 
2018).  Labor committed to 50% of energy coming from renewables by 2030 and net 
zero emissions by 2050.  The Liberal Party answered this by stating that ‘this 
reckless policy will damage our economy and cost local jobs ’ (Liberal Party of 
Australia, 2019b).  The Liberal Party vowed to back investment in new reliable power 
generation (coal-fired generators) which they believe would ensure lower prices for 
customers.  This split between parties regarding energy and climate change saw the 
2019 federal election with energy as one of the major manifesto items for all parties 
(Belot, 2019; Chang, 2019; Potter, 2019).  However, even though 84% of Australians 
in a recent poll stated that ‘the government should focus on renewables, even if this 
means we may need to invest more in infrastructure to make the system more 
reliable’ (Lowy Institute, 2018, p.13), the Liberal-National Coalition government have 
remained in office.  Currently, apart from the SRES, which runs until 2030, the 
current government have no plans to renew, or further, the country’s large-scale 
energy policy, or commit to any emission reduction scheme.  It has been suggested 
that State policy and the use of AEMO’s Integrated System Plan (ISP) will now 
become the primary means for Australia to adhere to its climate change 
commitments (Parkinson, 2019a). 
6.4.4  State energy policy 
Counter to the federal government inaction on climate and energy policy, some of 
the NEM States have announced renewable energy targets (RET).  Queensland 
have announced a RET of  50% by 2030, despite its vested interests in the coal 
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industry and generation (Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy, 
2019).  Victoria has a legislated target (VRET) of 25% renewable generation by 2020 
rising to 40% by 2025 (Victoria State Government, 2019). The ACT is to source 
100% of electricity from renewable sources by 2020 (ACT Government, 2016).  SA 
had a RET of 50% of electricity generation to be renewable by 2025.  Following a 
recent change of State government, the target in SA has been dropped, but pipeline 
projects and current installations mean that SA will have 75% of electricity being 
provided by renewable generation by 2020 (Parkinson, 2018b).  NSW currently has 
no RET in place but has a renewable energy action plan (NSW Government, 2018) 
to encourage investment (the efficacy of these targets is discussed further in section 
8.2.1.1).  
Due to the decision of the Victorian government not to join the National Energy 
Customer Framework (NECF) (see section 5.1.3), electricity retail pricing is still 
regulated by the Victorian State regulators – the Essential Services Commission 
(ESC). Not joining the NECF has allowed the Victorian government to legislate an 
energy efficiency program as part of the VRET, the Victorian Energy Efficiency 
Target (VEET).  This target requires retailers to acquire and surrender Victorian 
Energy Efficiency Certificates (VEEC) which are given for energy efficiency products 
and services within households.  
Interviewees explained that part of the reason for the decision not to join the NECF 
was the Victorian mandated smart-meter roll-out.  They suggested that, as they were 
the only State to have smart meters, retail regulation decided by the AER may not 
create the value that could be obtained from the smart meters. Victoria is now the 
only state in which all households have smart meters installed, which has enabled 
some of the new products and services that qualify for VEECs. 
‘…because the government invested in smart meters, a big driver for this 
program was to actually show some benefit back to the community’ 
Interview M6 dn 
 
6.5 DISCUSSION 
The coevolution between coal, energy and State energy policy has meant that the 
current energy system in Australia, and energy policy, is ‘locked-in’ (Unruh, 2000) to 
the incumbent interests of the coal industry and, for some States, a vested interest in 
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protecting coal for generation (see sections 6.2 and  6.3).  SET literature has 
suggested that if a system is ‘locked-in’ to an undesirable state then the governance 
of the system will need to be adaptive (Engle, 2011; Foxon et al., 2009; Walker et al., 
2004) to counter this lock-in. It has also been suggested that to counter the inertia of 
the governance institutions then institutional change will be required (Mitchell, 2008; 
Mitchell et al., 2016; Stirling, 2014b).   
However, there is contradiction between support of the coal industry and support of 
DER between some State governments, and the national Government is supportive 
of the coal industry in general.  This is understandable from a macroeconomic point 
of view, as coal is a substantial contributor to Australian GDP, provides additional 
revenue for the State governments and employment opportunities in rural areas.  
However, the effects of climate change are currently being felt in other parts of the 
economy, such as increased droughts causing hardship in the farming community 
(BBC, 2018), with droughts particularly affecting the states of NSW, QLD and SA11.  
As well as drought, the bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef is affecting tourism 
(Swann and Campbell, 2016).  In the 2019 federal election, these effects led 
Australians to decide, among other considerations, which economic benefit would be 
greater to them – the coal industry or the environment. The vote went to the support 
of the coal industry with the Liberal-National coalition winning by an outright majority 
of 77 seats to 68 for Labor in May 2019 (76 seats were needed for a majority win) 
(Sonali, 2019). 
Australia ratified both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, but unless 
Australia reduces its coal use for electricity generation it is unlikely to meet its Paris 
commitments.  A recent report from the Australian National University suggested 
that, if renewable generation carries on being installed at its current rate, then the 
Paris target could easily be met (Blakers et al., 2019), an idea that was echoed by 
the Prime Minister (Murphy, 2018a).  However, due to the current government’s 
backing of the coal industry, and the lack of large-scale renewable energy policy past 
2020, it is unlikely that the current rate of installation will continue (Hare, 2019; 
Skarbek, 2018).  Estimates of an increase, rather than a decrease, in emissions 
above 1990 levels have been predicted (Climate Action Tracker, 2018).  
                                              
11 a further effect of the drought, at time of writing, has been the ferocity of the bushfire season of 
2019-20 (Gergis and Cary, 2020), which may have considerable effect on future elections 
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This support of the coal industry suggests that the NEM is being resilient to the 
emergent change of DER.  For policymakers in the NEM who are supportive of the 
coal industry, growth in RE generation (whether within the NEM or globally) is 
considered to have a negative economic effect on Australia’s GDP and, as such, is 
an undesirable element.  In this case, the current coal-based system will continue to 
be the desired system and therefore, the adaptive capacity within the system (its 
resilience) is protecting coal-based generation.   
Australia’s energy policy has been inconsistent.  The Liberal Party’s amendment to 
the LRET, and their unwillingness to extend targets once they have been reached, 
shows their lack of commitment to the decarbonisation process.  This is then 
countered by Labor support for decarbonisation (although a recent article suggests 
that even Labor policy is too cautious to meet the IPCC recommended target of 
1.5⁰C (Dooley, 2019)).  The changing of governments, and the swing between the 
levels of support for decarbonisation, has left Australia with investment uncertainty, 
particularly for large-scale renewable energy projects. 
The inconsistencies of energy policy at the national level has encouraged the States 
to set, and fund, RETs.  As discussed in Chapter 4, State RETs have contributed to 
greater penetration of small-scale renewable technologies, at differing rates 
depending on the investment by certain State governments.  However, the current 
centralised system of NEM governance, which has been established to maximise the 
economic and operational efficiency of the energy system (discussed in Chapter 5), 
is now struggling to cope with a system that is increasingly becoming more 
decentralised at an uneven rate, dependent upon State policy.  There is now a 
contradiction between the inertia of the centralised system’s governance (due to the 
carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2000) of the NEM institutions), and State renewable energy 
policies (contributing to an unexpected and emergent change). This contradiction 
between state and national energy policy also affects the desired function of the 
NEM, where national government supports the current function (perhaps assuming a 
transition) while some States would like the desired function to include 
decarbonisation (perhaps needing a transformation). Whether this disagreement is 




Decarbonisation of the NEM will not be an easy task due to the complex interactions 
between the coal industry and the economic, social, political, technical and 
environmental aspects of the Australian energy system.  
Environmental concerns, the changing resources for electricity generation, and the 
climate and energy policies of Australia’s export markets, has created uncertainty in 
the future of coal in Australia, yet coal is still being supported by the current 
government.  There is now a split between the right and centrist political parties 
regarding their support of the coal industry, and the need to reduce Australia’s 
emissions.   An election win for the Liberal-Coalition in 2019, has allowed the coal 
industry to continue its influence over Australian climate and energy policy. However, 
despite the vested and incumbent interests of the coal industry in the energy system 
and its governance, the federal system of government has allowed some States to 
create renewable energy targets, counter to the national government’s position.    
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7. CHALLENGES OF DECENTRALISATION 
THROUGH DER 
In Chapter 4, the speed of uptake and the amount of DER was unexpected, which 
changed the structure of the NEM from electricity being generated by centralised 
generation assets, to a combination of centralised and decentralised generation 
assets, so altering system operation.  In Chapters 5 and 6, the centralised 
governance structure and the vested interests of some State governments were 
discussed.  This chapter will show how decentralisation in the NEM, led by the 
consumer through a rapid uptake of DER, has created challenges within the social, 
economic, technical and political spheres, and the difficulties created due to the 
limited ability of NEM governance to adapt to the unexpected outcome of such rapid 
change.  
To demonstrate the interactions between each of the social, economic, technical and 
political system aspects this chapter will be structured under the themes of (i) 
challenges to system operation, (ii) the changing role of the customer and (iii) grid 
optimisation for reliability, security and affordability.  
This chapter introduces how the increasing decentralisation of generation in the 
NEM has led to challenges to the physical operation at a system-wide level (Section 
7.1); how the role of the customer is changing and how it needs to be valued to 
enable this decentralisation to benefit all electricity customers (Section 7.2); and 
although decentralisation has created challenges, how enabling decentralisation can 
also be the solution to these challenges (Section 7.3).  This chapter then discusses 
how the current governance of the system is finding it difficult to adapt to 
decentralisation, in the time needed, to create an electricity system that benefits all 
electricity customers. 
 
7.1 CHALLENGES TO SYSTEM OPERATION 
As DER increases on the electricity system so this raises technical challenges for the 
market operator and the electricity networks. This section will look at some of the 
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major technical challenges that have been encountered, due to the high levels of 
DER changing the system operation, and the governance responses to these issues. 
7.1.1 Demand profile 
As more domestic solar PV generates electricity, so it alters the shape of the 
operational demand curve.  The effect of PV is to ‘hollow out’ the demand from grid-
supplied electricity during the peak daytime hours.  As the sun sets, so domestic PV 
generation reduces, leading to a steep rise in demand in the early evening (Figure 
7-1).  This change in the demand profile has created a peakier profile, or ‘duck curve’ 
(or as one commentator mentioned ‘it is starting to look more like a giraffe’ (M9 Sreg) 
due to the larger dip in the centre of the curve as solar uptake increases), and so 
meeting this change in profile requires changing the type of generation assets 
needed. In a system dominated by coal-fired power generation - which is slow to 
react to changes in demand - more flexible, quick start assets, such as gas 
generation and battery storage, are needed to meet the change in profile (see 
section 6.3).   
 
Figure 7-1 The effect of growing rooftop solar on the average operational demand profile for grid generated 
electricity in South Australia (Source: AEMO, 2018) 
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The growth of DER has also reduced the maximum demand for grid-supplied 
electricity, which used to be on hot summer days, to meet the demand for air-
conditioning, and moved to the early evening.  This can be seen clearly during a 
record event in Queensland where actual demand for electricity during a particularly 
hot summer period was reduced, as DER was able to meet the record demand, 
limiting the pressure on grid-supplied electricity (AEMO, 2018c).  
Figure 7-2  Queensland’s grid demand on 12-16 February 2018 (shown in blue).  Actual demand (shown in 
orange) would be much higher without the effect of reduction from domestic solar PV (Source: AEMO, 2018b). 
The change in demand profile has meant that visibility of DER i.e. the location and 
capacity of DER known to the system operator, is becoming an important 
consideration for the reliable operation of the NEM. 
7.1.2 Visibility 
Historically, there has been a lack of visibility on the low voltage (LV) parts of the 
distribution network due to little, or no, monitoring.  There is also an absence of 
coordination of DER, all of which are causing concern for the distribution networks 
and AEMO.  As the majority of change is happening in the distributed part of the 
system, the visibility of these areas is becoming an important consideration. 
Currently, as part of the SRES (see section 6.4.3), PV installers provide the Clean 
Energy Regulator with small-scale technology certificates. The certificates enable the 
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networks and AEMO to see the scale and density of domestic and small commercial 
PV installations in each locality.  AEMO uses weather and behavioural forecasting 
data to assess how much of the expected demand will be met by local generation, 
and therefore the subsequent requirements for grid supply.  
Currently, there is no such scheme in place for batteries, making them essentially 
invisible to AEMO, causing forecasting issues which in turn can lead to problems 
matching supply and demand, and therefore frequency instability (see section 
7.1.3.2). The SRES is due to end in 2030 which means that any small-scale 
(<100kW) PV installations after this date will also be invisible to the networks and 
AEMO. 
‘So, the visibility issue is something for us, and the controllability.  We 
forecast in SA, on some periods on some days, we will have negative 
demand.  Negative demand by about 2023-25 that period there.  So that 
situation will become uncontrollable if there is not some change there.’ 
Interview A8 NEM in 
In reaction to the challenges that would be associated with visibility, AEMO has been 
obligated by the AEMC, following a rule change, to implement a register for DER in 
the NEM (AEMO, 2019b).  The rule change commenced on 1st December 2019.  The 
rule requires that the network providers must supply AEMO with information about 
the DER connections to their network.  The register will then use this information, 
plus information obtained from the Clean Energy Regulator (CER), through the 
SRES scheme, to create a central register of DER.  The information will be available 
to AEMO and the networks to assist in forecast and network planning.    
Although the new rule change was welcomed by stakeholders in the NEM, there was 
a consensus, during the case-study interviews, and the preliminary and secondary 
consultation process from AEMO, that there was a possible compliance issue 
(AEMO, 2019c).   
‘…then the question is how do you actually enforce people to register 
them.  So, you could have a register, but no one actually registers 
anything, then as there is no subsidy there is no incentive to register.  
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That is what we are looking at, as a complementary legislative thing, to 
say that installers have to register and there will be an obligation on the 
installer, with a compliance framework around it with technical 
regulations.’ 
Interview A2 ad 
When a DER register becomes live, AEMO would be relying on the installers, or 
customers, to provide information to the networks of small-scale DER connections 
which would then become available for the DER register.   
‘So, we are having to think more creatively, how do you get obligations or 
incentives on electricians or other installers?  How do you take it down to 
that next level?  How do you get that information from customers?  There 
are already obligations for customers to advise this information to 
distributors when they do a connection, but there is only 30% compliance 
at best.’ 
Interview S5 NEM in 
The networks currently have no method to ensure compliance from installers to 
provide information, and there is little incentive for installers of DER, particularly 
domestic storage technologies to become accredited (as there is no similar scheme 
to the SRES in place for storage technologies). The stakeholders agreed that while, 
in principle, the register would be valuable to both themselves and the market 
operator, unless there was complementary legislation to enforce compliance, that the 
register would do little but become a central document for the fragmented 
information that was already available. 
7.1.3 System reliability and security 
As can be seen in Figure 7-2, the growth of DER has the effect of reducing demand 
from grid-supplied electricity, which can assist in system reliability, by providing extra 
capacity during peak events.  However, system reliability must also ensure that 
voltage levels across the system are kept stable.  Security of the electricity system 
must also be maintained by safeguarding system frequency and system strength.  
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7.1.3.1 System voltage 
Electricity transmission and distribution networks are designed to transport electricity 
at particular voltage levels.  Disturbances to the voltage levels, either by increasing 
or decreasing voltage, can cause the system to shut down. If local demand is being 
met by local generation through DER connected to the distribution network, this 
reduces the need to import electricity through the transmission network.   
‘Just to reiterate, currently, our average demand in SA is about 1400-
1500MW, it is only a small system.  Peak demand, the highest demand 
ever experienced is about 3300MW, but that was some years ago.  Now it 
is about 3000MW during the summer.  Then, of course, the big thing now 
is minimum demand on the transmission grid.  It always used to be 
around 1000/900MW, it has now been under 600MW, and the AEMO 
forecast suggests that, by the not to distance future, certainly within a 
decade, we will reach the point where it becomes zero, or less than zero 
at certain times of the day.’ 
Interview A6 tn 
The reduction in the need for imported electricity reduces the loading on the 
transmission line causing voltage levels to rise, which then requires the lines to be 
switched off to keep the voltages stable.   Switching off the transmission lines has 
the resultant effect of reducing the amount of synchronous generation available for 
system strength (see section 7.1.3.2) and voltage regulation. 
A similar effect is felt on the distribution network, as voltages are expected to drop 
along the lower voltage distribution network due to the household loads on the 
network.  The network was designed for a one-way flow of electricity with 
households closest to the substation, or the transformer, receiving electricity at the 
higher end of the allowable voltage range and with those at the further end of the 
distribution line receiving the lower allowable range.  As households generate and 
transport electricity this changes the way that the network is being used, creating a 
two-way flow on the network.  This can cause problems when networks have been 
designed to run at a particular voltage level, creating issues at the transformer or 
substation if distribution network capacity limits are breached.  
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‘..suddenly you have got to leave some load to be pushing in, so as you 
go along the wire, rather than the voltage going down it is going up, so all 
of a sudden people at the end of the line are at over-voltage, and you 
actually see this in data, where systems disconnect when it goes above 
250V, so you have an overvoltage problem.’ 
Interview M5 ac 
 
‘So the profile at the moment looks like, as most of it is getting used, so 
really quite negative, whereas that was on a distribution transformer, that 
was 125kW which was starting to get close to 125kW in a reverse 
direction on very highly saturated wires, and that causes upstream 
problems as well that is predominantly about voltage rise in low voltage 
networks.’   
Interview A5 dn 
Recognised as a cause for concern (AEMO and ENA, 2019), many of the 
interviewees suggested that smart inverter technology should be used for voltage 
control and cited a project being undertaken by the Institute of Sustainable Futures 
at The University Of Technology in Sydney – Networks Renewed (Dwyer et al., 
2019) -  which trialled the business case for behind the meter inverter controlled 
voltage regulation.  The results of the trial showed that there was a positive business 
outcome for customers, and the networks, in using behind-the-meter smart inverter 
technology, but that there were regulatory problems to overcome before being able 
to capture the market value that aggregated household services could deliver. 
A possible solution to voltage regulation and frequency control using grid-scale 
batteries is being trialled by ElectraNet, the SA transmission company.  For the trial, 
the network company would own, install and maintain a large battery to use for 
FCAS and voltage regulation on part of the network.  As only a small proportion of 
the battery would be needed for these services, this would allow the network 
company to enter a lease agreement for the remaining portion of the battery with an 
energy retailer, or community group, for storage and generation services.  Using the 
battery this way would improve the regulated benefits for the customer, as it 
improves the reliability of supply, and also for the network as the fast frequency 
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response would relieve constraints on the interconnector, whilst also giving the 
network both regulated and unregulated income from the project.  The Dalrymple 
Project (ElectraNet, 2019) is currently being trialled with funding from the Australian 
Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) and with AGL leasing the competitive market 
element.  Although able to be accommodated in the current rules, the AER has 
raised issues around the need for separation between the regulated income for the 
networks, and services that can be provided by a competitive market (ibid.). The 
need for networks to be able to earn unregulated income was seen by one 
interviewee as an important consideration in a future where there was a possibility of 
the networks becoming deregulated due to the outside competition with current 
network services. 
‘So, I am a strong believer that we will become deregulated, it is just a 
when question.  So despite my arguments about why customers might 
want to remain connected to the grid, I think once you get to grid parity, so 
once a customer has got a choice, that is a similar price to grid electricity, 
well why would you want the overhead, and it is a massive burden on 
society, the regulatory burden of our industry, why would you want that?’ 
Interview A5 dn 
The interviewee suggested that as people are, and become, able to generate 
and store all, or most, or their energy needs, then the cost to the customer of 
charges for unneeded infrastructure would be too great and that alternative 
competition with the traditional distribution networks would become available.  
This would then relieve the need for regulation of the distribution networks as 
they would no longer be a monopoly, and as such the costs would no longer 
need to be charged across all customers. 
7.1.3.2 System frequency and system strength 
The frequency of the electricity system is essentially the ’speed’ that the system runs 
at, which in Australia is 50 Hz. Frequency is maintained by matching supply and 
demand across the network, something that is becoming increasingly difficult due to 
the amount of household generation and storage.  An unchecked change in 
frequency levels in the system will result in a ‘system black’ where the entire system 
may fail, as was seen in South Australia in 2016 (see section 4.6).  To give the 
system time to respond to unexpected changes in frequency, system inertia is 
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needed.  Inertia provides a small amount of time to respond to the disruption of grid 
frequency caused by changing loads or generation, this is referred to as system 
strength. Currently, the majority of inertia is provided by synchronous generators 
burning fossil fuels to produce steam, which in turn spins a large turbine to produce 
electricity. The rotors of the fossil fuel generators spin in synchronisation to the grid 
frequency (at the same speed) and provide, or absorb, kinetic energy from the grid in 
the event of a deviation of grid frequency.  The stored kinetic energy within the 
rotational mass of a turbine provides the inertia, which allows the grid operator the 
time to react to faults on the grid, by preventing power system failure through the use 
of fast frequency response mechanisms such as FCAS (Frequency Control Ancillary 
Services), where loads or generation are required to ramp up or down.   
As more DER and other RE is connected to the electricity system, so the levels of 
synchronous generation are expected to fall leading to a lack of inertia on the 
system.  Keeping the required levels of inertia on the grid requires changes to the 
wholesale market to create a market for flexibility. 
‘So, the issues that we are finding with low amounts of synchronous 
generation, you get into the problems with inertia, frequency control, and 
system strength.  System strength is proven to be the most severe of 
those issues.  System strength is really about how synchronous the 
system is, and how much synchronising torque is applied to keep things 
synchronised.’ 
Interview A8 NEM in 
‘…So, the rate of change of that decline becomes more pronounced if you 
have less inertia, and that is what is happening now.  So, you have less 
synchronous generation online, which is where that inertia is typically 
coming from, and more asynchronous wind and solar.’ 
Interview A6 tn 
 ‘...So how you get the flexible, dispatchable generation, how you get the 
inertia and all that stuff, and how you keep those in the market, is the big 
debate at the moment...’ 
Interview A8 NEM in 
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Wind and solar are asynchronous as they are connected to the grid via invertors, 
which can supply power but not inertia.  Wind turbines can provide inertia by using 
alternative methods of grid coupling (Morren et al., 2006) but this reduces the power 
output of the turbine which has economic and supply considerations and is not 
currently being used. Solar PV is unable to provide inertia due to the lack of moving 
parts.  Battery storage can provide some synthetic inertia capability but not currently 
at the speed required to provide grid stability. 
The challenges associated with an increase of variable renewable generation (VRE) 
on system strength led to a rule change being initiated in September 2016, which 
commenced in September 2017, that required the Transmission Network Service 
Providers (TNSPs) to maintain minimum levels of inertia (AEMC, 2018b).  Currently, 
the minimum levels of inertia are being met by fossil fuel generation and have 
resulted in the curtailment of renewable generation to prevent system strength 
issues (AEMO, 2018d). 
‘They have limited the amount of wind to 1295MW, in terms of actual 
generation for the moment.  They are also now requiring three or four 
synchronous generating units on at all times.  So, this is now requiring 
them to use their powers of direction to require units to stay on when they 
otherwise would have shut off.  That comes at a cost.  We are just 
working through that at the moment.’ 
Interview A6 tn 
To prevent the loss of clean generation, there have been trials to use synchronous 
condensers to provide inertia (ElectraNet, 2018).  Synchronous condensers were 
originally used to provide voltage control in the early days of electricity.  They are a 
spinning mass, and so able to provide stored kinetic energy, but are not connected 
to a load or a generator, and so have been recommended to provide the inertia 
needed as more asynchronous generation is attached to the grid. 
‘It can be provided by contracting with fossils to keep running or you could 
invest in syn cons, that would be...syn cons are relatively cheap.  You are 
not burning fuel to spin them, once you are spinning them you have got 
friction inertia, friction losses are the only thing that really is a thing.  So, 
they are relatively low cost to run and they provide these services.’ 
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Interview A2 ad 
‘So, we're now coming to a conclusion that the most cost-effective way of 
dealing with the system strength issue is to invest in some synchronous 
condensers on our network, and that is what the discussion tomorrow with 
AEMO is all about.  So that could be an investment in four or six units.  It 
is like old technology becoming new again.  We used to have 
synchronous condensers on our network in the '40s and '50s to manage 
voltage, and now they are finding a new use.’ 
Interview A6 tn 
Although an increase in DER has meant a reduction in inertia across the system, 
DER is able to be used for frequency control.  The Hornsdale Power Reserve in SA 
has proven that battery storage can provide fast frequency response (FFR) at a 
superior level than traditional services (AEMO, 2018e). 
‘It has actually exceeded expectations; it has been very good.  We were 
working on that a minute ago.  We are going to write a report in few weeks 
time on how it has performed.  Its frequency control is far better than a 
conventional power station, it is almost instantaneous.’ 
Interview A8 NEM in 
There have also been trials for the use of wind turbines to provide FCAS (AEMO, 
2018f).  The trials were developed to improve the competitiveness of wind 
generation while increasing the supply of system security services. The trial has led 
to the market operator providing additional guidance for invertor connected DER 
within the Market Ancillary Service Specification (MASS) (AEMO, 2018g). 
A rule change was initiated in 2015 to change the financial settlement of the NEM 
from 30 minutes to five minutes (AEMC, 2017).  The rule change acknowledged the 
evolution of IT systems, metering and data collection that has happened over the 
past 20 years since the 30-minute settlement rule was first introduced.  The rule 
change will also maximise the investment potential of batteries and other FFR 
technologies, such as gas peaker plants and demand response.  The rule change 
was made in November 2017 and is due to be implemented on 1st July 2021.  It is 
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expected that creating a market that rewards FFR providers will improve the 
reliability and strength of a grid which anticipates a large VRE/DER penetration. 
In conjunction with the 5-minute rule change, the ESB is consulting on possible 
changes to the NEM market design post-2025 (ESB, 2019).  The consultation 
recognises that the NEM is rapidly changing and seeks to create a market design 
that will support reliability and meet the needs required by the changing generation 
mix.  Following the consultation, a market design for the appropriate scenario will be 
developed from the beginning of 2020.  At the end of 2020, the ESB expect to either 
recommend measures to adapt the existing design, or to recommend moving to an 
entirely new market design, that will ‘provide the full range of services to customers 
and deliver a secure, reliable and lower emissions electricity system at least-cost’ 
(ESB, 2019 pp. 5).  
 
7.2 THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE CONSUMER 
The rise of DER in Australia has created a much more dynamic energy system, one 
where the role of the consumer has changed, from a passive consumer of energy to 
an active participant in the energy system – a prosumer.  The amount of installed 
capacity of household and small commercial PV has meant that, at present, the 
second largest electricity generator by capacity in the NEM, is rooftop solar PV (see 
Figure 7-3) (CER, 2019).   
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Recognising that there is an increasing shift in power, from the incumbent, 
centralised generators towards the household distributed generator, the design of 
the future energy system should increasingly see the customer taking a central role. 
 ‘So, they forget that consumers are driving this now, so it doesn't matter 
what your FiTs or your policy settings are now, it is driven by the 
consumer, so it will have to change.’ 
Interview A1 Sreg 
‘…the customers are right in the centre because suddenly they can make 
choices they couldn't before, and suddenly all these commercial and 
corporate entities are now on the outer circle saying, ‘how can we keep 
ourselves relevant in this environment?’’ 
Interview M3 in 
The central role of the customer needs to be recognised by the governance of the 
energy system, as the customer now has the ability to shape the energy system in 
either a negative or positive way.  As has been discussed previously, energy is now 
an essential part of everyday life, so it is imperative that the impacts of DER result in 
a positive outcome for all energy customers and that the customer's role in the future 
energy system is valued. 
Figure 7-3 Generation capacity in the NEM by fuel/technology type 2019 (source: AEMO, 2019c; CER, 2019) 
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7.2.1 The consumer's ability to cause a ‘utility death spiral’ 
Consumers demand for self-generation was partially initiated by rising electricity 
costs (see section 4.3).  Further increases in the price of energy, in part due to 
situations such as curtailing RE and using traditional generation for inertia (see 
Section 7.1.3.2), makes the installation of DER more attractive to customers and 
could lead to the possibility of Australia undergoing a ‘utility death spiral’ (Box 7.1).  
A utility death spiral occurs as an increasing number of householders generate their 
electricity, which reduces the amount of revenue available to pay for the fixed costs 
of the system.  To pay for these fixed costs, prices need to be increased, resulting in 
the remaining customers facing the increased prices.  These increased prices then 
make self-generation viable for those customers able to install DER, and so on, until 
the utilities are unable to recover their costs. 
BOX 7.1 
Utility death spirals 
The concept of a utility death spiral is not new.  Initially, it was concerned with the 
rising costs of retail electricity leading to a reduction in consumer demand from 
switching or self-generation as a new era of competition began within the electricity 
industry (Costello and Hemphill, 1990).  Henderson (1986), theorized that in order for 
a market to be unstable, and therefore allow a death spiral to occur then the fixed 
cost fraction of a customer’s bill, the network charges, would need to be in the region 
of 50-66% , something which is currently happening in Australia (AEMC, 2016). The 
threat of the utility death spiral has re-emerged in Australia as DER, primarily 
residential PV, has become competitive with grid-based electricity due to high 
electricity prices and the costs for PV installations falling. 
Simshauser and Nelson (2012) suggest that, with the rise in uptake of DER, the 
death spiral effect could also occur because of the comparative rise in peak demand 
when PV generation is not available. This rise in peak demand requires investment 
in new peaking plants, poles and wires but less customer revenue from which the 
utilities are able to recoup costs, causing a rise in prices and more defections.  It is 
also argued that a death spiral may occur when disruptive competition enters the 
marketplace, in this case a synergistic wave of requirements such as technological 
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advancement combined with social need and policy and business development 
(Graffy and Kihm, 2014).  
Authors discuss, that in order for a death spiral to occur a ‘perfect storm’ of 
requirements is needed i.e. inflexible pricing structures, large defections and the 
distribution networks and suppliers unable to change their behaviour (Costello and 
Hemphill, 2014; Laws et al., 2016).   
Articles suggesting solutions to death spirals give a purely economic solution, which 
would allow the incumbent generators and networks to operate in a ‘business as 
usual’ scenario (Eid et al., 2014; Felder and Athawale, 2014; Simshauser et al., 
2011; Simshauser and Nelson, 2013).  No mention is made of the decarbonisation 
targets that instigated DER policies originally and the suggested solutions appear to 
discourage its further uptake. In order to meet future decarbonisation targets, DER 
will be essential, as will designing rates to encourage this (European Commission, 
2015).  This requires new ways of optimising the value of DER for system operation 
while recognising the changing role of the consumer. 
 
The ability of customers to cause a death spiral was not seen as an issue for 
concern by some interviewees, as the benefits of being connected to the grid would 
outweigh the costs of becoming self-sufficient.   
‘I think in Australia, maybe years ago, there was a lot of talk about the 
death spiral and people coming off the grid and then there's more costs 
for those remaining etc. etc., and there was real doubts about will we even 
need a grid 20/30/40 years.  I think we have very much moved on from 
that at the moment, but people do see that the grid has a role to play, a 
different role, it is really the glue that holds all these things together and 
allows them to trade and communicate.  It is an enabler.’ 
Interview A6 tn 
‘I just think the whole death spiral thing is just a bit overstated.  Has 
anyone come up with anything, well it is two or three years later, has 
anyone said, 'there’s the evidence, the death spiral is happening'?’ 
Interview M4 NGO 
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‘I think that it's a good headline but it's a bit overblown because the cost of 
batteries doesn’t make it cost-effective.’ 
Interview S1 ac 
However, with the costs of DER reducing, and in some States DER achieving grid 
parity (Figure 4-6), other interviewees suggested that it is entirely plausible that 
many of the NEM households would be able to reduce their reliance on grid-supplied 
electricity to a point where they are no longer contributing economically to the energy 
system, or they are able to rely on an off-grid system.   
‘One [Powerwall] and you would only need to buy 5-10% power from the 
grid.  When you have got down to 5-10%, your volume is so small that the 
grid cannot sustain a price that will get back sunk costs.  So you have 
already done the death spiral.  There is now a massive write-down of 
assets.  It is happening already.’ 
Interview M8 ac 
‘You will be able to buy a package where you get a big chunky PV system 
and big chunky battery and a small generator and the generator will keep 
you going for those 2 or 3 days a year when you are really running out of 
power….. Put it this way, 2 years ago I would have said, 'Grid defection, 
maybe 15 years', and now 'distinct possibility in 5 years' possibly at the 
outside if there were,.....The thing is we keep being startled by the speed 
of the costs declining.’ 
Interview C3 NGO 
It will become essential that the value of being grid-connected is understood, not 
only to provide grid services for those with DER but to prevent costs to non-DER 
consumers rising to unaffordable levels. 
7.2.2 Customer engagement 
Although there was disagreement about the possibility of a ‘utility death spiral’, there 
was agreement that customers were lacking engagement in how the optimisation of 
DER would benefit all energy consumers.   
‘We've gone down that path with the death spiral and it is true that they do 
all need the grid, but you have got to explain why.  It is not that you need it 
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for the power, it is the other services and products that can be provided to 
you, but there are all these other options for you if you stay.  But again, 
you have got to make it palatable for them, you have got to design the 
system to allow that.  If you just say we are going to keep the same 
system and you just have to stay on board, then, of course, they will want 
to go, there is no point.’ 
Interview C4 ENA 
Research for the OPEN Energy Networks report (AEMO and ENA, 2019) has shown 
that the additional services that DER can provide, such as reserve capacity and 
demand response, would help to reduce costs of electricity supply to all customers.  
Providing these services requires the customer to becoming engaged with the 
energy market and the services that DER can offer.  However, many interviewees 
suggested that customers were not interested in engaging in market services and 
that as they could generate virtually all of their energy requirements, there was little 
need for them to become engaged.   
‘When you get 95% of your production from your battery and a solar 
system on your roof, what do you care about the National Energy Market, 
what does it mean to you?’ 
Interview M8 ac 
‘There is a lot in Power Transformers too about how much is predicated 
on consumer engagement in energy policy and what a folly that is.  I think 
Victoria [smart meter roll-out] is a fantastic case study for where you can 
potentially end up if you set your direction with the built-in assumption of 
high engagement from a consumer base.’ 
Interview M7 ad 
The lack of engagement, combined with the continual reduction of DER 
technology costs, makes it understandable that AEMO and the ENA  are 
concerned about ‘the limited window of opportunity’ (AEMO and ENA, 2019 
pp.9) that is available to gain the grid benefits from DER (Smith, 2019) and to 
persuade consumers that engaging in the energy system will benefit them.  
Persuading customers to engage requires that customers trust the energy 
industry and institutions to act in their best interests. 
7.2.3 Customer trust 
Another of the drivers for the uptake of solar was the lack of trust that customers 
have of the energy industry and institutions, and the desire for energy independence.   
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‘We are really trying to find a way and take this out of this kind of esoteric 
kind of debate and get it across to consumers about why you need it, 
because as far as they are concerned in Australia, the feeling is, ‘I have 
been screwed my network, costs going up by 70% real in 10 years, my 
best opportunity is independence of some kind.’’ 
Interview S1/2 ac 
‘But there is a bit of a lack of trust, but I think if you can make it so 
consumers see a real big difference on their power bills and it is 
automated and you build it from there, it will start to be effective, and they 
will choose who they operate with.  Who do they trust?  Maybe someone 
else who is more trusted and has that consumer interface and just does 
contracts with energy businesses, it is hard to know.’ 
Interview S5 NEM in 
Yet, an engaged and trusting prosumer will be a key requirement to resolve the 
technical, economic and social challenges attributed to an increased use of DER 
(AEMO and ENA, 2019). 
Acknowledging the difficulties associated with consumer engagement and trust, and 
also to make use of the Victoria smart meter roll-out, Jemena (one of Melbourne’s 
DNSPs) trialled a household demand response initiative – Power Changers 
(Jemena, 2019).  The trial required both DER and non-DER customers to use 
behavioural methods, such as pre-cooling of the home or increasing air conditioner 
temperatures, to reduce electricity demand during peak events.  An important result 
of the trial was that the customers had more understanding of how customer actions 
could affect the network and that the trial was a valuable first step in both the 
network and the customer understanding and communicating with each other. 
‘Well that's the thing, it's a toe in the water.  It's a building up of 
relationship, a building up of their understanding of what is going on and 
why we need their help.  We are building a relationship we have never 
had in the past.  We have always sat in the background, under a rock, no 
one is talking about us.  So, this starts to get that meaningful relationship 
starting to happen.   Now after that progresses for a while maybe, you 
know, and we want to test this too, maybe they will feel comfortable with 
us cycling on and off their air conditioners and delivering greater impact 
through that, but we don't know.  We have got to try those things out 
through the process, but it didn't make sense to start with that because 
you just go ‘Big Brother!’.’ 
Interview M6 dn 
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7.2.4 Customer protections  
Another focus for many interviewees was that as customers become central to the 
energy system, national consumer protections and technology standards would need 
to be reviewed to recognise the changing energy system and the role of prosumer 
within that. 
‘Obviously one of the most exciting things going on at the moment is 
seeing these models emerge.  Whatever the model, is that the customer 
in metronomic consistency, can get the same local self-protections and 
services and so forth.’ 
Interview M9 Sreg 
‘Whether you have got that thin connection to the grid, a normal one or no 
connection, customers expect the same sort of service.  They need the 
same protections.  How do you regulate that effectively but without too 
much retained, but with appropriate connection?  All those standards 
really. What is an essential service?’ 
Interview S5 NEM in 
One aspect of decentralisation that is particularly relevant for the NEM is that, in 
some rural areas, creating a microgrid will improve reliability and reduce costs for all 
customers. Currently, rural customers are served from long distribution lines, which 
can be several hundred kilometres long and which require expensive maintenance.  
Removing these lines will then reduce O&M costs for the networks and, as the cost 
of connection is spread equally among all the States’ customers, reduce energy 
prices for everyone. Consumer protections, in this case, need to be updated to 
reflect the limited competition and the right to be connected to an essential service. 
‘We need consumer protections for people who disconnect from the grid 
before we start encouraging people to disconnect or allow networks to 
disconnect them.  So, there is a bunch of discussions going on about 
reliability frameworks, price protection, consumer frameworks etc. etc.’ 
Interview M4 NGO 
The AEMC has recognised that there is a need for changes to the National Electricity 
Customer Framework (NECF)12 (AEMC, 2019b).  The changes made to the 
legislation are to ensure that customers can access the new business models that 
will become available while ensuring that customers are adequately protected.  A 
                                              
12 The NECF applies only in the NEM states (excluding Victoria and Tasmania) and is the legislation that 
regulates the sale and supply of electricity and gas to retail customers. 
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review was undertaken in October 2019 to update consumer protections so that they 
are fit for purpose for new household demand response and DER (ibid.). 
The AEMC also undertook a review of the regulatory frameworks for stand-alone 
power systems (SAPS), which includes both microgrids and individual systems 
(AEMC, 2019c).  The review is closely aligned to the rules for consumer protections 
within embedded networks and requires the networks to ensure that, if SAPS are 
more economically efficient than a wired connection, then appropriate consumer 
protections and service standards are maintained.  
 
 
7.3 GRID OPTIMISATION FOR RELIABILITY, SECURITY AND AFFORDABILITY 
In the previous sections, the challenges of increasing DER penetration have been 
highlighted.  As discussed, the solutions to many of the challenges caused by 
increasing DER penetration can be met by new technologies, new business models, 
new markets and a changing role for the customer.  Many of these solutions require 
the customer to change their behaviour and become engaged with the energy 
system, all of which will require the customer to have trust in the energy industry.  
Within the solutions, there was also a need to review the rules and regulations so 
that NEM governance can be optimised for the inclusion of DER i.e. working for the 
benefit of both the consumer and the grid while ensuring that energy remains secure, 
reliable and affordable. 
Optimising governance for DER requires reviewing the current rules and regulations 
and how customers will pay for energy in the future.  This section will highlight some 
of the trials and solutions currently being discussed in the NEM that may provide the 
social, economic and technical benefits needed for this optimisation. 
7.3.1 Network regulation 
Currently, network charges are decided by a five-year price control.  The network 
companies deliver their business plans to the AER which then assesses the plans 
and advises the networks on their allowed revenue for the coming five years.  The 
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AER uses incentive-based regulation based on the revenue cap for their operating 
(OPEX) and capital expenditure (CAPEX).  Should the network spend less than their 
future OPEX/CAPEX estimate, e.g. by more efficient use of their resources, then 
they are rewarded by ‘keeping the difference’ between the allowance, and vice versa 
should they overspend (AER, 2014).  This method of regulation has resulted in some 
‘gaming’ of the system with the regulator. 
‘So, if you look at it purely from a strategic perspective.  If that is what we 
think we really need, why wouldn't you put in something higher? Because 
if that is what we really need and the regulator cuts that, then you have 
got less than what you really need.  That has always been the regulatory 
game, so we were quite upfront with Paula about that, that there was a 
real issue of trust here.’ 
Interview A6 tn 
To reduce the amount of gaming between networks and the regulator, one of the 
Victorian network companies have been trialling a new method of producing 
business plans - the New Reg process (AER, 2018b).  This process requires the 
network company to work with a Consumer Forum, a knowledgeable forum with 
representatives from industry, and also from the residential and small commercial 
sector.  Working with the Consumer Forum the networks produce a business plan for 
the expected spending in their distribution area over the next five-year period.  This 
is then scrutinised by a national Consumer Challenge Panel, before being sent to the 
regulator.  The premise of this more customer-centric network regulation is to allow 
the network to work more closely with all their customers and to give the customers a 
stronger voice in the business plan process.  By producing a plan in this much more 
transparent way it is hoped that ‘gaming’ around the business plan process would be 
reduced, as the AER would be more amenable to agreeing the suggested revenue 
figure.  The method also allows the network to gain a more meaningful relationship 
with its customer base.  This process is currently being trialled with AusNet services, 
a Victorian DNSP, who have spent the last 18 months in a series of ‘Deep Dives’ 
with their customers, and have prepared a draft proposal for their Customer Forum 
(AusNet Services, 2019).  The final plan is due to be submitted to the AER by 31st 
January 2020. 
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As discussed in previous sections, many of the solutions trialled for creating a viable 
DER market to alleviate grid and market challenges were impeded by the current 
rules and regulations. As part of the 2019 Economic regulatory framework review, 
the AEMC has released a report, Integrating distributed energy resources for the grid 
of the future (AEMC, 2019d). The report recognises that networks need to be 
incentivised to change the way they operate i.e. use non-network and smart 
solutions to alleviate grid constraints and to become a platform for the coordination 
of DER services.  There are currently no penalties, or incentives, for DNSPs who 
either constrain off or increase hosting capacity for DER.  The report recognises the 
difficulty of visibility on the LV network and expects that an incentive scheme for 
DNSPs ‘may need to be implemented over some years’ (AEMC, 2019b, pp.28).  
However, this ‘some years’ is contrary to a ‘limited window of opportunity’ recognised 
by the ENA and AEMO (AEMO and ENA, 2019, pp.9) and which is discussed further 
in section 7.4. 
7.3.2 Paying for the grid 
In a DER enabled grid, prosumers will be able to invest in generation and storage 
technologies and optimise their investment to gain revenue by selling services to the 
energy market.  This type of optimisation will reduce electricity prices for all 
customers.  However, even with DER helping to reduce prices there is still the 
question again around the death spiral scenario i.e. if prosumers are now earning 
revenue from grid services, requiring them to be attached to the grid, who is paying 
for the fixed costs of the grid? 
‘You read a lot of this, like the Network Transformation Roadmap and you 
walk away from that saying, 'We are all going to end up rich.  People will 
pay us to use electricity and they will pay everyone.'  But it actually 
doesn't work, someone has to pay for the stuff.’ 
Interview A4 ac 
Currently, revenue for the fixed and variable costs of electricity supply and 
generation is collected from customers through their energy bills, via a charge per 
kWh.  Some retailers now also charge a standing charge to cover the fixed costs of 
network charges.  The costs of electrical transport are socialised across State 
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customers so that all customers, within that particular State, are paying an equal 
amount regardless of the actual cost of connection, or how they are using their 
capacity.  The problem now being discussed by energy professionals in Australia is, 
how to have cost-reflective pricing that will benefit all customers?  Some 
interviewees suggested that the standing charge also needs to reflect the amount of 
demand i.e. the amount of network capacity a household requires, as well as the 
amount of energy they used.   
‘I think the death spiral concept was really around trying to make sure that 
if you are going to charge a fixed charge it has to be based on demand, 
not just that everyone pays the same.  So, if you are a household, 
particularly in Australia where you have huge air-conditioning penetration, 
you have at the moment got some relatively low-income households 
subsidising high-income households because the price is on energy, not 
demand.’ 
Interview S3 in 
The time and location costs of energy were also highlighted as an area for debate, 
as energy use and customer export may either help or hinder the grid. 
‘If you could earn money from your excess electricity at a time when it is 
going to help the network deliver the power quality, power reliability and 
energy that is their role.  If you can add some value, and they will pay you 
some money, then that's what we are talking about. How can we facilitate 
that kind of transaction?’ 
Interview S1/2 ac 
The networks have started including a demand charge for peak hours in some of 
their tariff structure statements (AER, 2019), but these types of demand charges 
have been criticised as not truly aligning to the customer's contribution to peak 
demand with the amount paid on the customer bill (Passey et al., 2017).  It has also 
been suggested that having various time-of-use, capacity limits and demand charges 
on bills is confusing for the customer (CSIRO, 2018; Markham, 2019). 
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 ‘When we did some work with SAPN a couple of years ago, on principles 
for pricing reform …. There were four key things that came out of it, but 
the most prevalent one was simplicity, let's just keep it simple.’ 
Interview A3 NGO 
Some of the interviewees felt that the best solution to cost-reflective pricing would be 
a simple, monthly payment.  The payment would allow customers to enter a contract, 
similar to a data contract for a mobile phone, based around their expected maximum 
usage or maximum capacity requirement.   
‘There's some bigger changes, and as we move towards this 
infrastructure energy where it is all about capital and there is little fuel 
costs as part of the equation, is the natural move then toward it is just a 
fixed price, lump sum, like your internet?  You buy the gold membership to 
AGL Club and you get your stuff.  If that is where we are heading, then 
maybe a lot of this more nuanced stuff isn't quite so relevant to the 
government’. 
Interview A3 NGO 
Cost reflective pricing is seen as a method of allowing all energy users to pay their 
‘fair share’ towards grid costs, and also as a method of flattening out peak events.  
The increased political power of the household solar owners, due to their numbers, 
may create difficulty for policymakers and the regulator if solar owners feel that their 
contribution to decarbonisation is not recognised.  The imperative is then to design a 
pricing mechanism that is seen as fair by all users of the grid. 
‘The fall-out of trying to unwind volumetric benefits to solar households 
are incrementally getting it through.  But you have had utility 
commissioners sacked.  A guy in Nevada was sacked for introducing a 
proper cost-reflective pricing.  The solar lobby went completely mental, 
’this is a tax on the sun, tax on solar.’ 
Interview S2/1 Gad 
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7.3.3 Optimising DER for grid and customer benefits 
Optimising DER is the solution to many of the challenges mentioned.  Using a 
separate distributed energy market would allow customers who have DER installed 
to deliver grid benefits to the system, which would then reduce electricity costs for all 
customers (AEMO and ENA, 2019). There are initiatives to create a distributed 
energy market (DEM) in the NEM, with four market models under consultation.  The 
consultation is questioning which framework would be optimal for both the customer 
and the NEM, whether it should be AEMO led, independent or using a distribution 
system operator (DSO) model (ENA, 2017b), with either the DSO running a local 
market or the DSO communicating to AEMO.  The independent DSO model would 
not require the distribution networks to change their current role.  Within each of the 
scenarios, the DSO has different characteristics and levels of management 
dependent on the model chosen.  Each of the models would require a review of the 
National Electricity Rules and network regulation, and to establish operating 
standards or guidelines. 
 
7.4 THE FUTURE GRID 
This chapter has introduced some of the challenges of DER penetration, some of the 
innovations that have stemmed from meeting these challenges, and how the 
changing role of the consumer will require changes to the way networks are 
regulated and paid for. It is recognised by the institutions of the NEM that the 
optimisation of DER (i.e. allowing innovation in business and technology to create 
the services needed for the new prosumer, which in turn will reduce prices for all 
consumers), may alleviate the grid and cost pressures that the NEM is currently 
experiencing.  Utilising smart systems, such as Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) (AGL, 
2017; Government of South Australia, 2017), DER can gain entry into the wholesale 
market.  Distribution energy exchanges (ARENA, 2017) can operate a distribution 
level market which can operate synergistically with the wholesale market.  Using 
smart meters can enable household demand response initiatives reducing the need 
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for network augmentation (Jemena, 2019).  Utilising a smart grid will give the 
prosumer the ability to reduce costs for all customers. 
As mentioned previously, the value of the smart grid has been recognised by AEMO 
and the ENA in a recent report (AEMO and ENA, 2019).  Within the report, AEMO 
also acknowledged that, due to falling costs and global emission policies, the market 
for storage and other DER technologies, and enabling technologies, was increasing 
rapidly.  The speed of uptake has meant that there is a ‘limited window of opportunity 
to reposition our electricity system to deliver efficient outcomes to customers’ (ibid., 
pp.9).  The report acknowledges that without effective coordination of DER, then 
AEMOs ability to maintain the effective operation of the NEM within secure operating 
limits will decrease.   
‘So we really, at AEMO, we really believe we have to ramp up the 
distributed energy resources area because we kind of see it as a major 
potential benefit, and if we can make demand more flexible it is going to 
be really helpful with a lot of renewable energy on to the system.  On the 
other hand, if we don't do something it will actually be a problem.  So, you 
have a solution and your worst problem.’ 
Interview A8 NEM in 
A major consideration is that many of the solutions to the challenges in the 
NEM are reliant on customer engagement and trust.  For DER benefits to be 
realised, DER needs to be visible to the market operator, helping to create a 
new flexible system.  As such, visibility would increase the adaptive capacity of 
the physical system by allowing for social, technical and economic innovations 
to capture new value for both the system, through flexibility, and for the 
customer, through equity.  As householders own the majority of DER in the 
NEM, gaining this visibility requires customers to trust the institutions and 
industries of the NEM. To gain customer trust, NEM governance may need to 
increase the transparency and legitimacy of its decision-making.  Within SET, 
authors suggest that this transparency and legitimacy can be achieved through 
an increase in customer involvement in the decision making processes (e.g. 
Nelson et al., 2008; Westley et al., 2011), and a move to New Reg (AER, 
2018b) may be a method to achieve this.   
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Within each of the sections above, solutions to the challenges of a highly 
saturated DER grid have been suggested, but within each of the solutions 
comes a need to review the rules and regulations, and either apply for a rule 
change; or establish an entirely new rule; or cause the regulators to decide 
whether a solution fits within the current regulations; or whether changes are 
needed within the regulatory system.  Adaptive governance recognises that the 
rules and regulations need to have a high adaptive capacity, so able to respond 
quickly to changes within the system, achieved through increased innovation 
capabilities, something that is also recognised in the AEMC.  What has also 
been noted, both within the interviews and within possible changes to the 
NECF, is that to encourage the ‘correct’ solutions, coordination will also need to 
provide boundaries in which the solutions/innovations may operate and that this 
may take the form of consumer protections. The AEMC has initiated reviews 
into the rulemaking process to allow for swifter rule changes (AEMC, 2018c) 
and has also recommended a regulatory ‘sandbox’ to be created (AEMC, 
2019e).  The sandbox allows innovative proof-of-concept trials facilitated by 
relaxing the regulatory requirements. The creation of the sandbox, in 
conjunction with a faster rulemaking process, may allow new concepts faster 
access to the market, thus increasing the innovation capabilities within the 
NEM, with changes in the NECF providing the boundaries in which these 
innovations may operate. 
To complete the recommendations of the Finkel Review, changes are needed to the 
rules, regulations and to system and market operations in the NEM, and particularly 
in the distributed level.  The ESB is embracing this by suggesting creating an entirely 
new market designed around flexibility (ESB, 2019).  The AEMC has recognised 
fourteen separate reviews that need to be undertaken around markets, pricing and 
regulation to enable DER (AEMC, 2019d).  However, as mentioned previously, the 
AEMC has suggested that a review of regulation ‘may need to be implemented over 
some years’ (AEMC, 2019b pp.28), contrary to the current speed of change in the 
NEM and also contrary to adaptive governance principles which are anticipatory 
rather than reactionary. 
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The many reviews needed, to make the changes within governance that can 
optimise DER for the benefit of all customers, will all take time to complete, and time 
is no longer on Australia’s side.  The Northern Territory’s state-owned Territory 
Generation has already had to write-down assets, due to the reduction of revenue 
from their customer base because of the increased uptake of solar (Territory 
Generation, 2019).  Synergy, Western Australia’s state-owned generation and retail 
arm, have also posted huge losses, again citing the increase in household solar and 
reducing levels of revenue, as one of the reasons for the losses (Synergy, 2019). 
With Australia’s rooftop PV installations setting another equal record for September 
2019 of 180MW, there is no sign of the rooftop boom slowing down (Parkinson, 
2019b). 
There is some recognition of the effect that increased DER has on system 
operation and the need to engage with customers. AGL, for example, are 
attempting to change their generation assets away from coal and towards more 
flexible generation (Dunstan et al., 2017) so allowing themselves to keep 
relevant in the changing market.  Some of the distribution and transmission 
companies are trialling new regulation methods and new business models to 
improve their customer engagement (AusNet Services, 2019; ElectraNet, 2018; 
Jemena, 2019). Whether the work now being undertaken in Australia will be 
completed in time to allow the changes happening within the NEM to be 
equitable is still unsure, as governance is struggling to match the current speed 
of the changes occurring at the distributed system level.  
To achieve a DER enabled grid, in a way that will allow innovation to flourish, 
and be equitable for all energy users, there will need to be changes to the 
governance of the NEM.  It is questionable whether some aspects of the 
current system and its governance are fit for purpose for an energy system 
undergoing rapid change. If the governance of the NEM does not adapt quickly, 
matching the rapid changes that are taking place, then the future, as one 
regulator described, could end up becoming ‘this never-ending game of whack-




What the NEM case study has shown, is the unpredictability and complexity of 
change within energy systems.  In the case of the NEM, the economics of falling 
technology costs, combined with high prices and a distrust of the energy industry, 
have created challenges within the energy system. Renewable technologies and 
accompanying business models are now competing (and in some cases winning) 
with the incumbent utilities.   
Customer preferences have caused the energy system to become decentralised 
more rapidly than anticipated, which has created system and governance 
challenges.   The speed of system change in the NEM has left NEM governance in a 
constant state of reaction as the institutions try to ensure that DER can remain a 
positive part of the energy system.  As AEMO and the ENA have stated (AEMO and 
ENA, 2019), DER is an essential component of a decarbonised grid, and the 
challenges of incorporating DER can be met by through new and innovative methods 
to gain the value that DER can bring, which needs changes to governance. 
This chapter has highlighted the effects of a rapid change to an energy system, and 
the challenges this causes within all the different system parameters.  The NEM has 
shown how a system needs to be nimble to react to these changes wherever and 
whenever they happen, to deliver efficient outcomes for customers in the time 
required.  How this may be achieved is discussed in the next chapter.  
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8. AN ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
FOR CHANGE WITHIN ENERGY SYSTEMS: 
LESSONS FROM THE NEM 
This chapter uses lessons learnt from the NEM case study to create an adaptive 
governance framework that may assist in enabling decentralisation in the current 
energy system.  This is achieved by first assessing whether the NEM needs to 
undergo, or is undergoing, a transformation, rather than a transition and how this 
relates to the carbon lock-in of NEM governance, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
The presence of adaptive governance principles in the NEM are assessed by 
reviewing the DER uptake discussed in Chapter 4, the governance reactions to this 
uptake, and the associated challenges, discussed in Chapter 7 (the results are 
illustrated in Table 8-2, page 167).   The framework suggested at the end of this 
chapter combines the principles of adaptive governance as suggested by SET 
literature with the practical examples from the NEM case study, to create an adaptive 
governance framework for practical application that may assist in energy system 
decentralisation.  
Section 8.1 discusses the current governance structure of the NEM and whether a 
transformation is needed (or is happening).  Section 8.2 then discusses innovation in 
the NEM in relation to the adaptive governance principles of SET theory.  Based on 
lessons learnt from the NEM, section 8.3 suggests an adaptive governance 
framework for the decarbonisation and decentralisation of energy systems, such as 
that in GB. 
 
8.1  IS TRANSFORMATION HAPPENING, OR NEEDED, IN THE NEM? 
In Chapter 2, it was discussed that a system would need to either transition or 
transform dependent on whether the system in question was a desired system or 
locked-in to an undesirable cycle.  Deciding whether the NEM needs to transition or 
transform, or is currently undergoing a transformation, depends on its resilience.  If 
the system is resilient and therefore has a high adaptive capacity, is the current 
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system able to absorb desired changes to the system and undergo a transition, or 
has it become locked-in to an undesirable path (Smith and Stirling, 2010; Westley et 
al., 2011)?  
To decide whether the current system is resilient, it is necessary to assess if the 
current changes seen within the NEM have affected its function, structure, identity 
and feedbacks.  If the changes are affecting these areas of the system, does the 
system have the adaptive capacity required to maintain the desired system, so 
allowing a transition to occur?  However, if the system resilience is causing the 
system to be locked-in, and a desired change is unable to occur, or causing 
challenges within the structure, identity and feedbacks, so affecting the systems 
desired function, then this suggests that a transformation may be needed, or is 
occurring. In this case, SET suggests that governance will need to be adaptive to 
enable the transformation or to allow the system to transform to a new desirable 
state (Folke et al., 2005; Walker et al., 2004).  
The following sections will discuss whether a transition or transformation is taking 
place in the NEM.  Section 8.1.1 will describe the desired function of the NEM, then 
discuss if changes within the structure (section 8.1.2), identity (section 8.1.3) and 
feedbacks (section 8.1.4) are affecting this desired function and, therefore, whether a 
transition or transformation is happening or is needed (section 8.1.5). 
8.1.1 Function 
The government of Australia regards the NEM as an essential service, and its 
desired function is to provide an affordable, secure, and reliable electricity supply to 
customers (Government of Australia, 2019).  These desired functions are delivered 
by government policies decided on by the COAG Energy Council and managed by 
the institutions who create the rules and regulations around the generation, costs 
and supply of electricity to the NEM customers (section 5.1). Any changes within the 
structure, identity and feedbacks of the NEM will need to guarantee that the basic 
function of the NEM will be protected.   
As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, due to the current national government's support 
of the coal industry, there are no national targets for decarbonisation.  However, 
there are decarbonisation targets at State level, which suggests there are conflicts of 
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interest for the desired function of the NEM, dependent on the viewpoint of the social 
actors within the system i.e. whether or not the desired function of the NEM should 
include decarbonisation. 
8.1.2 Structure 
The current structure of the NEM is one which is dominated by centralised 
generation and supply and an accompanying centralised governance structure (see 
Chapter 5). Although small-scale solar is currently the second-largest generator by 
fuel type in the NEM, centralised generation (including large-scale renewable 
generation such as wind and hydro) still accounts for 84% of total capacity (see 
section 7.2 & Figure 7-3) with the current centralised governance structure 
complementing this centralised system (Figure 5-1).  The current trajectory for 
increasing decentralised generation in the NEM is expected to continue, caused by 
falling technology costs and an expected rise in energy prices. This is changing the 
physical structure of the NEM to a system which has a combination of both 
centralised and decentralised assets. 
Similar to the emerging physical structure, the political structure of the NEM is a 
combination of centralised and decentralised decision making.  The States are able 
to legislate and fund RETs (section 6.4.4) and implement State-based 
incentives/funding for ‘green’ projects if they wish (e.g. SA’s VPP).  The State-based 
incentives for DER were one of the drivers for the uptake of DER initially and it could 
be suggested that this decentralised approach to decision-making helped enable the 
emerging decentralised physical structure. 
8.1.3 Identity  
The majority of electricity generated in the NEM currently comes from fossil fuels, 
with coal being the largest fuel source (Figure 6-3). This carbonised system is being 
protected, in some way, by the lack of national decarbonisation policy.  For Australia 
to meet its emission reduction targets, then the NEM will need to decarbonise, which 
is recognised by the NEM States that have a positive decarbonisation agenda. 
The dominant renewable energy technology in the NEM is currently household solar 
PV, combined with an increasing amount of battery storage, which has mainly been 
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delivered through State policy, and is reducing the demand for coal-generated grid-
supplied electricity. As DER is the dominant RE resource in the NEM, this is 
changing the identity of the NEM at the distribution level, to a system that is 
increasingly becoming decarbonised 
It could be suggested that as a DER owner, the identity of the customer can also be 
considered.  The customer is now also a generator as well as a consumer – a 
prosumer.  As a prosumer, the customer can have a positive effect on the desired 
function of the NEM.  Through services such as aggregating DER, or using IT or 
smart services, the prosumer is able to offer network and market services to the 
NEM, so reducing wholesale prices, and in some areas reducing the need for 
network augmentation (AEMO and ENA, 2019).  By becoming active and engaged in 
the energy market - through the use of new innovative business models such as 
aggregation, virtual power plants or microgrids (AEMC, 2019f; AGL, 2017; 
Government of South Australia, 2017) - a prosumer can have a positive effect on the 
desired function of the NEM by reducing costs for all electricity customers and also 
helping to maintain system security and reliability. However, should a DER customer 
not wish to become a prosumer, and instead choose to become independent, as 
discussed in Chapter 7, this may have negative consequences to the NEM 
functionality. 
8.1.4 Feedbacks 
Changes to the structure and identity of the current system and its actors will change 
the physical, economic and political feedbacks of the system.   
8.1.4.1 Physical and economic feedbacks 
Within the physical system, as demand for a centralised energy supply is reduced, 
so the infrastructure needed to supply and transport energy must support 
decentralisation, protecting the desired function by ensuring an affordable, secure 
and reliable supply of electricity for all electricity customers (see chapter 7, section 
7.3).  This change in the physical system then creates changes in the energy 
economics of the system.  
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At the wholesale level, DER has altered the NEM system operation so that flexibility 
services are required to complement the variability of RE generation and change in 
demand patterns (see chapter 7, section 7.1.1).  This change in operation requires 
new types of generation, moving away from traditional ‘baseload’ generation, such 
as coal, to more flexible generation such as battery storage, hydro or CCGT.  The 
transition within the market has changed the investment strategies of some of the 
large energy companies, such as AGL (Dunstan et al., 2017), but has also led to 
some incumbent interests resisting the change (see chapter 6, sections 6.2 & 6.4.3). 
At the distribution level, introducing a distribution level market, and the new business 
models around coordination of DER for the distribution market (ENA, 2017b), creates 
questions around how customers should pay for being connected to a more dynamic 
system.  Pricing for energy will need to consider those who wish to be prosumers, 
those who wish to be energy independent and those who are unable to become 
involved in a decentralised market.  It is now the value of the connection to the grid 
that needs to be considered, rather than the amount of energy being consumed (see 
chapter 7, section 7.3.2).  
8.1.4.2 Political feedbacks 
Within the political processes, as larger amounts of households install DER, so there 
is added pressure on State governments to acknowledge the wishes of a large 
proportion of voters.  This can be seen most clearly during the recent election of a 
Liberal Coalition government in SA.  Although national policy for the national Liberal 
Coalition government is one of climate change denial and backing of the coal 
industry (see chapter 6, section 6.4.3), due to pressure from the large number of 
solar owners in SA, the new State Liberal government gave backing to VPP projects 
for social housing and offered new battery storage subsidies to households 
(Parkinson, 2018c). 
8.1.5 Is the NEM undergoing a transformation? 
The traditional function of the grid has been to supply an affordable, reliable, and 
secure, one-way flow of electricity to the consumer at the end of the low voltage 
distribution line.  DER has changed the identity and structure of the NEM, from fossil 
fuel-based to one that is coming increasingly decarbonised at the distributed level, 
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combining centralised and decentralised generation and requiring behavioural 
change from its customers, from a passive consumer to an active prosumer.  These 
changes have altered the feedbacks within the system, all of which require changes 
within governance to maintain functionality.   
As seen in Chapter 7 and discussed here, the increasing levels of DER on the NEM 
have caused challenges to the desired system function.  There have been 
challenges associated with security and reliability as self-generation and export have 
disrupted the system operation and design.  Visibility issues are causing challenges 
to matching supply and demand, and subsequently, issues concerning frequency 
and inertia. There have been issues regarding the affordability of energy for those 
that are unable to install DER, and pricing reforms have been suggested to ensure 
that the PSO is upheld. For prosumers to affect the NEM function in a positive way 
there are assumed levels of consumer engagement with the energy market. 
Engaging in the energy market requires the customer to have a level of trust in the 
NEM institutions and utilities, something which is currently very low (see chapter 7, 
section 7.2.3).  If the level of trust that the NEM has with its customers does not 
improve, and DER owners cannot be persuaded to engage, then DER owners can 
have a negative role in the desired function of the conventional system. By being 
‘energy independent’ customers can reduce the amount of revenue for the traditional 
utilities causing further price increases for those unable to install DER (Box 7.1) as 
well as asset write-downs for some utilities (Synergy, 2019; Territory Generation, 
2019) and the possibility of a ‘utility death spiral’.   
DER is now the largest RE generator in the NEM, but NEM governance is still 
tailored towards the traditional centralised structure i.e. a passive consumer 
receiving electricity at the end of a top-down, centralised electricity system, with the 
markets, rules and regulations built around the efficient, traditional operation of the 
centralised system. Maintaining the desired function of the system in the 
conventional top-down manner has required curtailing the amount of large or small-
scale RE generation connected to the grid (see chapter 7, section 7.1.3.2 & 7.3.1), 
which allows the current government to maintain their support of the coal industry.  
149 
There have been issues with the federal government who are insisting that coal-fired 
generation is the only method to ensure reliability in the NEM, against the 
recommendations from some actors within the NEM institutions and industry (see 
chapter 7, section 7.1.3.2).  The national government's support of the coal industry 
and the traditional centralised grid, combined with the lack of any decarbonisation 
policy past 2020, has left the States to initiate their own decarbonisation targets 
which support the use of DER, thus creating a grid which is becoming increasingly 
decentralised. The conflict between some of the NEM states and the national 
government, in relation to the desired function of the NEM, has caused challenges, 
as without any effective vision or coordination from central government (see chapter 
6, section 6.4.4), this decentralisation has affected the desired function of the NEM. 
If the changes that are taking place in the NEM are applied to the definitions within 
SET literature, the NEM and its governance would be assessed as being resilient i.e. 
the adaptive capacity within the system, rather than allowing for change, is 
perpetuating the existing structure and function, creating lock-in.   For example, the 
ability of system actors to influence energy policy, rules and regulations (such as the 
federal government’s and some State government’s support of the coal industry and 
coal generation) is slowing the speed at which changes to governance can be made 
compared to the speed at which change is occurring.  This allows the traditional 
centralised system to operate in a traditional manner but is causing challenges when 
trying to incorporate decentralisation, such as issues of visibility of DER, voltage 
regulation and system security. There is resistance to change by the incumbent 
regime as current NEM rules and regulations favour the centralised, fossil-fuel 
elements of the system and so the introduction of DER into this system is causing a 
loss of system functionality. An increase in decentralisation in a system that is 
protecting the centralised elements has affected the function, and changed the 
structure, identity and feedbacks, of the system.  Had the adaptive capacity within 
the system been able to incorporate the new, emerging decentralised assets without 
a loss of system functionality then a transition could occur. However, the lock-in 
within the NEM institutions, the support at State level for DER and the lack of 
adaptability has affected this desired function and so the changes happening in the 
NEM could be better described as an unmanaged, bottom-up transformation.  This 
type of transformation, although destabilising the existing regime and forcing change, 
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is causing problems for the desired function of the system. To ensure that the 
transformation that is happening at the distributed level can be incorporated 
successfully, then SET literature suggests that this type of transformation needs to 
be managed and that adaptive governance is needed to achieve this fundamental 
change.   
Although some reports and recommendations suggest a more adaptive style of 
governance (AEMO and ENA, 2019; AER, 2018b; ESB, 2019), these have yet to be 
acted upon. It is the current inflexible, centralised structure of NEM governance, 
combined with a lack of a national decarbonisation agenda and coordination within a 
rapidly evolving system, which is ultimately affecting system functionality.  This has 
left the NEM in a position where there are questions around the reliability, security 
and affordability of an essential service, a service which still may yet undergo a 
‘utility death spiral’.   It is the resilience of the current system which is leaving 
governance of the NEM with a ‘limited window of opportunity’ (AEMO and ENA, 2019 
pp. 9) in which to achieve the adaptability of governance needed to enable the 
decentralised transformation.  This suggests that NEM governance needs to become 
more adaptive to facilitate the transformative change, which is being recognised, in 
differing degrees, by the NEM institutions (AEMC, 2019; AEMO and ENA, 2019; 
ESB, 2019).  The question then is how to design energy system governance to be 
adaptive to enable decentralisation and to deliver the required outcomes, and are 
there positive, as well as negative lessons, to be learnt from the NEM?   
8.2 ENABLING DECENTRALISATION 
SET theory suggests, that to enable transformation, adaptive governance should 
encourage innovation from the lower levels in the areas of policy, technology, 
economics and society; and that these areas of innovation are coordinated to meet 
an overarching strategic priority. SET highlights the importance of social capital 
within the adaptive governance process, as social capital increases participation and 
representation in the policymaking process, leading to greater transparency and 
legitimacy and therefore trust.  
In the previous section, it was discussed that the NEM is currently undergoing a 
transformation at the distributed level of the system.  This suggests that some 
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innovation has occurred for this transformation to happen.   For a transformation to 
be enabled within the system, then the other adaptive governance processes of a 
national vision and coordination also need to be present. The following sections will 
assess what, if any, adaptive processes there are currently within the NEM by 
discussing the areas of policy (section 8.2.1), technical (section 8.2.2), social 
(section 8.2.3) and economic innovation (section 8.2.4) and, if there is innovation, 
how and whether this innovation is being coordinated to achieve an overarching aim, 
and the importance of this in achieving a fully adaptive governance process (section 
8.2.5).  
8.2.1 Policy innovation 
Several authors suggest that local policy can be considered as a hypothesis, with the 
actions taken from the policy as experiments to achieve a desired aim (Nelson et al., 
2008; Westley et al., 2011).  Local policy may have different meanings dependent on 
the area or country in which it is being defined.  In the case of the NEM, DER uptake 
was encouraged by the use of State policy and so, as an example of how local policy 
can be used to encourage change, State policy is to be considered as local. 
In Chapter 4, the use of State RETs, FiTs and SBSs to encourage DER and the 
success of this policy, was discussed.  Section 6.4 introduced Australia’s current 
RET and commented on how it is due to finish in 2020, leaving Australia with no 
overarching national RE or emissions scheme.  However, due the federal system of 
government, each State can set their own RET (see section 6.4.4).  This 
decentralised policy process allows the State governments to enact or legislate 
energy policy at a State level (Table 8-1) e.g. to help achieve the targets as set out 
for Australia within the Paris agreement or to follow the Finkel recommendations.  By 
being able to create RETs and associated energy policy at State level, the State 
governments can link these to other State-level priorities.  State policies could be 
considered as being more locally representative than national policy and, therefore, 
more acceptable to the public. 
Within the theory for adaptive governance, authors suggest that when deciding on 
local policy that the effect of political influence should be diluted (Folke et al., 2005; 
Nelson et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2015).  As each of the States has its own elected 
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state government, and some of these governments can gain revenue from the coal 
and energy industries, the effects of politics on energy policy are noticeable.  
Although each State has set a RET, how effective this will be may depend on 
whether there is either a legislative target or recommendations (Table 8-1).  SET 
also suggests that policy should be coordinated to meet an overarching aim (Nelson 
et al., 2008; Westley et al., 2011).  NEM State policy, and how a national vision 
would assist in diluting political influence, will be discussed in the following sections. 
8.2.1.1 Current State policy for decarbonisation 
Currently all the NEM States, except for SA, have a RET.  The ACT has legislated a 
target of 100% of its electricity to be met by renewable generation by 2020 (ACT 
Government, 2016).  Victoria has a legislated target of 50% of energy to come from 
RE by 2030 (Victoria State Government, 2019).  New South Wales and Queensland 
have suggested targets of 20% by 2020 (NSW Government, 2018), and 50% by 
2030 (QLD Government, 2016), respectively.  Tasmania expects to reach 100% of 
energy produced by RE by 2022 (Tasmanian Climate Change Office, 2017) (Table 
8-1). 
Both VIC and the ACT, which have Labor governments that have positive 
decarbonisation agendas, have set legislation and introduced schemes that will 
benefit their State, not only for achieving decarbonisation but also for employment 
opportunities from RE by increasing industrial investment within the State.  
Queensland, although a Labor seat, has an ambitious target which is not backed by 
legislation.  The 50% RE target appears to be a nod to the environmental concerns 
over the Great Barrier Reef (see section 6.5), but the lack of legislation around the 
target seems to be trying to appease Queensland’s strong coal lobby and the State 
government’s vested interests in mining and the electricity infrastructure (see section 
5.2 & section 6.2).  QLD has also introduced new rules regarding the installation of 
solar that requires only qualified electricians to handle, as well as install, solar panels 
for solar farms (State of Queensland, 2019), increasing construction costs to levels 
that reduce the competitiveness of solar with coal generation.  The lack of legislation, 
and new rules, have led some to question the legitimacy of the Labor government’s 
50% renewable energy target (Parkinson, 2019c). In NSW, the vested interests in 
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mining leases and the State’s position as one of the largest coal producers could 
also be attributed to the low RET and lack of ambitious investment in RE.   
SA has legislation in place, but no new target was set for RE past 2020 following a 
change in government.  However, due to the investment strategies of the previous 
Labor government, pipeline projects and current installations means that they will 
achieve a 75% RE penetration by 2025, easily exceeding their previous 50% RET 
(section 6.4.4).   
TAS already has a high penetration of RE due to the majority of its electricity 
generation coming from hydropower (Figure 6-3).  State government initiatives 
intend to increase hydro and wind power and to act as ‘The Battery of the Nation’ by 
improving interconnection between the island the mainland (Potter et al., 2018).
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Table 8-1 Policy and legislation for state RET (ACT Government, 2016; NSW Government, 2018; QLD Government, 2016; Tasmanian Climate Change Office, 2017; Victoria 
State Government, 2019) 
State Renewable Energy Target Legislation and RE policy initiativ es Party 
affiliation 
ACT 100% by 2020 
Electricity Feed-in (Large-scale Renewable Energy) Act 2011 (ACT) 
Next Generation Energy Storage (Next Gen) Program 
Community Solar Scheme (opened 2015 for 1MW capacity) 
The Renewable Energy Industry Development Strategy 
Labor 
VIC 50% by 2030 
The Renewable Energy (Jobs and Investment) Amendment Bill 2019 (Vic) 
Climate Change Act 2017 
New Energy Jobs Fund 
The Renewable Communities Program (RCP) 
Solar Homes Program 
Labor 
NSW 20% by 2020 
Solar Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) Program 
Growing Community Energy Grants Program 
Clean Energy Knowledge Sharing Initiative 
 
Liberal 
SA No state target 
Climate Change and Greenhouse Emissions Reduction Act 2007 (South Australia) 
Grid Scale Storage Fund 
Home Battery Scheme Liberal 
QLD 50% by 2030 
Advance Queensland 
Solar 150 investment program 
Renewables 400 reverse auction 
 
Labor 
TAS 100% by 2022 
Battery of the Nation pumped hydro plans 
Tasmania’s Climate Change Action Plan 2017-2021 (Climate Change 21) Liberal 
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State government’s manifestos and policies are representative of their political 
Party’s national objectives, but at this more local level must also be accountable to 
local priorities and requirements.  Although non-governmental participation in State 
policymaking is not a formal requirement, the State government can be more 
influenced by local issues than the federal government, in either a positive or 
negative way.  An example of a positive influence on State policy can be seen in the 
SA election in 2019.  In the run-up to the state election, both the Labor (pro-RE) and 
Liberal (pro-coal) party made election promises to continue the incumbent Liberal SA 
governments VPP trial following the election and both Parties made election 
promises to introduce subsidies for battery storage (Parkinson, 2018c).  The effect of 
previous government policy has meant that in SA, large- and small-scale RE is now 
heading on a trajectory that would be difficult to stop and has meant that RE receives 
support from both of the major political parties (ibid.).   
Innovation in policy at State level has not produced the same positive results in 
every state in Australia, particularly in NSW and QLD in which coal plays a 
significant role (see section 5.2 & section 6.2), and as such vested interests within 
the local government, and the need to protect local jobs, continue to play a part.  The 
difference between the States can be attributed to the lack of an overarching vision 
and lack of coordination to reach the vision.  Having no national RE or 
decarbonisation policy (see section 6.4.3) leaves the States with no real necessity to 
provide legislative RE targets.  State RETs and funding for projects are arbitrary, 
based purely on State government acknowledgement of whether RE and DER will 
be beneficial to State residents, business and industry and the State government’s 
decarbonisation agenda.   
8.2.1.2 National policy for the decarbonisation of the NEM 
At a national level, the Finkel review (Finkel et al., 2017) made recommendations for 
the future security of the NEM.  Forty-nine of the fifty recommendations within the 
review were approved by the COAG Energy Council, however, the CET was not (see 
section 5.1.4).  Following the 49 recommendations has given the NEM an overall 
vision for the direction of the NEM, and has allowed AEMO to create plans, such as 
the Integrated System Plan (ISP) and the Distributed Energy Integration Plan (DEIP) 
(see section 5.1.4) for the integration of RE and DER.  
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The Finkel review sets out a plan for the NEM to achieve decarbonisation and the 
integration of DER while maintaining the security of the NEM. The ESB has been 
appointed to oversee the implementation of the approved Finkel review 
recommendations (see section 5.1.4) and as such is acting in a coordination role 
between the national NEM institutions.  However, there is no coordination between 
the States and the national institutions other than for technical coordination through 
the market operator, which is due to the necessity of maintaining reliability and 
security within the NEM, and the positive outlook for decarbonisation from the 
current leadership of AEMO (see section 8.2.3.3), rather than through any formal 
obligation. 
What is lacking in the NEM, is a legal duty or timeframe for the national and State 
governments to achieve the vision that has been set out within the Finkel Review, 
which would have been provided by the Clean Energy Target had it been approved. 
The lack of a legal duty or timeframe, and therefore policy coordination from a Clean 
Energy Target, has diluted the effect that the Review may have had.  The COAG 
Energy Council are currently consulting on a Strategic Energy Plan (COAG Energy 
Council, 2019), which is to provide a ‘strategic focus and clarity of direction to market 
bodies and market participants’, but by currently having no national target for 
decarbonisation the only timescale, and subsequent coordinating factor for the NEM, 
is the rapid transformation that is happening at the customer level, which has left the 
ISP and the DEIP, as the only current ‘policy’ available. 
8.2.2 Technical innovation 
In Chapter 4, the drivers for the current DER uptake were discussed.  This initial 
uptake has required further innovation in the technical sphere to enable the 
decentralised grid.  The need for technical innovation to combat challenges arising 
from DER uptake saw a change in the regulatory process.  In September 2019, 
following a rigorous consultation process, the AEMC introduced a regulatory 
sandbox as part of the 2019 Electricity network economic regulatory framework 
review (AEMC, 2019g). The sandbox arrangement was seen as a vital constituent to 
allow proof of concept testing in a more flexible environment.  The sandbox provides 
an enquiry service for innovative trials to assess feasibility under the current rules 
and regulations.  It then allows trials to operate with a regulatory and rules waiver 
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where the trials can be seen to have a potential positive customer benefit within the 
NEM, although there is no mention of low-carbon or zero-carbon within the feasibility 
rules (ibid.). 
Innovation funding for Australia is currently provided by ARENA.  ARENA was 
established in 2012 by the Australian Renewable Energy Agency Act 2011.  
ARENA’s A-lab initiative created a process in which the NEM institutions and the 
ECA can assist participants to develop innovative technologies and business models 
for RE.  At present, there is a total of Aus$1.46bn being provided to 486 projects 
across all the Australian States and Territories.  Projects funded by ARENA are 
required to share learning from the trials through their Knowledge Bank (ARENA, 
2019b).   Projects, such as those in the Fringe of Grid (FOG) portfolio (Ekistica, 
2018), have enabled lessons learnt for a rule change for Standalone Power Systems 
(SAPS).  This rule change followed on from an initial submission in 2017 from 
Western Power.  The initial rule change was rejected due to the broader 
requirements the AEMC felt needed to be investigated but have since been provided 
by the ARENA funded FOG projects. The SAPS rule change provides a new 
regulatory framework for the provision of standalone systems where this would lead 
to cost savings for electricity networks (AEMC, 2019c).   
ARENA has funded other projects that have value in enabling grid decentralisation.  
The Digital Energy Exchange (DeX) project is now undergoing a live trial as part of 
the SA VPP (ARENA, 2017) and the Hornsdale Battery is undergoing feasibility 
testing for battery storage to be configured for FCAS provision (AEMO, 2018e).   
ARENA has been a vital constituent in providing funding for the various technical 
trials that are currently helping the institutions and industry of the NEM towards 
decarbonising the Australian energy industry and the integration of DER on the grid.  
It is expected that the ARENA funded trials, which will soon also receive institutional 
support through the new regulatory sandbox, will be essential to the system 
transformation (ARENA, 2019c). The new regulatory sandbox should assist with 
faster rule and regulatory change for projects which show a customer or service 
benefit. 
ARENA funded projects, and soon those that participate in the regulatory sandbox, 
have an obligation to share knowledge.  Knowledge gained from trials, through either 
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success or failure, is one of the principal values of innovation trials.  Within AG, 
policy as hypothesis suggests an increase in experimentation, with knowledge 
sharing as a vital method of increasing social capital (Dietz et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 
2007).  In the case of technical innovation within the NEM, ARENA and now the 
AER, are acting in a coordinating role, with an obligation for trials to show customer 
benefits or better services, and the results of the trials made publicly available.  
Adaptive governance suggests that the actions taken from local policy should be 
seen as experiments which can then be diffused or scaled-up (Folke et al., 2005; 
Westley et al., 2011).  Lessons can be learnt for AG processes from the manner in 
which ARENA has enabled technical experimentation and the method in which 
ARENA’s Knowledge Bank has enabled separate trials to be bought together, such 
as with the FOG portfolio, that led to the rule changes for Standalone Power 
Systems.   
However, funding for ARENA is due to end in 2022 and the current government has 
not issued any statements to suggest that it will continue funding the agency.  This 
would then leave the AER, with its direction set by the AEMC, as the only method for 
integrating and coordinating technical trials in the NEM.  AG suggests that an 
increase in social capital would come from knowledge networks, such as those 
conceived by ARENA, and that these networks should be politically independent 
(Folke et al., 2005; Nelson et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2015).  As is discussed in the 
following section, the lack of outside participation within the AEMC, and so 
subsequently their influence over the AER, leaves little transparency and legitimacy 
within the institutions, and so the technical innovation process may become subject 
to influence from incumbent industries. 
8.2.3 Social innovation 
One of the important aspects of AG is the increase in social capital which is achieved 
through increased participation of non-governmental and industry actors within local 
and national organisations and institutions (Dietz et al., 2003; Folke et al., 2005; 
Schultz et al., 2015).  An increase in social capital would also provide greater 
opportunities, through increased diversity (Granovetter, 1973), for transformative 
leadership which would be able to recognise and identify opportunities and 
constraints (Folke et al., 2005). 
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8.2.3.1 Encouragement of local actors 
The most pronounced social innovation within the NEM is that DER uptake has 
changed the focus of industry and institutions from one where the customer is seen 
as a consumer of energy who is suppliant to the will of the market, to one who can 
become a prosumer and have an active role in the energy system (see section 7.3).  
As a consumer, the customer had little influence over the energy industry.  
Decentralisation of the system through the uptake of DER has now changed this 
role, and as a prosumer, the customer now has the ability to either have a positive or 
negative effect.  Energy customers are the instigators and the focus of the 
transforming energy system.  The role of the prosumer needs to be valued by the 
industries and institutions within the NEM (see section 7.4) so that decentralisation 
has a positive effect on the affordability, security and reliability of an essential 
service. 
8.2.3.2 Increasing representation and participation 
Currently, representation and participation in the NEM comes from electoral 
influence over state policy, trials for new business models such as the VPP, and the 
consultation process used for changes to rules, regulations and standards.  There 
were criticisms in the interviews of the lack of outside representation in the AEMC 
and although the ESB is welcomed as a new institution to bring together the views of 
the NEM institutions, there is still a lack of representation from NGOs or customer 
advocacy. 
‘And the problem with the AEMC is that they are a bunch of unelected 
quangos who have no accountability whatsoever in our experience.  So 
they just simply ignore consumer advocacy...’ 
Interview M7 ad 
The ECA is a governmental organisation for consumer rights, yet they have no 
representation on the boards of the AEMC or the ESB.  Board members of the ESB 
and the AEMC are industry and network representatives, with two of the AEMC 
board members having been instrumental in Australia’s previous energy reform , 
which created the current centralised system (AEMC, 2019h). 
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Within the institutions and industry, there has been a trial to improve inclusivity within 
decision-making processes.  The AER’s New Reg trial in Victoria (see chapter 7, 
section 7.3.1) required the distribution network to create a customer forum, which 
represents customer perspectives and whose members have a range of skills and 
experience.  This type of customer representation intends that the future network 
expenditure plans would take advice and recommendations from the forum and 
would be more closely aligned with the future needs of the local customer.  As the 
expenditure plan would have included an independent and rigorous customer 
focussed process, it is expected that the regulator would be more agreeable to the 
proposed expenditure budget. 
Also in Victoria, the Power Changers trial by Jemena (see section 7.2.3) encouraged 
behavioural change to reduce expected peak events.  One of the results from the 
trial was the building of a new relationship between the network and the customer of 
understanding, communication and trust. 
8.2.3.3 Enabling transformative leadership 
The main source of positivity for energy system change within the institutions has 
come from the leadership of AEMO.  The appointment of Audrey Zibelman as CEO 
of AEMO was described by interviewees as a ‘breath of fresh air’ (C3 NGO) in one 
case and recognised by another as the ‘biggest single source of change within the 
institutions’ (C5 ac) of the NEM.   
Previous to her appointment, Ms Zibelman was instrumental in the design of the New 
York: Reforming the Energy Vision (NY REV) program which sought to create fit-for-
purpose governance for sustainable technologies (New York State, 2014).  The fit-
for-purpose governance would include changing system operation and regulation, 
encouraging new business models and creating a system which would be founded 
around the wishes of its customers.  Ms Zibelman’s recognition of the complexities of 
energy system change was seen as a positive step for the NEM. 
‘I think there’s some positives, we do have limited interaction with AEMO, 
but I think their new leader, Audrey Zibelman, is a much more, a person 
who is alive to the consumer and social impacts of energy market policy 
and regulation, just from the way in which she conducts herself and 
speaks and the direction they are taking.  That is positive.’ 
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Interview M7 ad 
AEMO has been supportive of the many trials that have taken place, including the 
SA VPP (AEMO, 2019a) and the Hornsdale FCAS Project (AEMO, 2018f), and have 
worked closely with the ENA on the Open Energy Networks program which seeks to 
construct a market for DER (AEMO and ENA, 2019).  AEMO has also included a 
new market design which recognises flexibility as part of the ESB’s Post 2025 
Market Design consultation (ESB, 2019) and for a register of DER to increase the 
visibility of DER on the Networks (AEMO, 2019c).  Other AEMO led and joint 
projects include the ISP and the DEIP which are, as mentioned, the only current 
plans for the integration of renewable energy and DER currently available (AEMO, 
2018a; ARENA, 2019a). 
The federal system of government in Australia has allowed transformative leadership 
within the NEM through the government of South Australia.  As previously 
mentioned, the long-standing Labor government, under the leadership of Jay 
Weatherill, created a stable policy landscape for RE generation and DER.  Generous 
FiTs in the state helped towards the rapid uptake of DER which saw gird demand 
reduce.  This reduction in demand, coupled with an increase in large-scale wind and 
solar, enabled SA to meet the capacity shortfall that was left by the closure of the 
Northern coal-fired generator (AEMO, 2018h).  The legacy of the Labor leadership in 
SA has now created a political landscape for energy that has reached a tipping point.  
Even if a new state government wished to slow down the transformation that is 
happening, it is now not possible to do so.  
SET literature suggests that transformative leadership is an important part of the 
transformation process (Engle, 2011; Folke et al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2010).  
Increasing participation and representation in the governance process will increase 
diversity so leading to more opportunities for transformative leaders to appear 
(Granovetter, 1973).  Although there are moves to increase participation within the 
institutional framework, these are currently only within regulation for the distribution 
networks and are only being trialled with one of the thirteen distribution companies in 
the NEM. There is still no representation on the boards, or the executive leadership, 
of the AEMC or the AER of a consumer advocate or NGO and, without the 
leadership of Audrey Zibelman, it is doubtful that AEMO would be as progressive as 
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they are.  Considering the changing role of the customer in a transforming energy 
system, the lack of customer representation within the NEM institutions is 
concerning. 
8.2.4 Economic innovation  
DER has enabled new methods of buying and selling electricity.  Within the NEM 
there have been new initiatives such as aggregation of particular storage 
technologies to produce a virtual power plant (e.g. Sonnen, 2019 and AEMO, 
2019b).  There has also been the use of blockchain technology to introduce peer-to-
peer electricity trading (e.g. PowerLedger, 2019).  These new methods, enabled by 
IT, have changed the feedbacks of the system and have allowed DER customers to 
become prosumers, which is beneficial to all NEM customers.  
This change in the role of the consumer to a prosumer has changed the electricity 
flows on the network.  This has then changed how the networks need to operate the 
system.  Current regulation is focussed on economic efficiency to ensure that the 
amount networks are charging customers is fair.  Future regulation of the networks 
will need to focus much more on enabling decentralisation, with the customer as the 
central focus, rather than just on economic efficiency.  The most economically 
efficient way for the networks to answer the challenges of decentralisation would be 
to disallow DER connections, so reducing congestion and voltage issues.  This 
would not, however, help towards decarbonisation and would increase costs for 
those customers unable to install DER.  Changes are needed within regulation, to 
incentivise the networks to find alternative solutions for the decentralisation 
challenges that benefit the decarbonisation agenda and affordability for all 
customers.  
8.2.4.1 Network regulation 
In 2014, the AER proposed regulatory reform to move to more incentive-based 
regulation, incentivising the network companies to improve efficiencies (AER, 2014).  
This package of reforms did not, however, reduce the ability of the network 
companies to ‘game’ the system and did not incentivise the inclusion of DER (AER, 
2014).   There were also the problems associated with technical regulation being in 
the hands of local governments, some of whom had vested interests in gold-plating 
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the networks and so increasing the value of their regulated asset base (see section 
5.2.2).  The network companies were also critical of the AER as, even if they had 
shown an increased consultative approach to assessing future revenues, they felt 
the AER would always reduce their expected revenue allowance (see section 7.3.1). 
The New Reg process (AER, 2018b), which is currently being trialled, is seen as a 
solution to many of the problems that the regulators and the networks are currently 
experiencing.  Having a revenue assessment process, which undergoes an 
extremely rigorous customer consultation, ensures that the individual network 
company tailors their revenue proposals to suit the local area requirements, and so 
putting the customer at the centre of the networks business plan. 
The need to have a more decentralised approach to network regulation, which the 
customer forum allows, is particularly relevant in the NEM and complements the 
decentralising system.  Thirteen distribution companies are covering very different 
geographies.  For example, in Victoria, three distribution companies are covering the 
city of Melbourne, and two covering the more rural areas.  Each distribution company 
has different priorities, some have a large business customer base, some have city 
suburbs, while others have many fringe-of-grid customers.  The consultative 
approach that the customer forum allows creates a revenue determination that 
prioritises the needs of the local customer base.  Should this regulation trial be 
followed in the future, then the role of the national regulator becomes more of a 
coordination role, which could be used to incentivise priorities for network companies 
to meet the recommendations for network operation, as set out in the Finkel review. 
8.2.4.2 Pricing regulation 
As the States joined the NECF, regulation for retail pricing was moved into the 
national space and the AER took over the role for energy market retail regulation.  
The exception to this is VIC, who did not join the NECF due to the recent completion 
of their smart meter roll-out (see section 5.1.3).  This allowed the Victorian ESC to 
create a retailer led energy efficiency scheme as part of the VRET, which has a 
Victorian Energy Efficiency Target (VEET) as part of its legislation.   Victoria also has 
a legislated minimum requirement for solar FiTs, to be paid by the retailer, which is 
based on the ESC’s calculation for the benefits of DER.  Following an amendment to 
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their legislation13, these benefits now include a requirement to calculate ‘the avoided 
social cost of carbon and the avoided human health costs attributable to a reduction 
in air pollution’ (ESC, 2017).  The ability of the federal government in VIC to set 
legislation for RETs, for energy efficiency and local FiTs has meant that Victoria can 
have a more cohesive local energy policy.  However, VIC will need to update their 
retail regulation to match the changes that are currently under review for customer 
protections in the NECF (see chapter 7, section 7.2.4).  The review updates 
customer protections for household demand response, and other business models 
and DER related issues. 
8.2.4.3 Pricing reform 
The uptake of DER in the NEM has meant that the idea around the value of energy 
is changing.  In their report The Network Value of Distributed Generation (Essential 
Services Commission Victoria, 2017), the ESC concluded that the way to fairly 
charge and pay customers for DER services is to have a distribution level market.  
The ESC suggested that this market should take account of the time-location-social 
value of DER services and requirements.  The use of a distributed energy market 
(DEM) has also been recognised by AEMO and the ENA and there are currently four 
possible options for the operation of the market under consultation (AEMO and ENA, 
2019).  The use of a market for DER also has the added benefits of reducing the 
need for network augmentation and in reducing the need for private investment in 
new generation (ibid.). 
Until the distribution market is established, and assuming that DER owners want to 
engage with a market, there are conversations around how to pay for the networks 
currently, with time-of-use tariffs and capacity payments being the main 
considerations.  As previously mentioned, it is the value of grid connection that will 
become an important factor, rather than the value of received energy (see section 
7.3.2).  The problem for the NEM is that the economic innovations, particularly 
around regulation and pricing need to happen at the same pace as the current DER 
uptake.  The lack of synergy between this uptake and economic innovation is what 
may still cause the NEM to undergo a utility death spiral. 
                                              
13 Energy Legislation Amendment (Feed-in Tariffs and Improving Safety and Markets) Act 2017 (Vic), 
assent date 14 February 2017 
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8.2.5 The importance of vision and coordination  
Within the NEM there are political, technical, social and economic innovations 
occurring at the distributional areas of the system.  Innovations at the political level 
have occurred in the State sphere through State accountability and decentralised 
government processes that allows the States to set RETs, and, in the case of SA, 
due to transformative leadership and a stable policy landscape.  Technical 
innovations have been supported nationally, and knowledge shared through the 
funding from ARENA.  The technical and political innovations have promoted social 
innovation in the form of the rise of the prosumer.  Supporting the rise of the 
prosumer, economic innovations for decentralisation have included the use of VPPs 
and aggregation, and the use of blockchain technology to buy and sell energy.  The 
rise of the prosumer will need to change how the networks determine their future 
revenues and how energy is priced.  
The recent consultations on the post-2025 market design and the Open Energy 
Networks distribution market, although welcomed, may still be too late to capture the 
value from DER that will assist in the affordability, security and reliability of the NEM.  
The lack of outside participation within the decision-making processes of the NEM 
institutions means that there is a lack of the transparency and legitimacy needed to 
create trust with the NEM customers, something which will be essential to encourage 
DER owners to become engaged prosumers.  The DEIP is a welcome move to 
correct this but is still in its early stages and, at time of writing, has not been initiated. 
The current transformation in the NEM is due, in part, to some adaptive governance 
processes at the State level.  State policy has created State RETs, and these 
policies have created areas of experimentation in the social and technical 
parameters which have allowed for further experimentation in the economic spheres, 
so allowing a transformation to occur at the distributed level.  What is lacking in the 
NEM are the other requirements for a fully adaptive governance process that 
manages transformation i.e. mid-level coordination of the experimentation process to 
achieve a strategic national priority (Nelson et al., 2008; Westley et al., 2011), which 
can be attributed to the national government’s support of the traditional industries. 
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Essentially, the lack of vision and coordination, and a lack of social capital within 
State government and the NEMs centralised governance structure, has left the NEM 
in a position where it is reactionary to new events rather than anticipatory, and 
lacking the trust it needs from its customers.  Unless it moves quickly to more 
adaptive governance principles, something which is recognised within the New Reg 
process (AER, 2018b), the Open Energy Networks project (AEMO and ENA, 2019) 
and the DEIP (ARENA, 2019a), then the NEM may well be unable to maintain its 
function as an affordable, secure and reliable electricity system. 
 
8.3 AN ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK TO ENABLE ENERGY SYSTEM 
DECENTRALISATION 
As discussed, there have been aspects of adaptive governance that have helped to 
initiate the transformation that is occurring in the NEM.  In particular, the ability of the 
States to set local energy policy.  There are also aspects of adaptive governance 
that are missing i.e. vision, coordination and customer representation and 
participation (summarised in Table 8-2).  The lack of vision and coordination has led 
to a missed opportunity for the NEM to create an adaptive process that may enable 
transformation, by coordinating positive innovations to improve system functionality.  
A lack of customer participation and representation has allowed vested interests and 
incumbency within the energy system to slow the changes needed to enable 
decentralisation.  Instead, the NEM is currently undergoing an unmanaged, 
decentralised transformation, causing challenges that are negatively affecting the 
desired function of the NEM.   
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Table 8-2  A comparison of the principles of adaptive governance for energy systems from Table 2-1 to the 
present governance in the NEM (source: author). 
 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 7, DER (which includes the demand side) can 
provide some of the solutions to decarbonisation and will need to be used in 
conjunction with centralised RE and system flexibility solutions to meet 
decarbonisation targets (AEMO and ENA, 2019; CCC, 2019).  However, these 
positive solutions also bring new challenges.  The introduction of DER creates an 
evolved system which adds various distribution-based options (whether supply, 
demand, storage, system flexibility) to the broadly centralised approach. It also 
provides the ability for the new distribution-based prosumer to trade their energy 
whether in the distributed area of the system or with national flexibility programs.   
This section aims to create a framework for adaptive governance which may answer 
some of the challenges introduced by decentralisation and can be applied to similar 
energy systems, such as GB.  This is achieved by using the lessons learnt from the 
case study of the NEM and adapting the theories for adaptive governance from SET. 
Transformation in the NEM occurred in the distributed area of the system, and so 
lessons can be learnt from this case study for managing this type of transformation 
and the challenges that can occur as a system evolves.  The following sections will 
describe the elements needed within AG for energy systems, to create an adaptive 
governance structure that may aid energy system decentralisation to help meet 
national decarbonisation targets. 
8.3.1 The customer at the centre of the policymaking and regulation process 
Creating a new governance framework to enable decentralisation requires designing 
governance around the customer, as the customer is now the heart of the system.  
Adaptive Governance Principles for energy systems The NEM
Customers at the centre of the policymaking and 
regulation process
Trial with AER and Victorian distribution network
Empowered local policy at State government level
Knowledge sharing as part of ARENA's funding; new AER sandbox
Coordination of innovation only for technical trials (ARENA)
Coordination of local policy no
Coordination between the physical and operational 
elements (distribution, transmission, markets)
under consultation;  SA trial of DEM
National vision and target for decarbonisation not legislated, suggested within the Finkel review
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Enabling DER can reduce costs for all customers by reducing the wholesale price of 
electricity and reducing network investment. The institutions and industries in the 
energy system need to recognise that an energy system that includes DER, so 
becoming more decentralised, only operates efficiently for all customers if the 
customer is active and engaged. To gain customer trust, customer representation is 
needed throughout the decision-making processes. Customers need to trust the 
institutions and industries to encourage them to become a prosumer.  This requires 
transparency and legitimacy in the decision-making processes through increased 
customer participation and representation in all aspects of system governance, 
including policy and regulation.     
8.3.1.1 Customer protections 
Customer protections, such as financial protections and national safety standards, 
are needed for new technologies and business models.   As it is not possible to 
predict the innovations of the future, broad standards and protections may be 
required e.g. minimum safety requirements for electrical installations, consumer 
protections for the selling practices of new business models, retail pricing regulations 
to allow customers to easily compare retail offers, and follow national and 
international guidelines.  By creating a broader set of standards and protections in 
this way, innovations to meet challenges would be able to operate under a clear set 
of guidelines.  Following international standards may also open overseas markets for 
local initiatives, or for innovation to come from elsewhere.  To reduce the difficulties 
of diffusion or scaling up of innovation, it may be prudent to continue to create 
consumer protections and standards at the national level, and under centralised 
control. 
8.3.2 Empowered local policy 
As seen in the NEM, State policy was able to create a stable investment landscape 
for RE and DER.  The uptake of DER then allowed for innovation within the 
economic, social, technical and political parameters.  However, this was only true of 
the States which had a positive decarbonisation agenda.  The lack of an overarching 
national policy, with targets for the timely delivery of achieving decarbonisation, left 
those States with vested interests in the political sphere little incentive to promote 
decarbonisation.  The influence of vested interests in the State policymaking process 
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can also be attributed to a lack of participation and representation from outside of 
government.  Increasing outside participation and representation would reduce the 
power of lobbying from interest groups.   
To achieve positive decarbonisation and decentralisation policy, local policy could be 
created through understanding how local needs and resources - where resources 
include the environmental resource plus the social resource combined with the 
technical and economic capabilities of meeting local needs - may help to meet a 
national vision.  It would be recommended that local policy is empowered by local 
funding so that funding can target the needs and resources of the local area (e.g 
Victoria’s VEET and VRET).  
Innovative approaches to challenges associated with energy system decarbonisation 
and decentralisation could be encouraged by opening participation in decision 
making.  In this case, local energy policy could be decided with representation in the 
policymaking process from all political parties as well as customers, community 
groups, advocacy, NGO’s, academia, and industry representatives and the 
institutions of the energy system.  Creating local energy policy in this way increases 
social capital allowing for more diversity and hence innovation, plus the possibility of 
transformative leadership.  Practical examples of AG have shown that creating local 
policy in this transparent and legitimate way increases the trust of individuals in 
institutions and industries (Dietz et al., 2003; Engle and Lemos, 2010; Westley et al., 
2011) which, as mentioned previously, is essential for DER owners becoming 
prosumers, thereby benefitting all energy users.   
As part of local policy, and in a similar vein to the ISP (AEMO, 2018a), local areas 
could create a local energy plan which sets out local objectives over the short-, 
medium, and long-term. Creating a plan in this way allows the institutions and 
industry to work with the local initiatives set by the plan to achieve a positive 
industrial, economic and social outcome for decarbonisation and decentralisation.   
The local energy plan could become instrumental in how the distribution networks 
decide on their future revenue determinations.  Using a process, such as the New 
Reg process, this allows the networks to work with a customer forum to show how 
their investments could enable the outcomes identified within the local area plan.   
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Creating revenue determinations in this way are more transparent and legitimate and 
enable the distribution network companies to increase their levels of customer trust.  
The increased use of customer participation and creating a revenue determination 
that helps to achieve a local energy plan may, as a result, increase the trust between 
the networks and the regulator.  This may allow the role of the national economic 
regulator to change as it reduces the need to assess the business plans in terms of 
benchmarking performance or questioning the revenue determinations.  The role of 
the national economic regulator could then become a coordinating role, to provide 
output based regulation (see Mitchell, 2016) for the networks, encouraging them to 
use innovative and cost-effective means to help to meet the national objective 
through their local collaborations. 
8.3.3 Coordination of local policy 
As can be seen from the NEM, creating local policy with no overarching vision allows 
local policy to meet the needs of the local area even if these needs are counter to 
the decarbonisation goals of climate change mitigation.  To meet a national vision, 
there would need to be coordination of local policy to ensure that local policy 
objectives are aligned to the strategic national priority.   
8.3.4 Coordination of innovation through knowledge sharing 
Coordination of innovation may be needed to promote the technical, economic, 
political and social innovations that come from the local policymaking process.  A 
knowledge-sharing initiative may be used so that innovations can be shared between 
local regions to be diffused or scaled-up.  Knowledge sharing could also include 
areas of experimentation that have not been successful to avoid repetition.  The 
open-access platform of ARENA’s Knowledge Bank is an excellent example of 
knowledge sharing for technical innovation and could be replicated for innovation in 
other areas. The benefit of this type of coordination of knowledge is that it amplifies 
the identification of where changes to the national rules and regulations are needed, 
to allow innovation within any area of the energy system. 
8.3.5 Physical and operational coordination 
Protecting system functionality as the system evolves to include decentralisation 
requires both physical and operational coordination.   A distribution market operator 
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may be needed and could be created by changing the current network role from a 
distribution system operator to a distribution system provider or be provided by a 
new separate entity.  The new decentralised markets require coordination between 
themselves and the wholesale market.  This role could be a new, separate, 
independent market coordinator, or the responsibility of the current market operator 
(AEMO and ENA, 2019).   
The use of a decentralised market changes the flows on both of the supply networks.  
As well as a two-way flow on the distribution network, decentralisation also changes 
the flows on the transmission network as DER, through either self-generation or 
aggregation, in conjunction with other demand-side options, are able to meet local 
demand.  Changes to the way the networks are regulated may need to include 
coordination of the networks business plans to ensure that future plans recognise 
these changing flows and are incentivised to meet any future challenges.  
8.3.6 Adaptation to the future unknowns 
Within this section, I have examined how adaptive governance can be framed to 
assist in the current energy system decentralisation.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
energy system is complex, and disturbances may come from any part of the system.  
As a complex system, changes within one part of the system will invariably create 
challenges within another.  Adaptive governance increases the flexibility of the 
system by increasing the innovation capability for solving challenges created through 
change, whether these changes are positive or negative and foreseen or 
unforeseen. 
It is also not possible to predict how the energy system may need to change or 
evolve in the future. An adaptive governance framework manages a transformation 
and then allows the new desired system to be resilient, and have a high adaptive 
capacity, by adapting to changes through the benefits of increased social capital.  
Should this desired system be considered undesirable in the future, then adaptive 
governance can allow for a new system transformation by creating a new desired 
vision and allowing local regions to adapt their local policy, which is then coordinated 





One of the major lessons to be learnt from the NEM is the unpredictability of change 
and therefore, the need for flexibility and coordination within governance to gain the 
benefits that this unpredictability may bring.  The governance of the NEM needs to 
facilitate this unexpected change to protect the desired system function.  This may 
be achieved by updating the rules and regulations (AEMC, 2019d), creating new 
markets (ESB, 2019), and possibly creating new institutions (AEMO and ENA, 2019; 
Mitchell et al., 2016; Willis et al., 2019a).  New methods of regulation are also being 
discussed which incentivise the utilities to change from a business as usual scenario 
to one which allows new and innovative products and services to optimise DER in 
the NEM (ENA, 2017b).      The NEM case study shows the importance of 
coordination, both vertically and horizontally between the physical and operational 
elements, as DER is able to both cause and answer some of the challenges 
associated with a decarbonising energy system. Updating the rules and regulations, 
creating new markets for DER and for flexibility, as well as pricing reforms, may help 
to answer some of the challenges around the affordability of energy supply while still 
maintaining the reliable and secure functioning of the system. 
For NEM governance to protect the desired function of the system, the principles of 
adaptive governance suggest that the current transformation in the NEM would need 
to be managed in a positive way.  However, taking lessons learnt from the NEM, for 
adaptive governance to have this type of positive management, adaptive governance 
must include a national vision for decarbonisation, with coordination of the current 
local initiatives to meet these national decarbonisation targets and coordination 
between the physical and operational elements.  Unfortunately, due to the national 
government's support of the coal industry, a national vision for decarbonisation is 
unlikely, however AEMO’s possible introduction of a flexibility market may still enable 
some of the value of DER to be captured within the NEM. 
Following the theory for SET and the lessons learnt from the NEM, this chapter has 
suggested a general adaptive governance framework for energy systems that could 
enable decentralisation through a managed transformation and can be applied to 
similar energy systems elsewhere.  This framework would require that: 
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 Customers are at the centre of the policy and regulation process, thereby 
creating transparent and legitimate processes which increases customer trust 
and accessibility; 
 Broad national customer protections and standards are created, to allow for 
innovation under clear guidelines; 
 Local areas are empowered, to allow for local policymaking and funding to 
create areas of experimentation for innovation in the social, technical, 
economic and political parameters, including a local area plan; 
 Local areas will require coordination, this may be achieved through policy 
coordination, creating a distribution level market, creating a more adaptive 
regulation process and through knowledge sharing that will help to meet a 
national vision; 
 Further physical and operational coordination is needed between the 
decentralised and centralised assets/institutions, and that 
 coordination will only be effective if there is a national vision and target for 
decarbonisation. 
Application of this framework to other energy systems is then possible to either 
understand (i) if elements of this framework are currently being used, and if this is 
helping to enable a system transformation, (ii) if, due to the complexity of the energy 
system, governance of transforming systems are being pushed towards more 
adaptive principles as set out in the framework, or (iii) as will be demonstrated in the 
following chapter, applying the framework to suggest an adaptive governance 




9. ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR DECENTRALISATION IN GREAT BRITAIN 
The GB parliament has declared a climate emergency and the government has set a 
target of net-zero emissions by 2050 (CCC, 2019). As well as the national level, 237 
local authorities in GB (ranging from parish councils to devolved national 
governments) have also declared a climate emergency, with 67% of those setting a 
more ambitious net-zero target of 2030 (Harvey-Scholes, 2019). 
As GB moves towards a decarbonised energy system, system design and operation 
is expected to become characterised by a combination of centralised and 
decentralised facets (NIC, 2016; Ofgem, 2017a). By taking the lessons learnt from 
the NEM, in how a lack of adaptability can affect system function, the purpose of this 
chapter is to begin a discussion on how an adaptive governance could be framed 
and applied in a GB context.  
In GB, the National Grid ESO has provided possible future energy scenarios (FES) 
dependent upon the level of societal change happening within the system and how 
much change will be needed to meet net zero (National Grid ESO, 2020).  What the 
FES show is that in each of the possible scenarios put forward, technological and 
behavioural changes are needed.  Although the changes needed are able to be 
predicted, exactly when and if these will happen is not so simple to predict.  For 
example, in GB it may not be solar PV that causes challenges to the centralised 
system but electric vehicles (EV) should the cost of EV ownership fall dramatically 
(as was seen with battery storage in Australia).  An increase in EV ownership could 
cause challenges to maintaining supply for charging and to the security of the 
system pertaining to frequency and voltage.  Similar to PV in the NEM, the uptake of 
EVs could also bring solutions, such as EV charging/discharging aggregated to 
provide system services in much the same way as a VPP.  What the NEM case 
study has shown is that an encouraged change may happen at an unexpected pace 
due to outside influences, and so perhaps approaching the future energy scenarios 
with the idea of management rather than control, may be needed. 
This chapter will build on the framework suggested by the IGov2 project and 
introduce adaptive governance processes that could enable decentralisation and 
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innovation, which may be able to counter the challenges that arise due to changes 
within a complex system. This chapter will show how the adaptive governance 
framework suggested in Chapter 8 could be applied in GB to assist local 
governments to meet their decarbonisation targets.  The Chapter suggests methods 
that may help to meet decarbonisation targets through the empowerment of all local 
areas (other than those that currently have access to decentralised funding e.g. 
devolved governments) and the coordination of all local areas, including the 
devolved governments, to meet a national vision.  This chapter has been written to 
encourage a conversation around if/how adaptive governance could be practically 
applied for the inclusion of decentralisation in a centralised system.  This chapter 
brings together separate strands of current research, under the adaptive governance 
framework suggested in Chapter 8, and suggests changes that could be applied to 
current GB energy governance (illustrated in Table 9-1) to become more adaptive 
(Table 9-2, page 191), building on the research undertaken by the IGov project 
(Willis et al., 2019a). 
Table 9-1  Illustration of current GB energy system governance in comparison to the suggested adaptive 
governance framework from Table 2-1 (source: author). 
 
 
9.1 IGOV2: GETTING ENERGY GOVERNANCE RIGHT 
Adaptive Governance Principles for energy systems GB
Customers at the centre of the policymaking and 
regulation process
new customer challenge panel for 
transmission and distribution 
Empowered local policy
no; only devolved governments and 
administrations
Knowledge sharing no
Legislated net-zero target by 2050;
Clean Growth strategy
Coordination of innovation no
Coordination of local policy no
Coordination between the physical and operational 
elements (distribution, transmission, markets)
Open Networks Project; National Grid ESO
National vision and target for decarbonisation
176 
 
As mentioned Chapter 1, this thesis was funded as part of the IGov2 project which 
suggested possible governance changes needed at all levels of the GB energy 
system to meet future decarbonisation targets.  In GB, as in the NEM, the need for a 
distribution market and for changes to the way the distribution networks operate is 
being discussed (AEMO and ENA, 2019; ENA, 2017a; Mitchell, 2017).  Distribution 
networks in GB are moving towards a Distribution System Operator (DSO) model, 
which allows the DNO to become a ‘neutral market facilitator’ (ENA, 2017a) but with 
limited changes to how the networks are regulated.  IGov suggests further evolving 
this role to that of a distribution service provider (DSP), with increased performance 
based regulation with the majority of network revenue being earnt through providing 
platform services and non-wire demand side and DER services (see Mitchell and 
Poulter, 2018). IGov has also suggested a new role, an Independent Integrated 
System Operator (IISO) (Willis et al., 2019a) in GB, similar to the independent 
market coordinator suggested in Australia (AEMO and ENA, 2019), to allow for 
coordination between the decentralised and centralised physical elements of the 
energy system.   
Within GB, the importance of local, or sub-national government to meet climate goals 
has been recognised (see Duggan, 2019; Smith, 2007; Willis et al., 2019).  In 
countries which have complete centralised control over energy governance, there 
have been difficulties encouraging small-scale projects to enter the energy space 
(Webb et al., 2016).  In comparison, where local policy has been empowered, such 
as in the NEM, the uptake of DER, encouraged by local policy, has created a 
transformational decentralisation. The need for local areas to be funded to meet 
individual targets has been recognised within the IGov project, as has the 
importance of creating local area plans, to recognise the different resources that 
each local area can provide to meet whole system outcomes (Willis et al., 2019a).  
IGov also recognised the need for direction setting (Lockwood, 2018) and 
coordination (Hoggett, 2018) within the GB energy system and it has been 
suggested that an Energy Transformation Commission is needed to oversee the 
direction-setting process and to coordinate the key actors at the national level (Willis 
et al., 2019a).  Figure 9-1 sets out the local and national governance interplays, as 




Figure 9-1  IGov proposals for local and national governance 
The thesis suggests that the adaptive governance framework complements the 
research above by creating adaptive governance for decentralisation by empowering 
local government and then coordinating the local initiatives to align with the direction 
and targets as set by the national government. The following sections of this chapter 
suggest how adaptive governance in the GB context could be implemented from the 
principles as set out in Table 9-1 and by building on the IGov proposals, other 
relevant research and current energy policy. 
9.2 A NATIONAL VISION AND TARGET FOR DECARBONISATION 
In Chapter 8, an adaptive governance framework was suggested.   It stated that for 
the framework to be effective, and to ensure that local policy would not be open to 
vested interests, it would need to work towards a national vision and target for 
decarbonisation.  Currently, in the UK, the government has declared a climate 
emergency and has legislated a target for net-zero emissions by 2050 (CCC, 2019).  
In 2017, the UK Government issued a white paper on an Industrial Strategy (HM 
Government, 2017) for the UK.  The Industrial Strategy set out a vision for the future 
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productivity of the UK, which included four grand challenges to make the UK a leader 
in future industries.  One of the challenges was for British industry to benefit from 
clean growth.  Alongside the Industrial Strategy, the government released the Clean 
Growth Strategy (BEIS, 2017).  Within the Clean Growth Strategy, the government 
set out how it planned to meet the forthcoming carbon budgets, with the majority of 
investment given to decarbonising transport and power (58%). However, within the 
Clean Growth Strategy, and the current government’s election manifesto (The 
Conservative and Unionist Party, 2019), there is little mention of the benefits of DER 
and the majority of innovation funding is targeted at large-scale RE innovation, such 
as offshore wind or the use of carbon capture and storage.   
The Clean Growth Strategy may be a missed opportunity for the government to allow 
for more adaptive processes and to create a true decarbonisation agenda by setting 
sector targets i.e. electricity, heat and transport, to meet the carbon budgets that will 
allow the UK to achieve Net Zero by 2050.  Targets such as these have been 
recommended within a recent report by the National Infrastructure Commission (NIC, 
2019) which suggested that sector targets are needed to provide long term 
strategies to support investment and that these should be set through a Strategic 
Policy Statement (SPS) (see also Mitchell, 2018).  This would then enable the local 
areas to plan how they could meet these targets (see section 9.3), with regional and 
national coordination to ensure that local area plans are operating within the 
direction set by the national government (see section 9.6).  
The use of an overarching vision has been used for the New York Reforming the 
Energy Vision program (NY REV) (New York State, 2014) (see also Willis et al., 
2019).  The NY REV has created a process for energy system transformation that 
sets out a clear vision and then coordinates this vision to meet targets.  It does this 
by acknowledging that implementing the NY REV creates wider system change and 
so coordination includes the recognition of themes through various workstreams, 
such as the changing role of the customer, new metering models and new regulatory 
processes.  Regulation has moved to more output-based regulation, incentivising the 
networks to meet the REV goals.  This has also required the DNO’s to change their 
operations to include a platform that allows trade between DER owners and also 
between DER and the wholesale market (see Mitchell, 2016).  The NY REV 
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recognised that change is needed throughout energy system governance to meet 
the decarbonisation agenda.  
Broad decarbonisation targets could be set, perhaps based on the GB carbon 
budgets, to provide a clear direction for business, industry and other initiatives. The 
targets could be set by Strategic Policy Statements, as suggested by the NIC report 
(2019) and implemented by the new Energy Transformation Commission (ETC), as 
suggested by Willis et al (2019a).   The role of the new ETC could be to coordinate 
the regional and local areas through direction setting to meet the government 
targets.  This could be achieved i) by providing strategic oversight of the system 
goals as set by the SPS; (ii) through an engagement function to encourage wider 
engagement from new and established players, as well as from the wider public; and 
(iii) provide input of decarbonisation goals that require consensus-building and 
forward planning at a national level. Setting a direction in this way (Lockwood, 2018) 
could give the local areas of GB a defined end-point of where their local initiatives 
could help to achieve the wider decarbonisation objectives, without being too 
prescriptive, allowing more flexibility for local policy goals.   
 
9.3 EMPOWERED LOCAL POLICY 
Following the setting of the broad decarbonisation targets, policy could be created at 
a local level which feeds into the national targets, as set by the SPS. For example in 
GB, local could be defined as county level, as there are distinct differences between 
each of GB’s counties e.g. urban, rural, semi-rural, with each geographical type 
located in different areas of GB.  Each county then has different capacities, 
dependent on physical geography, resource, demographic and economy, on how 
they would be able to help achieve a national overall RE target (Roelich, 2018; 
Smith, 2007).  
Authors have suggested that this type of local governance for energy would benefit 
from empowerment through access to funding, enabling local councils to act on 
locally significant energy policies (Britton, 2018; Smith, 2007).  The benefits of local 
policy and having the available capital to invest in these policies can be seen in 
those countries that operate a federal system.  In both Australia and the USA, states 
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such as South Australia, Victoria, California and New York State, have achieved 
positive decarbonisation agendas, and in the case of California, has allowed the 
State a voice in the COP negotiations (Duggan, 2019).   
An example of targeted funding is the use of DER to create system benefits while 
helping to alleviate social difficulties, as was demonstrated by the South Australian 
VPP project (Government of South Australia, 2017).  The state-funded project 
targeted 1000 social housing homes to install solar and batteries, so reducing the 
cost burden of electricity supply to low income and vulnerable households, with the 
system benefit of demand response, and frequency and voltage regulation via the 
VPP.  A targeted approach, rather than a blanket subsidy or FiT scheme, has the 
advantages of (i) allowing those who would not normally be eligible for FiT or subsidy 
schemes access to DER e.g. renters, low-income families, and (ii) to fund the 
optimum solution to the decarbonisation challenge for a particular area.   
This type of targeted local funding may also be very applicable in the 
decarbonisation of heat e.g. electrification or biomass may be the best method of 
decarbonising heat for rural households, whereas, for urban areas, heat networks 
may be the more appropriate decarbonisation method.  Where the broader approach 
has been used in GB, through the Renewable Heat Incentive, difficulties arose when 
urban households installed biomass technologies creating air pollution problems (Air 
Quality Expert Group, 2017).  It is these types of considerations that would be 
highlighted within a Local Area Plan (see section 9.3.1).  This then allows local 
government to create policy, and most importantly, be able to target their funding to 
achieve the policy objectives using the optimum decarbonisation solutions for their 
region. 
9.3.1 Local area plans 
As discussed in previous chapters, creating local policy allows for greater diversity in 
the decision-making process, allowing for new and alternative ideas, processes and 
technical solutions, and the opportunity for transformative leadership (Folke et al., 
2005; Nelson et al., 2007; Westley et al., 2011).  Those areas that have similarities 
within their geographies would then be able to share and discuss their approaches.  
This could be achieved through collaboration and coordination of a local energy plan 
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(Tingey et al., 2017), or Local Transformation Plan (LTP) (Britton, 2019; Willis et al., 
2019a). Before creating local policy, each local area would need to create an energy 
plan for system transformation (which for this chapter is to be known as the Plan).  
The Plan would include how the local resources - where resources would include the 
environmental resource, plus the social resource, combined with the technical and 
economic capabilities of meeting local needs – would help to meet the national 
targets.  Before creating local policy from the Plan, the separate Plans could be 
coordinated at a regional level, which may be DNO areas or the areas currently 
covered by the newly created regional Energy Hubs (Johnson, 2019), to achieve a 
national objective and to highlight economic and technical considerations that cannot 
be captured at a local level (coordination will be discussed further in section 9.6).  
Following refinement of the Plan, local government could design local energy policy.   
 
9.4 CUSTOMERS AT THE CENTRE OF THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS 
Following lessons from empirical studies of adaptive governance, creating policy that 
is accepted and trusted by the local community, needs to involve the community 
within the initial planning process (Engle and Lemos, 2010; Firestone et al., 2020; 
Schultz et al., 2015).  Within the central government, a Citizens Assembly (CA) was 
used to discuss the future of Adult Social Care (UK Parliament, 2018).  This 
Assembly included representation from a mixed demographic of UK citizens, advised 
by expert leads from academia and NGOs who had impartial expertise in the subject 
area.  Although deemed as a successful collaboration, there has yet to be any 
finalised report from the UK government, and therefore if any of the 
recommendations from the CA have been acted upon (OPSI, 2019).  A similar 
assembly is also currently being established for climate change mitigation (UK 
Parliament, 2019).  A similarly structured advisory group could be created to ensure 
transparent and legitimate policymaking process (Folke et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 
2016; Nelson et al., 2007; Shove and Walker, 2007) for local policy.  The CA, 
through their varied expertise, could make recommendations for the final policy 
briefing that enables the Plan, and that also gives wider societal and economic 
benefits to the local area.    
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9.5 CUSTOMERS AT THE CENTRE OF THE REGULATION PROCESS 
It is anticipated that meeting national targets for decarbonisation needs both 
centralised and decentralised electricity generation (National Grid, 2018; NIC, 2016).  
Electrification of heating and vehicles is also expected to increase as a method of 
reducing sector emissions (National Grid, 2019).  The use of other demand-side 
initiatives to decrease energy use and meet increased demand also needs to be 
encouraged.  This changes the use of the electricity distribution networks, and the 
role of the network operator, and will require networks to work closely with the local 
policymakers to enable local decarbonisation plans.  As has happened in New York 
as part of the REV process, and also recommended in the recent National 
Infrastructure Commission (NIC) report (NIC, 2019), and within the IGov project 
(Willis et al., 2019b), meeting a net-zero target requires a review of how electricity 
distribution networks are regulated. 
In Chapter 8, it was suggested that for networks to be more adaptive a new 
approach would be needed to assess future revenue determinations.  Section 8.3.4 
recommended a process similar to that being trialled in Victoria (AER, 2018b), where 
network business plans are constructed through a rigorous customer focussed 
process using a customer forum, such as the Citizens Assembly, as recommended 
in the previous section.  Also, in the previous section, it was discussed that a local 
Plan would need to be formulated that would include short-, medium- and long-term 
propositions for reducing emissions.   
Currently, in GB, the DNOs price control periods are set over eight years.  However, 
for the next distribution price control (RIIO2 ED2), which begins in 2023, the price 
control period is reduced to 5 years.  If the local Plan was set over the same five-
year periods i.e. what can be achieved now and in the next five years, out to ten 
years and then fifteen, this would allow policy and regulation to be aligned.  Aligning 
area Plans and network price controls could enable the DNOs to structure current 
and future investments in conjunction with the local area plans, while advising on 
how local plans are able to fit within the current regulations and codes (this also 
highlights which aspects of regulation and the electricity codes may need to be 
reviewed to enable a positive innovation, which could be part of the regional 
coordinator's remit (see section 9.8)).  It would then be possible for the network 
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business plans to show the investments needed to meet the local requirements.  The 
network business plan would be focussed on the needs of the local customer and 
able to show future investment possibilities for relevant businesses, whilst having 
undergone pre-determination scrutiny through the local advisory group. 
The NIC report – Strategic Investment and Public Confidence (NIC, 2019), 
highlighted areas within Ofgem’s duties they felt needed to change to meet the 2050 
net-zero target.  These included: 
1. Ensuring decisions are consistent with, and promote, the net-zero target. 
2. Regulators take regard of devolved administrations strategic vision, and that 
advisory committees should be put in place to ensure this. 
3. Regulators should require companies to demonstrate that they have taken 
regard of the strategic visions set out by the metro mayors and local 
governments. 
4. Legislation should be introduced to remove barriers to the use of competition 
to provide network enhancements, and that regulators should be able to carry 
out competitive tenders. 
Creating a business plan and price control process, in conjunction with local 
government Plans and policy and under the direction of a local advisory group, may 
allow coordination of network investment to meet the net-zero target.  As networks 
would have worked closely with local government and independent customer 
advisory groups, it could be assumed that network business plans have taken into 
account points 1-3.  As networks would also be involved in short-, mid- and long-
term planning, their investment strategies would highlight areas for present and 
future investment.  This then ties in to point 4, as each local area would have 
highlighted the network enhancements needed to meet local area decarbonisation 
objectives, so these could be put to tender in a timely manner should the relevant 
legislation be introduced.  
Currently, customer input to network business plans is incentivised through a small 
incentive as part of the Broad Measure of Customer Satisfaction (BMCS) (Ofgem, 
2017b; Poulter, 2017). An incentive of a maximum of 0.5% of the DNO base revenue 
may be given should the regulator consider that the DNO has shown increased 
engagement with their customers during the business plan process.  However, there 
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is no risk of penalty if the DNO chooses not to engage. Although this does somewhat 
incentivise the networks to engage more with their customers, as there are no 
penalties for those networks who choose not to engage, the approach seems more 
of a box-ticking exercise rather than a formal planning approach as recommended 
above. 
In the RIIO2 ED2  price control, to start in 2023, the use of a customer challenge 
panel has been agreed (Ofgem, 2019a).  The panel is to be set up by the DNO, with 
the DNO having the choice of the panel representing its license area or by region.  
Rather than the panel having oversight of the entire business plan process, and 
coordinating between local areas and the networks as suggested above, the panel in 
RIIO2 is only used as a pre-assessment panel of the business plans once they are 
nearing completion (Ofgem, 2019b).  Although this is an improvement on current 
price controls, it still does not actively seek meaningful customer input during the 
entire business plan process.  In this case, rather than the RIIO2 customer challenge 
panel, the use of a local advisory group and the networks working in conjunction with 
local government and county Plans would be prudent, providing more customer 
focussed business plans, and introducing increased transparency and legitimacy to 
the business plan process.   
Using a local advisory group could also reduce the burden on both the customer 
challenge panel and the regulator to have complete oversight of points 1-4 as these 
points should have been addressed through the business plan process.  The role of 
the regulator could then be to coordinate the networks to meet outcomes based on 
the national vision, as set by the ETC, with the outcomes set over the same short-, 
medium- and long-term timeframes as the local Plans and network price controls.  
Regulation could then become more ‘outcome’ based, similar to that as 
recommended by the NY REV (Mitchell, 2020), with the networks incentivised to use 
innovative measures to meet the outcomes as set by the regulator.  The regulator 
sets an endpoint, and it is then up to the networks to arrive at this endpoint through 
the most efficient and innovative means, operating within the boundaries set by the 
regulator and within the electricity codes, while meeting the needs of the local Plans 
and national vision. This type of regulation could increase the adaptiveness of the 
networks through less prescriptive regulatory controls, and the adaptiveness of 
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regulation itself as outcomes can be managed should there be unexpected events, 
such as rapid technological advancements or the need to intensify the 
decarbonisation agenda. 
As recommended by IGov ((Willis et al., 2019b), Ofgem’s role could change to that of 
purely economic regulation of the networks, with its code management role being 
taken by the new IISO (see section 9.8.2).  Ofgem’s new role as economic regulator 
would be to ensure that network business plans work to the outcomes set within the 
price controls, with the outcomes based upon the strategy set by the ETC from the 
government’s Strategic Policy Statement. 
 
9.6 COORDINATION OF LOCAL POLICY  
A British government policy brief recently noted that ‘Subnational government 
bodies, financial institutions, NGOs and multinational firms all possess influence over 
energy policy, and their own objectives and agendas may not necessarily align with 
one another or with central governments.’ (POST, 2019 pp.36).  In the Paris Climate 
Conference in 2015, the Talanoa Dialogue recognised that a broader range of actors 
was required, but methods would be needed to answer the complex challenges that 
would arise from including this broader range of viewpoints (Duggan, 2019).  What 
both of these statements suggest, and what can be seen from the NEM case study, 
is that empowerment of local actors and governments can be beneficial to 
decarbonisation, but without coordination leaves the policy process open to influence 
from vested interests, and may also create a ‘messy’ pool of innovation that lacks 
commonalities, or indeed works against each other, rather than being coordinated to 
meet a desired end goal (Krog and Sperling, 2019; Sperling et al., 2011).  Ensuring 
that local empowerment does not become ‘out of control’, or open to excessive 
influence from the wrong direction, the coordination element will be vital to ensure 
that local policy continues to follow the direction set from the national government. 
Section 9.1 discussed that national coordination was needed to set energy system 
targets and that this could be the remit of the ETC as suggested by Willis et al 
(2019a).   In section 9.3, the need for a local area plan to create policy objectives 
was discussed and it was suggested that the local plan would need to be 
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coordinated at a regional level to meet a national agenda.  Recently in England, 
regional Energy Hubs have been established.  These Hubs cover the Midlands, 
North East, Yorkshire and Humber, North West, South East and South West regions 
of England.  Energy for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is the responsibility of 
the devolved administrations.  The remit for the Energy Hubs is to provide funding for 
large projects that deliver a public good, e.g. decarbonisation, wellbeing, and that will 
be profitable and can be replicated in other Hub areas.  Projects are expected to 
complement the areas identified within the Clean Growth Strategy and Industrial 
Strategy and to support the local authority strategies.  Omitted from the Energy 
Hub’s remit is a coordinating role around these local authority strategies (Johnson, 
2019).  
The need for coordination has been recognised in research relating to the practical 
applications of local government RE strategies (Beermann and Tews, 2017; Krog 
and Sperling, 2019; Sperling et al., 2011).  In Krog and Sperling (2019) and Sperling 
(2011), a lack of coordination between Denmark’s municipalities was seen as 
suboptimal and led to stakeholders working independently, and sometimes against 
each other, rather than towards a common goal.  A need for regional coordination 
was also recognised in Germany, where local initiatives overlapped between federal 
districts (Beermann and Tews, 2017) causing conflict within the social and 
environmental parameters.  A lack of coordination between the supply and demand 
requirements of the regional areas also caused a lack of optimisation of the physical 
energy system structure (ibid.).   The research undertaken in the NEM case study 
also showed that a lack of coordination led to vested interests in some of the NEM 
States influencing State government’s decarbonisation targets and RE Policy (see 
section 6.5). 
Research suggests that locally-based institutions may be in a better position to 
recognise the resources available and required at a local level (Roelich, 2018; Smith, 
2007), but coordination of these resources will be needed to ensure that these 
initiatives do not lead to ‘inefficient policy outcomes’ (POST, 2019 pp.36).  In 
countries such as Denmark and Germany, and also from the results of the State 
RETs in the NEM, research suggests that regional coordination would need to take 
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into account environmental, political, social and technical and economic 
considerations when organising local initiatives to meet a common goal. 
This section argues that regional coordination of local plans is needed and that this 
could be the responsibility of the Energy Hubs.  Energy Hubs are currently being 
used to identify and fund large local energy projects.  In section 9.3, it is suggested 
that funding of local energy projects – of whatever size - could be the responsibility 
of local government.  A preferred use of the Energy Hubs would be to act as regional 
coordinators of the empowered local governments.  Regional coordination would 
consist of (i) assessment of local Plans to ensure that they meet national 
decarbonisation criteria and as an interface between the regional areas to identify 
challenges, such as possible overlaps/conflicts between local areas, and (ii) as a 
Knowledge Hub, where initiatives from the local Plans could be stored in an open 
access database. 
9.7 COORDINATION OF INNOVATION AND KNOWLEDGE  
For governance to be adaptive, SET authors recognised the need for policy to be 
treated as a hypothesis, with the initiatives coming from the policy to be thought of as 
experimentation, thereby increasing learning (Folke et al., 2005; Nelson et al., 2008; 
Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007).  Within public policy literature, knowledge sharing has also 
been acknowledged as critical in moving to a decarbonised energy system 
(Kuzemko and Britton, 2020). In the NEM, ARENA’s Knowledge Hub was able to 
bring together a portfolio of separate trials, or ‘experiments’, aimed at improving the 
reliability and affordability of rural householders and communities.  The results of the 
fringe of grid (FOG) projects improved the reliability and affordability of electricity in 
remote areas by using renewable electricity and storage technologies (Ekistica, 
2018).  Creating a portfolio of separate trials enabled the faster identification of the 
rule changes needed to replicate the projects as part of standard operating 
procedures (AEMC, 2019f). 
It would be recommended that the regional coordinators operate a central, open-
access knowledge hub, similar to that of ARENAs.  During the Plan assessment, the 
knowledge hub would allow all the regions and counties to share the initiatives from 
their regions, and like the FOG project, enable faster identification of where possible 
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changes to rules or regulations may be needed.  Following the finalisation of the 
Plans and policy enactment, it would then be possible to share completed trials and 
policy initiatives, including recommendations for improvements.  The knowledge hub 
could include the intention, outcome, and learning from the initiatives, allowing other 
similar regions to replicate successful initiatives, or to avoid repetition of mistakes, so 
creating an area to assimilate ‘experimentation’. 
9.8 COORDINATION OF THE PHYSICAL AND OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS 
Including decentralisation into a system that has been optimised for centralisation 
will require coordination between the decentralised and centralised assets to ensure 
that the entire energy system remains secure and reliable.  This requires 
assessments of expected changes to the current energy flows on the networks and 
new methods of coordinating between distributed and wholesale generation. 
9.8.1 Networks 
In section 9.5, a method of adaptive regulation was discussed.  It was suggested that 
as a requirement for the RIIO price control, the DNOs could work with the county 
councils to identify physical infrastructure requirements of meeting the plans.   The 
DNOs have oversight of the counties within their licence areas, which could enable 
coordination of the physical system plans between counties, highlighting wider 
infrastructure considerations due to the expected changes to energy flows on the 
distribution networks. 
Increased use of the distribution networks, through an increase of DER installation 
and other electrification proposals, would invariably lead to changes to the flows on 
the transmission network, as is currently happening in South Australia.  It could be 
expected that transmission may have periods of zero or negative flows on their 
networks.  In this case, there would need to be continued coordination between the 
two networks to ensure reliability and security, which would be the role of the 
national regulator.  As each of the local authorities has made a 5-, 10- and 15-year 
plan, so the DNOs could also make complementary plans.  This would allow the 
regulator to assess the current and future changes expected within the distributed 
area, and so be able to design distribution and transmission regulatory outcomes 




Research, and the case study of the NEM, has shown that for decentralisation to 
benefit all customers, a distribution level market is needed, and requiring the 
changing role of the consumer to a prosumer (AEMO and ENA, 2019; Mitchell et al., 
2016).  There are currently discussions on the role of the DNO changing to that of a 
Distribution Service Provider (DSP) (ENA, 2017a; Willis et al., 2019a).  The DSP 
could act a market facilitator by coordinating local supply and demand through 
balancing services, such as flexibility markets and demand response.   
This would also require coordination between the distribution level markets and the 
current wholesale market.  The IGov project suggests that this role should be taken 
by a new institution, an Integrated Independent System Operator (IISO) (Willis et al., 
2019a).  The IISO could coordinate the wholesale and distributed markets to act in 
accordance with the direction as set by the new ETC, ensuring compliance with 
decarbonisation objectives. 
 
9.9 POLICY AS AN ITERATIVE PROCESS 
Following the recommendations as set out in this chapter, and the new institutions 
and new roles for existing institutions as recommended by IGov (Willis et al., 2019b), 
iteration is achieved at the national level by the ETC acting as a conduit between the 
national and local governance institutions.  The national targets, as set by the 
government’s SPS, are advised by the ETC.  The ETC gains information on how 
targets are being met, and the challenges that have arisen, through communication 
with the Energy Hubs.  The ETC is then able to advise the relevant centralised 
institutions to evolving situations, such as changes required to the codes or 
consumer protections, or if local funding may need to be increased or can be 
reduced.  The information received from the ETC could then inform the future SPS. 
The ETC could also receive and inform market direction through the IISO, and for 
energy supply through Ofgem. 
At a local level, the mid- and long-term strategies of the Plan should be open to 
modification to allow for future changes, such as changes to national targets through 
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the SPS or unexpected events.  The channels of communication in the local areas, 
established in the creation of the Plan and from the CA, could be continued, allowing 
for continual feedback of the local policy outcomes, with changes to be made to local 
policy as required.  Should local policy not have the desired outcome, lessons can 
be learnt and shared through the regional Knowledge Hub.  Sharing of knowledge in 
this way may allow solutions to policy problems to be suggested, with local policy 
then altered to achieve the desired outcome. As policy is enacted in smaller areas, 
this iterative approach may enable policy to be nimbler in reacting to expected and 
unexpected outcomes and change.  Iteration at this local level could also reduce the 
risks associated with policy failure as economic and political damage would be 
limited. 
Iterative policy could be achieved by combining top-down and bottom-up processes 
through coordination of the local, regional and national levels, by using regional and 
national institutions to achieve this coordination.  Iteration may be achieved through 
national targets setting the local policy direction, which allows for experimentation at 
the local level, with the results from the local policy experiments helping to inform 
future strategies. 
 
9.10   CONCLUSION 
This chapter has suggested how a framework for adaptive governance could be 
applied within the GB energy system.  The framework is designed to allow for the 
inclusion of decentralisation while protecting the functionality of the system, based 
on lessons learnt from the NEM case study.  Should GB wish to move to a system 
that incorporates both centralised and decentralised facets, then to enable 
decentralisation, adaptive governance could be considered.  To manage the 
transformational change that decentralisation requires, the adaptive governance 
processes suggested in this thesis need an institution, such as the ETC, to 
coordinate the various government departments to meet the decarbonisation targets 
(see Willis et al., 2019b) as set by the vision laid out in the Governments Strategic 
Policy Statements (SPS).  Local authorities could create a Plan on how local areas 
could help to meet these targets and be empowered to create and enact local policy, 
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allowing for local experimentation.  The Plans could be assessed and coordinated by 
the Regional Energy Hubs, with initiatives from the Plans shared through the use of 
a Knowledge Hub.  The information collated at the Energy Hubs could advise the 
ETC on possible future strategies, which could, in turn, inform the SPS (These 
changes are summarised in Table 9-2).   
Table 9-2  Summary of the changes to GB governance to create more adaptive processes which may aid in 




10.   CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has suggested how an adaptive governance framework for energy 
system decentralisation, through a case study of the National Electricity Market in 
Australia, could be practically applied in Great Britain.  Although SET theory for 
energy has been considered as a promising avenue for further research (Goldthau, 
2014), this has been limited and there has been no case study analysis of its use for 
energy.  This thesis builds on the current SET theory and its practical application for 
water and food systems by suggesting that the principles of SET could also be 
applied to enable energy system decentralisation.  
An adaptive governance framework from SET theory was chosen due to the 
similarities in the behaviours of social-ecological systems and the current energy 
system.  Comparable to the current energy system, social-ecological systems, such 
as water and agriculture, are essential and complex systems, and solutions to issues 
for their sustainability can be solved through the use of local resources.  SET theory 
acknowledges the complexities of these systems and recognises the need for a 
system to transform should the current system be resilient to a desirable change, 
through lack of adaptability or ‘lock-in’.  SET theory, perhaps more than STT, 
recognises the complex interactions between the social, ecological, technical, 
political and economic parameters and the importance of coordination between 
these parameters to meet a particular vision.  SET also recognises the value of local 
resource and of time as a limiting factor.  SET proposes principles for the application 
of adaptive governance: 
 an increase in social capital  
 to use policy as hypothesis  
 have transformative leadership and empowerment of social actors, and  
 to create an institutional infrastructure for the coordination of research, social 
capital and multilevel rules across all levels of governance.   
 
To assess if NEM governance was adaptive, or applied any of the principles above, 
research questions were designed to investigate the rapid uptake of DER, the history 
and present governance of the NEM, and the challenges associated with the rapid 
transformation that was currently taking place.  Results from the research questions 
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were achieved, through primary and secondary research, by assessing how the 
disturbance of DER was received, and managed, by the incumbent industry and 
institutions within NEM governance.  The results of the case study were then used to 
provide recommendations for an adaptive governance framework, based on SET 
theory, for transformation of the electricity system and applications for the GB 
electricity system.  
The NEM was chosen as a case study due to the rapid increase in DER.  In 2008, 
the NEM States initiated a FiT policy that hoped to see 15MW of solar PV installed.  
However, a combination of unexpected synergistic events meant that the adoption 
rates were far higher than anticipated, and by 2019 over 25% of all Australian 
households had installed a PV system, with a growing percentage of these also 
including battery storage.  Owning a PV and storage system in the NEM has now 
reached grid parity in some States.  Although this can be seen as a success, in that 
the NEM far surpassed the original intention of their policies for small-scale PV, the 
unexpected rapid uptake within the distributed area has caused challenges within the 
technical, economic, social and political parameters within the NEM.   
A review of the history of Australia’s energy system and the reforms that have 
happened within the NEM, showed that energy systems are in a state of constant 
evolution and so the governance surrounding the system needs to reflect this.  The 
research highlighted that the current transformation in the NEM, to a more 
decentralised system, is happening more rapidly than previous transitions and 
suggested that an adaptive governance approach may be more applicable to allow 
for this rapid change. 
Following an unexpected climatic event, which caused a blackout of the SA 
electricity grid, the Finkel review was initiated.  The results of the review recognised 
the benefits of decentralisation and made recommendations to the future energy 
security and reliability of the NEM.  However, although 49 out the 50 
recommendations were approved, the CET was refused and currently, Australia has 
no national emissions or RE policy past 2020.  This lack of national RE policy has 
limited the power of the Finkel recommendations, as now the recommendations may 
be initiated at any time.  Although the Finkel review contains a vision for 
decarbonisation and decentralisation, there is a lack of urgency as to when this 
vision should be implemented. 
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The reluctance of the federal government to introduce an emissions target can be 
understood due to Australia’s relationship with the coal industry.  Coal has played an 
important role at both the national and State level in the growth of Australia’s 
economy.  Yet, environmental concerns, the changing resources for electricity 
generation, and the climate and energy policies of Australia’s export markets, has 
created an uncertain future for coal in Australia.  This uncertainty has created 
disagreement between the right and centrist political parties regarding their support 
of the coal industry, and the need to reduce Australia’s emissions.  However, despite 
the vested and incumbent interests of the coal industry in the energy system and its 
governance, the federal system of government has allowed some States to create 
renewable energy targets, counter to the national government’s position.  The ability 
to create, and fund, state RE policy has assisted in the rapid growth of DER in some 
States, starting a rapid, customer-led, transformation of the NEM. 
The use of a singular case study allowed an in depth analysis of adaptive 
governance principles in an area where transformative change was happening.  
What the results of the NEM case study have shown is the unpredictability of energy 
system change.  The customer-led transformation, caused by the economics of 
falling technology costs, combined with high prices and a distrust of the energy 
industry, led to system governance having to be increasingly reactive to the 
unexpected challenges that occurred.  The case study also highlighted the need for 
coordination between both the decentralised and centralised physical and 
operational system and also between State and national policy, which may have 
alleviated some of the challenges that have, and are, occurring. Maintaining the 
functionality of a rapidly changing energy system requires governance to keep pace 
with the transformation that is taking place, by creating governance that is flexible, or 
adaptive, to enable decentralisation. 
This thesis has presented an adaptive governance framework that may enable 
decarbonisation while reducing the negative effects of challenges caused by the 
complex interactions that are part of energy system transformation. As the majority 
of change is expected at the electricity distribution level, the framework suggested 
supports the decentralisation of the electricity system by suggesting the need for 
complementary decentralised energy policy processes, regulation and decision 
making.  The recommended adaptive governance framework works with the 
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governance framework suggested by the IGov project (Willis et al., 2019a), and 
shows how the framework would interact with the new national institutions as 
recommended by IGov. 
Following the theory for SET and the lessons learnt from the NEM, this suggests that 
to enable decentralisation through a managed transformation process, adaptive 
governance for energy decentralisation should: 
 Follow a national vision and target for decarbonisation 
 Ensure that customers are at the centre of the policy and regulation process, 
thereby creating transparent and legitimate processes which increase 
customer trust and accessibility; 
 Create broad national customer protections and standards, to allow for 
innovation under clear guidelines; 
 Empower local areas, to allow for local policymaking and funding to create 
areas of experimentation for innovation in the social, technical, economic and 
political parameters, including a local area plan; 
 Coordinate the local areas, through policy coordination, creating a distribution 
level market, and through new methods of regulation and knowledge sharing, 
that will help to meet a national vision 
 Coordinate the physical and operational elements of decentralised and 
centralised facets 
Applying this framework to GB energy governance, and incorporating the 
recommendations from the IGov project, creating adaptive governance to assist GB 
in meeting the net-zero target, then:  
 an institution, such as the ETC, could coordinate targets as set by the 
government’s Strategic Policy Statements (SPS)   
 local government should be empowered to create and enact local policy  
 local government could create a Plan on how local areas would help to meet 
national targets 
 distribution networks could work with the local governments to enable the 
Plans, through a new adaptive regulation process   
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 the Plans could be assessed and coordinated by the Regional Energy Hubs, 
with initiatives from the Plans shared through the use of a Knowledge Hub 
 the information collated at the Energy Hubs could advise the ETC on possible 
future strategies, which could, in turn, inform the SPS.   
Creating an adaptive governance framework in this way could enable flexibility within 
energy system governance, to react to the challenges of decarbonisation, wherever 
they may occur.  This is achieved by increasing innovation capability through an 
increase in social capital, which is coordinated to meet a national vision.   
For governance to be adaptive the case study also highlights how all aspects of the 
proposed framework are equally important. For example, having empowered local 
policy can cause challenges if not complemented by a national vision and 
coordination, suggesting that it may be difficult to achieve adaptive governance in 
areas that are seeing an increase in DER but where national government do not 
support decarbonisation.  Equally, where there is positive decarbonisation policy 
from national government but not empowered local policy and no coordination of 
DER, it may be that system decarbonisation may not be as equitable as it could be 
or that uncoordinated decentralised projects cause challenges to the centralised grid.   
This need for all aspects of adaptive governance to be in place suggests that 
achieving functional adaptive governance may be difficult. Acknowledging the 
limitations of a singular case study, to further assess the suggested practical 
application, and to understand the significance of social capital, vision and 
coordination to achieve a fully adaptive governance process, it is recommended that 
further empirical research is undertaken to apply the adaptive governance framework 
to other transforming energy systems.  This would enable further understanding of 
how adaptive governance principles may be framed in an energy context and the 
benefit of this to rapid system transformation.    
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11. APPENDIX I 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
 
 
ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE FOR ENERGY SYSTEM DECENTRALISATION: A CASE 
STUDY OF THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET IN EASTERN AUSTRALIA 
 
Please initial each box 
 
If you are happy to participate in the research, please initial each box as appropriate (leave 
blank any box for which you prefer not to give consent) and then sign this form at the end: 
 
 
1. The researcher has given me my own copy of the Participant 
Information Sheet, and I have had the opportunity to read and 
consider the information. 
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